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FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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
Review of Current Military Literature

U.S.
THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas *Library*

The object of this publication, is a review of current military literature, by cataloging articles of professional interest, in selected military and naval periodicals, in the domestic and foreign field. Articles from foreign language periodicals have translations of title and brief digests of contents. Material of particular importance is covered by a more detailed translation in "Translations of Foreign Language Articles."

The Section of "Book Reviews" contains reviews of the outstanding books, recently accessioned, which are of technical and professional interest.

December 1931
Second Quarter



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
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THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL PRESS

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Part I
PERIODICAL LITERATURE

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A—Foreign Language Periodicals
B—English Language Periodicals
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D—Foreign Language Book Reviews
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Section 1
DIRECTORY TO CATALOG
of
Periodical Articles

General.—Included in this directory are only those periodicals from which articles have been selected.

Arrangement.—Periodicals are arranged in two categories: (1) Military and Naval; (2) General.

An index number precedes the title of each periodical.

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Section 2

CATALOG OF SELECTED PERIODICAL ARTICLES

This section catalogs the articles selected from Library periodicals for the current quarter. To locate a particular periodical, consult the Directory (page 7). Periodicals in this Catalog are arranged in the order followed in the Directory.

1—ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL

28 November 1931

- (1) PRESS HOLDS LEAGUE SECRETARIAT TO BLAME IN SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION
- (2) ARMY PROMOTION SITUATION

19 December 1931

- (3) PROPOSE NEW DEPARTMENT (NATIONAL DEFENSE)

26 December 1931

- (4) ADJUTANT GENERAL'S REPORT
- (5) NEW STEEL FOR WARSHIPS
- (6) RECENT ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT DEVELOPMENTS

2—ARMY AND NAVY REGISTER

19 December 1931

- (1) REDUCTION OF SERVICE PAY

26 December 1931

- (2) MILITARY AMMUNITION DEVELOPMENTS
- (3) MECHANIZED CAVALRY REGIMENT

4—ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE GAZETTE (Great Britain)

24 September 1931

- (1) THE WAR ON THE PLAIN. Maneuvers of the British Royal Tank Corps, 1st Brigade. A feature was an exhibition of tank brigade drill, in which a series of formation was controlled by wireless or flag signals. The formations and movements of the brigade changed as easily as do those of a fleet at sea. Captain Liddell Hart stated "the fact of supreme significance is that a tank brigade is the only formation that can, in the strict sense, be controlled and maneuvered on a modern battlefield."

1 October 1931

- (2) "AT G.H.Q." A review of General Charteris' recent book, which covers the activities of Marshal Douglas Haig, at British G.H.Q., through all the vicissitudes of war. The comment on prominent contemporaries are significant, as Joffre, Wilson, Repington, Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, etc.

15 October 1931

- (3) YORKTOWN, 1781. The birth of a nation. Captain Laws

22 October 1931

- (4) A CENTURY OF TACTICS. Mollwitz to the Crimea. Major Redway
- (5) THE SWISS ARMY TO-DAY

5 November 1931

- (6) GEOGRAPHY AND STRATEGY. Major Redway. This is an interesting study of the strategic features of the defense of the British Empire, in which the influence of geographical features on strategy is cleverly traced.

- (7) Infantry organisation: Rumor and experiment

19 November 1931

- (8) CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831
- (9) THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS
- (10) REORGANISATION OF THE ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES

26 November 1931

- (11) MANCHURIA AND THE SINO-JAPAN QUARREL. Brigadier-General Bruce
- (12) THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE

3 December 1931

- (13) THE BIG BULLET. Major Blacker

10 December 1931

- (14) A REFORM AND A SAVING. Unity in medical services
- (15) A NEW SEARCHLIGHT SYSTEM.
- (16) THE MANCHURIAN DISPUTE.

17 December 1931

- (17) SOME MUSINGS ON MECHANISATION. How mobility may affect supply. Captain Shaw
- (18) THE MANCHURIAN PROBLEM.

5—FIGHTING FORCES (Great Britain)

July 1931

- (1) WHY PROD? Major-General Fuller. (General Fuller's article contends that the role of the infantry, as the spear-head of the attack, must come to an end, in view of the fire effect of modern small arms. He foresees armored fighting vehicles and machine gunners as principal actors.)
- (2) BRITISH SHIPS AND THE MENACE FROM THE AIR. Lieutenant-Commander Butt
- (3) THE TIME AND SPACE PROBLEM OF A FLANK GUARD. Major Thomas
- (4) THE BRITISH AT BUENOS AYRES, 1806-7. Captain Laws

October 1931

- (5) FUEL AND THE FIGHTING FORCES. Captain Bernard
- (6) THE BATTLE OF ROSSIGNOL. Major Burne
- (7) THE FIFTH ARMY. The Editor
- (8) THE ARMY OF THE SOVIET. "Nomad"

6—JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION (Great Britain)

August 1931

- (1) THE HIGHER STUDY OF WAR IN THE ARMY. Major-General Gwynn
- (2) ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON CONTINENTAL VICTORIES. Captain Liddell Hart
- (3) THE SUBMARINE IN FUTURE WARFARE: A GERMAN VIEW. Captain Thomson
- (4) MILITARY UMPIRING. Colonel Harvey

- (5) THE FUTURE OF AEROPLANE DESIGN FOR THE SERVICES. Faircy
- (6) MECHANICAL MOBILITY. Major Bagnold
- (7) NIGHT ATTACK ON HARBOURS. Commander Moore
- (8) MISSILE AND ASSAULT WEAPONS. Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray

November 1931

- (9) THE MERCHANT NAVY IN WAR. Commander Norman-Jones
- (10) ARMY TRAINING, 1931. Major-General Gwynn
- (11) BRITISH AND FOREIGN AIR EXERCISES OF 1931. Major Turner
- (12) THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF AIR FORCES. Squadron-Leader Andrews
- (13) THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE FIGHTING SERVICES. Squadron-Leader Slesmor
- (14) THE LAND AND AIR DEFENCE FORCES OF AUSTRALIA. Major-General Bruche
- (15) SOME THOUGHTS ON NAVAL TACTICS. "Phormio"
- (16) THE ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS. Colonel Badcock
- (17) THE UTILITY OF THE TANK. Brevet-Major Ross
- (18) METEOROLOGY AND AIR NAVIGATION. Lieutenant-Commander Josselyn
- (19) AN AMPHIBIOUS TANK
- (20) THE SUPPLY OF OFFICERS FOR THE ARMY. Captain Dean
- (21) ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT SINCE 1918. Steed

7—JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA (Great Britain—India)

July 1931

- (1) OPERATIONS ON THE KHAJURI AND AKA KHEL PLAINS, 1930-31. Major Toovey
- (2) THE SOLDIER STATESMAN. Captain Pemberton
- (3) THE DEFENCE OF PORTS. (I) By "Madeira"
- (4) A CHEAP METHOD OF PROVIDING MORE FIRE POWER. Lieutenant-Colonel Chaldecott
- (5) HOW TROOPER GRISDALL, TENTH HUSSARS, SAVED ENGLAND AND EUROPE. Colonel Kearsley
- (6) MACHINE GUN CONCENTRATIONS, TO BE OR NOT TO BE?—AN ASPECT. Major Strahan
- (7) THE CAWNPORE RIOTS. Major Lowe
- (8) CONCERNING FIGHTING ON THE N.E. FRONTIER

October 1931

- (9) THE DEFENCE OF PORTS. (II) By "Madeira"
- (10) MY MANX CAMEL CORPS. Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd
- (11) CLOSE SUPPORT OF INFANTRY—AN INFANTRY OFFICER'S POINT OF VIEW. Captain Kennelly

11—ARMY QUARTERLY (Great Britain)

October 1931

- (1) THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE OF THE 18TH OF JULY, 1918. (With map)
- (2) THE LEGEND OF THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. (With Map) Captain Sheppard
- (3) JOFFRE AT THE MARNE, 1914.
- (4) THE ROYAL AIR FORCE EXERCISES OF 1931. Major Stewart
- (5) DEFENCE AGAINST TANKS. (Review of: "Der Kampf gegen Tanks," by Major Borchert, German Army)

12—BOLETIN DEL EJERCITO (Cuba)

By MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

May-June 1931

- (1) LA INVASIÓN DE LAS VILLAS EN 1875 Y MÁXIMO GÓMEZ. [The invasion of de las

Villas in 1875 and Maximó Gomez.] Historical study of early revolutionary campaigns, in 1875, in Cuba. The forerunner of the more serious disturbances which led to the Spanish-American War. Contains typical incidents of guerrilla warfare and character; sketches of guerrilla leaders of the period.

- (2) EPISTOLARIO DE LA REVOLUCION DE 1895. [The Revolution of 1895.] (I) Narrative account of the guerrilla warfare incident to the uprising of 1895 directed toward the overthrow of the Spanish government.

July-August 1931

- (3) INFORME SOBRE EL EJÉRCITO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTE-AMÉRICA. [The Army of the United States.] Report of the Military Attaché of Spain, in Washington, Captain Plannell.
- (4) REGLAMENTO PROVISIONAL DE MANIOBRA DE INFANTERÍA. [Provisional field service regulations (infantry).]
- (5) EPISTOLARIO DE LA REVOLUCION DE 1895. [The Revolution of 1895.] (II) (Continued from previous number)

September-October 1931

- (6) EPISTOLARIO DE LA REVOLUCION DE 1895. [The Revolution of 1895.] (III) (Continued from previous number)
- (7) DIVULGACION MILITAR, CUBA. [Precedence and equivalent rank, Cuban Army and Navy.]
- (8) DE LA GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA. DECRETOS Y RESOLUCIONES EN RELACION CON EL EJÉRCITO. [Decrees and resolutions affecting the Army.]

14—CANADIAN DEFENCE QUARTERLY (Canada)

July 1931

- (1) EDUCATION AND THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA. Bridger
- (2) THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SITUATION
- (3) THE MEANING OF RECENT CONFERENCES ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS. Commodore Hose
- (4) CANADIANS IN "DUNSTERFORCE." (I) Captain Murray
- (5) EXPERIENCES OF A MECHANIZED CAVALRYMAN. Lieutenant-Colonel Charrington
- (6) WORLD ECONOMIC DEPRESSION AND THE WAR DEBTS. Burton
- (7) WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY IN THE CANADIAN CORPS IN FRANCE. (I) Lieutenant-Colonel Steel
- (8) THE BLACK WATCH (ROYAL HIGHLANDERS) OF CANADA. Major Hutchinson and Lieutenant-Colonel Mills
- (9) A BRIEF REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES. Major Wilmot
- (10) MILITARY NOTES

October 1931

- (1) "THE OLD RED PATCH." The 1st Canadian Division at the breaking of the CANAL DU NORD LINE. Lieutenant-General Macdonell
- (2) MACHINE GUNS IN ATTACK. Captain Worthington
- (3) THE MONGOL OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. Flight Lieutenant Walker
- (4) CANADIANS IN "DUNSTERFORCE." (II) Captain Murray
- (5) WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY IN THE CANADIAN CORPS IN FRANCE. (II) Lieutenant-Colonel Steel
- (6) THE BASKET HITCH OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN PACK SADDLE. Major Westmorland

15—DE RE BELLICA (German—Spanish text)

BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

Number 9, 1930-31

- (1) ZONAS DE DESTRUCCIONES. [Zones of destruction.] Teniente Coronel Wabnitz. A discussion of demolition belts and employment of engineer and pioneer troops in defensive operations.

- (2) QUÉ ENSEÑANZAS OBTUVO LA DIRECCIÓN SUPREMA, DE LAS GRANDES OFENSIVAS DE 1918, POR LO QUE SE REFIERE AL EMPLEO DE LA ARTILLERÍA. [Artillery lessons, in the great offensives of 1918.] Coronel Lange.

- (3) CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE LA MOVILIZACIÓN, DESPLIEGUE ESTRATÉGICO Y PLAN DE OPERACIONES, TENIENDO EN CUENTA LAS CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECIALES DE LOS PAÍSES SUDAMERICANOS. [Strategic deployment, applicable to tropical countries.] von der Goltz.

- An important study by a German Staff Officer on D.S. with the Army of Argentina, on the special operative problems in South American countries.

- (4) CARROS DE COMBATE. [Tanks.] Commandante Faber du Faur.

Brief discussion of tactical employment of the tank.

- (5) LA GUERRA: SUS BATALLAS Y SUS HOMBRES. [Studies on the World War: Battles and leaders.] (II) Eastern Front: 1914; Battle of Masurian Lakes; Initial Austro-Serbian operations; The Galician Front; The battles of Krasnik and Komarow; The first battle of Lemberg; Rawa-Ruska and second battle of Lemberg.

Number 10, 1930-31

- (6) ABASTECIMIENTO DE LAS TROPAS EN LA ALTA MONTAÑA. [Supply in mountain operations.] General von Hörauf.

- (7) LA POLÉMICA INTERNACIONAL SOBRE EL PROBLEMA DEL SUMARINO. [International discussion on the submarine problem.] Contralmirante Spindler.

- (8) DOMINIO DEL MAR O DOMINIO AIRE? [Control of the sea or the air?] Vicealmirante Meurer.

A study of the relative importance of naval or aerial supremacy. It is held that, with present equipment, naval aircraft is more adequate for strategical missions than for tactical effect. The conclusion is that the warship is still the most effective weapon, on sea, for naval warfare.

- (9) PUERTOS AÉREOS, TERRENOS DE ATERRIZAJE AUXILIARES, PUESTOS DE RECOGIDA DE PARTES. [Emergency landing fields and temporary supply points for aircraft.] Capitán Somme.

- (10) CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE LA MOVILIZACIÓN, DESPLIEGUE ESTRATÉGICO Y PLAN DE OPERACIONES, TENIENDO EN CUENTA LAS CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECIALES DE LOS PAÍSES SUDAMERICANOS. [Strategic deployment, applicable to tropical countries.] von der Goltz. (Conclusion)

- (11) LA GUERRA: SUS BATALLAS Y SUS HOMBRES. [Studies on the World War: Battles and leaders.] (II) The battle of the Marne 1914.

16—GUERRA Y SU PREPARACION (Spain)

BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

May 1931

- (1) EL MANDO Y EL ESTADO MAYOR EN LA GUERRA MUNDIAL. [Command and General Staff in the World War.] Commandante Serrano.

A progressive study of the historical development, organization and operation of G.H.Q. and General Staffs, in the German and French Armies.

- (2) POLONIA.—ORGANIZACIÓN DEL EJÉRCITO EN 1. DE MAYO DE 1931. [The organization of the Polish Army, 1 May 1931.] Commandante Bara.

- (3) SUECIA.—SU ORGANIZACIÓN PARA LA GUERRA. [The war organization of the Swedish Army.] Teniente Coronel Marvá.

June 1931

- (4) LAS GRANDES MANIOBRAS DEL EJÉRCITO FRANCES EN 1930. [The grand maneuvers of the French Army in 1930.] This is a rather complete account of the Army Maneuvers, based on the official report of the Spanish military observers; good maps for general orientation are attached. The opposing forces were constituted as follows: Blue (S) VII Corps, 2 divisions (Inf), 1 division Cavalry; Corps troops attached—1 regiment of armored cars, 1 regiment artillery (portee), 1 regiment (motor) heavy artillery. Red (N) XX Corps, 1 division, 1 regiment artillery (portee) Det. aviation; Corps troops, The 2d Div., entrained, and not available until September 5. The organization of the 5th Cavalry Division was given special attention, and contained certain motorized units, viz.: 2 brigades (2 regiments each); 1 regiment (motorized); 1 regiment (horse); 1 regiment artillery (portee); 3 squadrons machine guns; pioneers, cyclist; 1 telegraph company; 1 radio detachment (motorized); 1 pontoon company; 1 motorcycle squadron. The successive phases of the maneuvers were based on the following operative scheme: Red had the general mission to cover detaining unit, in the vicinity of Metz. Blue employed the 5th Cavalry Division for reconnaissance and to seize initial crossings over the Sanon, for a general Blue advance. This is the first time, since the War, that important masses of troops were concentrated.

July-August 1931

- (5) LAS BATALLAS DE LA GUERRA DE LA INDEPENDENCIA DE 1808-1814. [The battles of the War of Independence, 1808-1814.] This is a translation in Spanish of the well-known work by the English historian, Sir Charles Oman, "A History of the Peninsular War."

- (6) CURSO DE PREPARACION DE CORONELES PARA EL ASCENSO. [Examination for the promotion of colonels.] A series of map problems, in combined arms, of large units, to include the corps. The regiments cover: Field orders, for troop movements, march tables, estimates of the situation, and operation orders for the units within the corps.

- (7) EL PROBLEMA AEREO. [The air problem.] A general review of the principles of organization of a modern air service. (1) Creation of a General Staff; (2) Central organization of all services; (3) Progressive construction of material; (4) Tactical organization.

17—MILITAR-WOCHENBLATT (Germany)

BY CAPTAIN F. DURING

4 August 1931

- (1) DER KERN DER SCHLIEFFENSCHEN LEHRE. [The heart of the teachings of von Schlieffen.] Oberst v. Mantey.

The author states that it is not true that von Schlieffen taught exclusively the envelopment. What von Schlieffen did teach was the destruction of the enemy, either by frontal or envelopment attacks. He realized that a long peace makes one forget the experiences of the war; or the teachings of tactics based on the last war become erroneous. He cites the frontages used by a corps of 5 divisions

after 1870, which was 5 km., and then states that he increased the frontages manifold. v.Schlieffen in his "Cannae" study gave three means which would destroy the enemy the quickest way: (1) by a single or double envelopment; (2) by a turning movement, to throw the enemy against impassable obstacles or neutral territory; (3) by a pursuit to cut the enemy's communications.

- (2) NEUE FRANZÖSISCHE VORSCHRIFTEN. [New French training regulations.] (III) A continuation of a discussion of the 1930 French training regulations.

- (3) KRAFTRADVERRÄNDE UND NEBEL. [Motorcycle units and smoke.] The missions of motorcycle units are occupation of important terrain features, to prevent debouchment from or passage of a defile by the enemy, pursuit, and harassing rear areas. The use of smoke on such missions will not interfere with other friendly troops. Since motorcycle units can only travel on roads it is possible that the enemy patrols can easily interfere with them. To avoid any lengthy stops, smoke is used by the motorcycle unit, and, under the protection of this smoke, they either fight and drive the enemy patrol off, or go around it to continue on their missions.

- (4) ZUSAMMENARBEIT VON KAMPFWAGEN UND ARTILLERIE BEIM ANGRIFF. [Cooperation between tanks and artillery in the attack.] Due to the fact that the tanks are very fast now, it is difficult to have artillery support the tanks. Communication between the two is unsatisfactory. The author recommends that all artillery fire be taken from the area in which the tanks attack. This will of course give the enemy artillery a chance to place its fire on the infantry which follows the tanks. This the author acknowledges, but he replies that a tank company has not the strength to completely destroy enemy machine guns and then quickly push on to overrun the enemy artillery. Therefore the use of tanks in support of a division is tactically unsound. The tank is only of value when it is used in large masses. Only when used in great numbers, on a wide front and in many waves will the tank attack be successful. That way the front wave can overcome the enemy artillery and stop its fire. An army should never parcel out its tanks to divisions, but under one leader, attack on a front where the decision is sought. The division artillery has the mission to protect the tanks on the march into position, but during the attack and after it, the mission of the artillery is to assist the infantry in its advance. Should artillery become necessary for such a tank attack, then it should be motorized and armored to follow the tanks.

11 August 1931

- (5) OPERATIVE LUFTAUFLÄRUNG UND FERNERKUNDUNGSFLUGZEUG. [Distant air reconnaissance and matériel.] (I) Hauptmann Ritter.

A review of the articles appearing in the "Revue des Forces Aériennes" by General Voisin (see page 25, in this number of RCML).

- (6) MITTEL UND WEGE DER SCHWERPUNKTBILDUNG. [Ways and means for forming the main effort.] (See abstract, page 53)

18 August 1931

By MAJOR A. VOLLMER

- (7) OPERATIVE LUFTAUFLÄRUNG UND FERNERKUNDUNGSFLUGZEUG. [Distant air reconnaissance and matériel.] (II) Hauptmann Ritter.

A review of the article in the May 1931 number of the "Revue des Forces Aériennes," written by Captain Etienne, the second contributor to the series on that subject in that magazine. His contribution is in the nature of a supplement to the articles written by the first contributor, General Voisin, and constitutes an inquiry into the technical aspects of distant reconnaissance airplanes. Captain Etienne is of the opinion that the existing types of distant reconnaissance airplanes are not suitable, and, in proof of this contention, presents a table showing the principal characteristics of each. (This table is reproduced in the article here reviewed.)

The author, Captain Etienne, sets himself the problem of prescribing the characteristics for an airplane of this class which would be superior to existing types. This he does from a tactical standpoint. Two characteristics he considers indispensable and not debatable: (1) the requirement of a minimum cruising radius; and (2) that of adequate camera equipment. He concludes that the cruising radius should be at least 1000 kilometers and that the photography will usually have to be "mosaics" by automatic camera, supplemented at lower elevations by 3 objective (stereoscopic) photographs.

In this connection the author criticizes the latest competitive requirements of the French Air Ministry in which only a 900 kilometers cruising range and a top speed of 240 kilometers per hour is prescribed. This he considers inadequate. There is then discussed in detail the matters of "ceiling," armament and speed—all debatable characteristics.

- (8) KRIEGERFAHRUNG UND TRUPPENAUSBILDUNG. [War experience and troop training.] Generalleutnant Fleck.

"If military training is to have sense it must guide itself by the circumstances under which the next war will probably be fought." In contradistinction to this doctrine it remains that troop training must result from definite War Department directives, and these cannot be grounded in probabilities as to future warfare, but must be based on past military historical examples. At best the training of officers is the only field in which prescriptive methods can enter through the evaluation of the progress of foreign armies. Therein resides a fertile field for the imagination.

It is difficult enough to follow the correct teachings as exemplified by the past. Outstanding soldiers and keen minds differ on what is to be considered as war experience. How much more difficult it is to judge what will happen in the future.

The article goes on to show how the German Army, for example, did not profit in the past by the experiences of former wars. Outstanding in this seemed to be the desire to expose themselves as a badge of courage—both the utilization of masses of troops and the exposure of individual officers. The consequence was, of course, many casualties. Examples of the German campaigns are given in which this resulted. Thereupon the regulations which followed came only slowly to a correction of such practices; in other words, the Army learned but unwillingly from its war experience.

25 August 1931

By MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

- (9) OPERATIVE LUFTAUFLÄRUNG UND FERNERKUNDUNGSFLUGZEUG. [Distant air reconnaissance and matériel.] (III) Hauptmann Ritter.

A study of "ceilings" for reconnaissance and observation planes. There is a prevalent opinion that excessive height, (21,000 feet) while a guaranty of safety, is probably impracticable for observation. The author recommends this height, however, and insists upon refinement of photographic matériel to overcome the atmospheric difficulty involved in excessive heights.

By MAJOR A. VOLLMER

4 September 1931

- (10) FRANKREICH'S "ABRÜSTUNG." [French disarmament.] A politico-juridical discussion of the French and German disarmament commitments of the Treaty of Versailles, and the departure therefrom by the former.
- (11) GESICHTSPUNKTE FÜR EINE UMBEARBEITUNG DER AUFLÄRUNGSZIFFERN DES F. U. G. (Führung und geleitet der Verbundenen Waffen.) [Considerations for revision of the reconnaissance paragraphs of F. u. G. (Conduct and combat of the combined arms—Regulations German Army.)] Major v. Faber du Faux. (See abstract, page 38.)
- (12) DAS GELÄNDE ALS ELEMENT DER KRIEGFÜHRUNG. [Terrain as a factor in warfare.] (See abstract, page 53.)
- (13) DIE NEUE FRANZÖSISCHE AUSBILDUNGSVORSCHRIFT FÜR DIE KAVALLERIE. [The new French cavalry training regulations.] (See abstract, page 47.)
- (14) DER LUFTKREUZER "AKRON." [The dirigible "Akron."] A description without comment, of the construction, characteristics, costs, etc., of the Akron.
- (15) GASABWEHR UND GASBEREITSCHAFT. [Gas defense and gas readiness.] In greatest part a résumé of the article on gas defense which appeared in the Italian paper "Esercito e Nazione," for June 1931, outlining the types of attack and measures needed to combat them. It emphasizes, above all, the necessity for every soldier and civilian in war time, having a first aid gas packet with him at all times.

11 September 1931

- (16) PYRRHUS-SIEGE. GEDANKEN ZUR VERLUSTFRAGE. [Pyrrhus victories. Thoughts on the question of casualties.] The title recalls to our minds the exclamation of Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, after his defeat of the Romans at Asculum (279 B.C.), "one more such victory over the Romans and we are utterly undone." The author of this article traces the attitude of military thought towards casualties from the time when their quantity was glorified by the historian to the present when all measures in avoidance are extolled. He points out to Germany that with its reduced combat strength such measures must be employed in future.
- (17) VERWEHRUNG EINER ENTWICKELTEN DIVISION NACH DER FLANKE. Eine Kriegsgeschichtliche Lehre. [Change of attack direction by a deployed division. A lesson from military history.] (See translation, page 34.)
- (18) WIE IST DER BEWEGUNGSKRIEG ZU BEFLÜGELN? [How is the war of movement to get mobility?] General v. Taysen.
A sarcastic controversial review of Major Vallet's book, "Tendances Allemandes" [German tendencies], in which he lauds and magnifies the German Reichsheer (National Army), its material developments, tactical and strategical techniques, etc., and enjoins France to emulation. The reviewer contends that that which Vallet so admires is as yet on paper only. The reviewer remarks that this habit of comparison of armies of the world

has again come to the front with the reappearance of the former Loebell series, now by K. L. v. Dertzen, entitled, "Rüstung und Abrüstung. Eine Umschau über das Heer und Kriegswesen aller Länder. [Armament and disarmament. A survey of the army and military activities of all countries.] (German original is in C. & G.S.S. Library, Class No. M 103) (See review, page 73)

- (19) FASCHISTENORGANISATIONEN 1931. [Fascist organizations, 1931.] A survey of the organization of the Fascist units in Italy, their statistics, activities, etc.
- (20) SCHWERGEPANZERTE RIESEN ODER BEWEGLICHE ZWERGE? [Heavily armored giants or mobile dwarfs?] A comparison of the characteristics of the heavy, medium and light tanks with the conclusion that the last named, one something like the British Carden Loyd, is the only one which will suit future combat.
- (21) DIE NACHKRIEGSENTWICKLUNG DER AMERIKANISCHEN ARTILLERIE. [Post war development of American artillery.] A short article containing a few items from the "Field Artillery Journal" concerning development of artillery types in the United States.
- (22) LUFTFAHRT-RUNDSCHAU. [Aerial survey.] A résumé of countries of civilian and military events and developments in aeronautics.

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- (23) KORDONKRIEG—ENTSCHEIDENDE OPERATIONEN. [The Cordon War: decisive operations.] The author refers to Clausewitz' definition of a cordon as a "defensive plan which is intended directly to cover a whole district of country by a line of posts in connection with each other" ("On war" Book VI, Chapter 22, page 297, 1911 ed. Graham translation, London). Examples of its use and misuses are given—East Prussia 1915, Russia—Poland 1920, Serbia 1918. The author believes that defense by operations (East Prussia 1914) is the ideal solution but that the use of the cordon will, on occasion, be required to make possible a decisive operation elsewhere, and that this becomes continually more practicable in view of the progress in defensive machine weapons and obstacles, quick transport reliable communications, and aerial reconnaissance.
- (24) DER "BEWEGLICHE VERRAND" ALS TRÄGER DER MARSCHEISUNG. [The mobile unit made responsible for march security.] (I) (See abstract, page 42.)
- (25) KRIEGSMÄSSIGE ÜBUNGSANLAGEN. [Training exercises true to war conditions.] General-leutnant Fischer.
Following the lead of other writers the author expresses his belief in the necessity for those without war experience being trained in exercises which closely simulate war conditions. He explains his thesis by an example with map of the employment of a battalion.
- (26) KAVALLERIE AUF DEM STREIFZUG. Der Ritt der russischen Zusammengesetzten kavallerie-Division im August 1914 auf Kamionka-Strumilowa. [Cavalry on a raid: The ride of the Russian composite cavalry division in August 1914 to Kamionka-Strumilowa.] Presents a detailed narrative of the events during this enterprise. It has been lauded in Russian literature, but the German author of this article sees it as the way not to do it, and points out its ill conceived plan in which lack of artillery and machine guns enabled it to do little damage of important nature, while it sustained many casualties and loss of equipment.

- (27) GRENZEN UND MÖGLICHKEITEN VON KRAFTRAD-EINHEITEN. [Limits and possibilities of motorcycle units.] The author sees the limits of the motorcycle brought about by the facts that it is noisy, that it cannot go across country, that it is highly vulnerable unarmored, and that it comes to grief on slippery and muddy roads. He, however, values its use first in the motorcycle rifle company as a mobile reserve, and second in liaison.
- (28) DIE NEUE RUSSISCHE ARTILLERIE-SCHIESSVORSCHRIFT. [The new Russian artillery firing regulations.] An advanced forecast of part of these regulations which are not yet published.
- (29) ENGLISCHE ABRÜSTUNG? [English disarmament.] An account of the recent disposition manifested in England to bring disarmament to a halt and again bring to life its former powerful fleet, in view of failure to disarm on the part of other nations, likelihood of the "balance of power" again becoming the international system, and the questionable effect of the Kellogg Treaty. The author enjoins a similar attitude for Germany.
- (30) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: IST DER STAHLHELM ZWECKMÄSSIG? [Out of the workshop of the troops: Is the steel helmet suitable?] This question is answered in the negative for the reasons given that it is too heavy on a long march, too shiny and visible, has poor acoustics for patrols, inconvenient in use with telephones, panoramic sights, gun sights, range finders, gas masks, etc., and conflicts with the infantry pack. Examples of its failure to protect from rifle fire are given.

25 September 1931

- (31) DIE KAMPFWAGEN DER GEGENWART. [The tank of the present.] (I) Since the decisive summer months of 1918 when the overwhelming numbers of tanks gave a new turn to Fate for the Entente powers there have been many changes in their technique and tactics. One thing, however, has remained—the threat to the German frontiers by enemy armored combat vehicles. It remains to be seen how the coming disarmament conference can reconcile the Kellogg Pact with this threat by thousands of improved modern tanks. The map accompanying the article purports to show graphically the encirclement of Germany by this weapon—now one suited for use in open warfare and even autonomous in employment in armored brigades. The article traces the development and portrays the present status of tank construction in the countries of Europe and America. Even if America, England, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have the most modern types, still France with its 5,000 modernized light Renaults by 1935 represents the most dangerous armored power on the continent.
- (32) DER "BEWEGLICHE VERBAND" ALS TRÄGER DER MARKSCHÜTZUNG. [The mobile unit made responsible for march security.] (II) (See abstract, page 42)
- (33) TREFFWAHRSCHEINLICHKEIT BEIM GEFECHTSSCHIESSEN. [Probability of hits in combat firing.] A discussion of the appendix to the German Firing Regulations for rifles, light machine guns, etc., 1926.
- (34) DIE FREIHEITSWILLE DER VÖLKER. [The popular will to freedom.] A summary of the wars for freedom which have occurred in modern history.
- (35) ENGLANDS WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHE LAGE. [The politico-industrial situation of England.] A consideration of the financial, political and

industrial factors in the British economic situation.

- (36) DAS RESERVE-OFFIZIER-AUSBILDUNGSKORPS DER UNIVERSITÄT VON OKLAHOMA. [The R.O. T.C. of Oklahoma University.] A review of the article in "Field Artillery Journal" (U.S.) of May-June 1931.
- (37) NEUE TAKTISCHE STRÖMUNGEN IM POLNISCHEN HEERE. [New tactical elements in the Polish Army.] An announcement of a new Polish Infantry Regulation.
- (38) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: ERHALTUNG DER DIENSTFREUDIGKEIT IN DER TRUPPE. [Out of the workshop of the troops: Maintenance of morale in the troops.]

4 October 1931

- (39) VERLUSTEINSCHRÄNKUNG IN ZUKUNFTS-SCHLACHTEN. [Reduction of losses in future war.]
- (40) DIE KAMPFWAGEN DER GEGENWART. STAND: SOMMER 1931. [The tank of the present. Summer, 1931.] II. MEDIUM TANKS.—An account of the situation in England, France, and the United States relative to construction of this type. England is the only possessor of modern medium tanks, with its 16 ton Vickers armed with one 3-pounder and 4 machine guns. HEAVY TANKS.—A resumé of the causes for the creation of this type of vehicles, its history, and status at close of World War and at present. As with the light tank France is the most dangerous factor in this field with its "Chars de rupture" or breakthrough types "2C," "3C," and "D." The latter is notable for reorganization of weapons—its forward turret with 15.5 cannon is lower than the rear turret with 7.5 cannon. An additional 10.5 cannon in the stern with 12 machine guns (besides 6 in reserve) completes the armament. AMPHIBIAN TANKS.—The French Schneider-Creuzot Laurent is deemed superior in this field, a wheel and caterpillar type of 8 cylinder motor, speed of 45 kilometers per hour on wheels, 30 kilometers on tracks and 16 kilometers in quiet water. Its moderate height of 2.45 m. affords excellent buoyancy. It can ascend 48 degree slopes and effect 2½ meter crossings and has a radius of action of 320 kilometers on wheels. It weighs 7 tons. With its 3.7 cm cannon and heavy machine gun equipment it constitutes not only an excellent amphibian tank but is the best solution of a light armored car for strategic distant reconnaissance. SPECIAL TANKS.—The consideration of these includes those for communications, engineers, and rear guard purposes. There have generally been utilized the war time types rebuilt for these purposes. CONCLUSION.—France constitutes the greatest tank threat with its modernized Renaults and "Chars de Rupture." England and the United States are potential factors. The former because of its advanced tactical viewpoint, the latter because of its wealth of commercial resources.
- (41) IMPROVISIERTE KAVALLERIE. AUS DEM POLNISCHE-RUSSISCHEN REITERKRIEG 1920. [Improvised cavalry in the Russo-Polish Mounted Warfare of 1920.] A recital of the difficulties encountered in equipping the Polish cavalry in the Russo-Polish War of 1920, of the new and curious triangular formations used, and of its important service and excellent leadership in spite of those difficulties.
- (42) DER STURZBOMBER. [The diving bomber.] An account of the development in the United States Navy Air Corps of nose dive bombing of small targets.

- (43) DIE FASCHISTISCHE MILIZ IN ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT DEM HEERE. [The Fascist Militia in cooperation with the Army.] A continuation from "Militär-Wochenblatt," 11 September 1931, of the consideration in detail of the organization of these Italian military components.
- (44) DIE STUNDE DES SOLDATEN. [The hour of the soldier.] A plea for publicity for the German Army through the use of radio broadcasting. The people are ignorant concerning the present National Army. Other countries support their armies and they are afforded much publicity. Because the National Defense in Germany is so curtailed by the Treaty of Versailles and in view of threat of civil war it becomes imperative that the Army must be "sold" to the German people so that they will amalgamate together as a unit for national defense.
- (45) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: KLASSEN- UND GRUNDSÄTZE DES SCHÜTZENKOMPANIE. [Out of the workshop of the troops: Class training in the rifle company.]
- (46) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 1. [Tactical exercise No. 1.] First situation. Requirement: Order of the 4th Division for the occupation of a rest area.

11 October 1931

- (47) DIE FRANZÖSISCHEN GROSZEN MANÖVRE 1931. [The French grand maneuvers of 1931.] An account, with accompanying sketch, of the French maneuvers of September 1931 near Reims. It consists of a narrative of events following the outline of the general situation which obtained. The sketchy nature of the account deprives it of much of the strategic value which a full consideration would ordinarily afford. That will be available only at a much later date. However, the German contention is that the latter half of the maneuvers was a "play" to a large gallery of assembled notables, and perforce converged on Reims at the proper time and that both parts of the maneuvers failed to achieve realism in that the assumed advances would have been impossible, in view of the respective strengths of the opponents. It is also intimated that the French do not show their newest equipment and method, on account of a policy of secrecy. But above all, the author's contention is that in this maneuver, in which the less well equipped Blue forces on French territory are represented as on the defensive against an invading Red force coming from the northeast, lies the French political propaganda of "threat to security." And that if one but reverse the opponents the true picture appears of a defenceless Germany (Blue) and a militaristic France (Red). But "as is" the maneuvers afford the tactical and strategic experience which is their purpose, without inviting the charge of militarism or weakening the ancient contention that a great French military machine is needed for security.
- (48) WEHRKRAFT UND WEHRWILLE. [Combat strength and combat will.] A review of the book so entitled, by General Walther Reinhardt, Infantry, German Army, Ret.
- (49) TANKABWEHR VON HEUTE. [Defense against tanks today.] Oberst Fischer. (See abstract, page 40)
- (50) STÖRUNGSFEUER MIT 8. MG. [Harassing fire by heavy machine guns.] Proper targets after dark are lines of communication, concentration areas, crossroads, bridges, tunnels, small woods. In a sector of 1000 meters there will be 10 to 15 such targets. One machine gun company can operate on 15 such targets without too great demand on the personnel—

provided ammunition supply allows. The purpose of this fire is not to cause casualties but to prevent ingress and egress, rest, sleep, traffic, and food supply. Great ammunition expenditure must not be involved. Bursts of 20 to 30 rounds suffice at time intervals determined by the situation. Every hour at irregular intervals at least one such burst should be laid down.

- (51) EINE FLIEGERMELDUNG AUS DER SCHLACHT BEI TANNENBERG. [An aerial report from the battle of Tannenberg.] An hitherto unpublished account of the discovery by Lieutenant Canter, pilot, and Lieutenant Mertens, observer, of the Russian columns advancing on Mława to the relief of General Samsonow on August 30, 1914, and their delivery of this information both to the Headquarters I Army Corps and to General von Hindenburg at his headquarters. This discovery—which was of immense importance—occurred about three hours before a similar one made by Lieutenant Hesse and Korner, which has been given wide publicity (Hindenburg, "Out of my Life," page 89; von Francois, "The battle of the Marne and Tannenberg," page 228; "Schlachten des Weltkrieges," etc.). The information from two aerial sources was corroborative and the action predicated thereupon were decisive on the Eastern front.
- (52) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: METHODEN UND GRUNDSÄTZE DES SPORTLEHRERS. [Out of the workshop of the troops: Methods and principles of athletic teachers.]
- (53) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 1. [Tactical exercise No. 1.] Second situation. Requirement: Order of the 4th Division for the advance.

18 October 1931

- (54) ABRÜSTUNG. [Disarmament.] The first article of a series in anticipation of the February 1932 Disarmament Conference, presents the German viewpoint. It cites "Rüstung und Abrüstung" by von Oertzen (In C. & G.S.S. Library—see review in this issue of RCML, page 73). (See abstract, page 40)
- (55) DIE DEUTSCHE RÜSTUNG ALS ENTLASTUNGSBILD FRANZÖSISCHEN MASSENWAHNS. [German preparedness as a cure for French popular delusion.] An inquiry into the causes of the attitude of the French people towards Germany. The author finds the French attitude to be one of fear of Germany and belief that the latter is bent on revenge. He believes this to be artificially kept alive by those in authority. In the face of a disarmed Germany he ascribes the attitude of France as born of several psychological factors such as delight in indignation over the alleged German atrocities, a "sop" to her conscience troubled over the injustice she did to Germany in the peace agreements, and lastly, the justification she finds in this attitude for her colossal military edifice, about which she is sensitive as an alleged evidence of her desire for aggression. He expresses amazement that the French mind, so noted for laidity and realism, can be so misled. The remedy the author sees not in a supine care not to give offense and justification to France, but in an honest pursuit of adequate national defense by Germany. To suffer injustice makes a people disliked. Invulnerability makes it respected. Unpreparedness engenders the hate of those who wish to assault it.
- (56) MARSCHGLIEDERUNG BEI FLIEGERGEFAHR. [March formations during danger from aeroplanes.] An account of a test march of a division in the Soviet Army on June 24, 1931 as reported in "Voenyiny Vvestnik," No.

19/20, August 31, 1931. It was intended to test formations against observation by and combat measures against aeroplanes. There is nothing new in the measures taken, the formations being those relying on the taking of distance between units as well as the infantry marching along the sides of the road; and the combat measures consisting of antiaircraft and machine guns. It is stated that aerial observers mistook the units for small detachments. Considering the 200 m. distances between companies, 2000 m. between advance party and support of advance guard, and 1000 m. between latter and main body, it is not reasonable to suppose that this mistake on the part of the aerial observers would be the usual thing.

- (57) DER FELDZUG DER IMPROVISIERTEN HEERE RUSLANDS UND POLENS 1920. [The campaign of the improvised armies of Russia and Poland, in 1920.] A review of a Soviet study by Movcin on the operations on the Marne 1914 and on the Vistula 1920. The disparity between supply and combat troops on both sides is noteworthy. In March 1920 Poland had 740,000 troops but only 100,000 combat troops. Russia had 5,000,000 troops but only 300,000 combat troops; of the latter there were 160,000 on the west front against Poland, of which 2/3 were north, 1/3 south of the Polesia. In the pursuit of the Poles by the Russians north of Vilna, after their failure to throw the Poles into the Pripiet Marshes, there was a desertion rate in the Russian Army of 4 to 5 thousand monthly. The only reinforcements were the recaptured deserters. This was a serious factor in morale. Infantry companies were sent forward in farm wagons in columns of more than 1 kilometer in length. In the rear the company commander rode in a carriage with a woman stenographer, while at the head of the column disorder and panic reigned. One of every three soldiers was a Communist. The Poles had harmed the railroads so little that they were restored at the rate of 12 to 20 kilometers daily but the stations were so congested that a systematized supply was impossible. The Fourth Russian Army reported that until the end of the operations not a pound of bread, not a pair of shoes nor one man for replacement was forthcoming. This portrayal from Soviet sources shows the earmarks of improvised armies—lack of autonomy, early dissipation of combat strength, inadequate organization for sustaining and replacing man power, disorders, panics, dissolution. It is astonishing that the Polish Army, more improvised even than the Russian, was eventually successful. The causes hereof were probably utilization of French officers and the numerical superiority of the Poles in the decisive theater, 180,000 Poles against 55,000 Russians.

- (58) BEOBSACHTUNG AUF GROSSE ENTFERNUNGEN. [Observations at long ranges.] An account of experiments made in 1918 in Germany by the Artillery Range School in the observation of bursts of time fuzes at long ranges.

- (59) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: ZIEL-REZEICHNUNG UND SCHUSSBEOBSACHTUNG DURCH DIE SCHÜTZENKOMPANIE. [Out of the workshop of the troops: Target designation and observation of fire by the rifle company.] A consideration of practical examples of the cooperation of infantry and artillery in these functions.

- (60) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 1. [Tactical exercise No. 1.] Solutions and discussion of first situation.

25 October 1931

- (61) DER LUFTKRIEG DER ZUKUNFT. [The air war of the future.] Hauptmann Ritter. An

account of the air maneuvers in Italy, France and the United States.

- (62) JOFFRE ALS MENSCH UND FELDHERN. [Joffre: Man and general.] General v. Kuhl.

A review of the book by Commandant Müller entitled, "Joffre et la Marne" (in C. & G.S.S. Library). The German reviewer concurs with Müller that the glory of the Marne should be Joffre's, not Gallieni's, for the former bore the responsibility thereof. He extols Joffre's steadfastness in his determination to attack on 6 September in the face of opposition by his Staff, who urged the fact that the situation was not clear. He deems this to have been a wise decision; that today the events show that a delay would have been worse for the French. The reviewer counts as valuable Müller's opinion that the Marne was not a tactical, though a strategical, victory for the French arms, but adds that Müller fails to mention the fact that at two points—on the Ourcq and at Pere Champenoise—the French suffered serious reversals which could have resulted in a general German victory if the battle had not been broken off.

- (63) NAHKAMPFARTILLERIE IN DER VERTEIDIGUNG. [Close range artillery in the defense.] The artillery of the defender will of course busy itself with fire of annihilation on the assembly areas of the attacker so that the attack shall, if possible, fail at the outset. But if the attacker begins the assault, and succeeds in entering the positions of the defender—then the close range artillery has indeed a difficult problem. How now to help the Infantry? The chief difficulty is observation. The author considers the use of the certain barrage at this stage but comes to no conclusion as to the propriety of its use. He invites the contributions of experienced infantrymen on this question. The only other suggestion which he offers is that particular terrain features—depressions, ravines, woods, hedges and houses—which serve as avenues of approach and cannot be reached by machine guns be taken under fire.

- (64) SCHIESZAUSBILDUNG DES SCHWEIZER INFANTERISTEN. [Rifle training of the Swiss infantrymen.]

- (65) DER NEUE MITTLERE STRASSENKAMPFER IN U.S.A. [The new medium armored car in the United States.]

- (66) EIN MARKSTEIN DEUTSCHER GESCHICHTE. Zur Erinnerung an die Schlacht bei Breitenfeld. [A mile post of German history. In memory of the Battle of Breitenfeld (1631).]

- (67) DAS SPEKTRUM EUROPAS. [The spectrum of Europe.] A review of Count Hermann Keyserling's book so entitled.

- (68) UNIFORMFRAGEN. [Questions of uniform.]

- (69) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: MEHR LIEBE FÜR DIE KRAFTFAHRAUSBILDUNG. [Out of the workshop of the troops: More love for motorization.]

- (70) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 1. [Tactical exercise No. 1.] Solution and discussion of second situation.

4 November 1931

- (71) FRANKREICH UND DIE VÖLKERBUNDSARMEE. [France and the League of Nations' Army.] A discussion of Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant prescribing joint military-naval action by its members against a member transgressor; the impotency of this provision; and the relationship of France to this situation together with a list of the present factors of her National Defense strength and one of those which she demands in addition.

- (72) DAS PROBLEM DER MARSCHEICHERUNG. DARGESTELLT AN SCHWACH AUSGERÜSTETEN

- UND NEUZEITLICHEN HEEREN. [The problem of march security in weakly equipped modern armies.] (I) (See abstract, page 48)
- (73) VOM INFANTERIEANGRIFF. [Infantry attack.]
- (74) UEBERLEGENE ARTILLERIE TUT NOT! [Artillery superiority is a necessity.] An answer to the question "Are masses of artillery necessary?" which was put in "Militär-Wochenblatt," August 18, 1931. It concludes that 2 regiments of artillery is the maximum which should be allotted to the division, other than that of a special mission type which operates from the rear. A short discussion of the employment of such artillery is included.
- (75) BRANDBOMBEN. [Incendiary bombs.] A review of the book, "Brandbomben: Ein Beitrag zum Luftschutz Problem." [Incendiary bombs: A contribution to the problem of air security,] by Incendiary Bomb Engineer in Chief Rumpf.
- (76) FREIUNGENG ALS SCHAUNUMMER. [Calisthenic exhibitions.]
- (77) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE. AUSBILDUNG DER UNTEROFFIZIER-ANWÄRTER BEI DER KAVALLERIE. [Out of the workshop of the troops: Training of the non-commissioned officer candidates in the cavalry.]
- (78) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 2. EINGERAHMTER AUSGRIFF EINER INFANTERIE DIVISION. [Tactical exercise No. 2. Attack by an Interior Infantry division.] Requirements: (1) Decision of the division commander with reasons; (2) Orders and commands of the 7th Division.

11 November 1931

- (79) CLAUSEWITZ. Zu seinem 100. Todestage (16. November 1831). [Clausewitz. In commemoration of the 100th anniversary of his death (16 November 1831).] Generalmajor von Cöthenhausen.
- An appreciation of the "greatest military thinker of all times," as the author calls Clausewitz.
- (80) DAS PROBLEM DER MARSCHEICHERUNG. DARGESTELLT AN SCHWACH AUSGERÜSTETEN UND NEUZEITLICHEN HEEREN. [The problem of march security in weakly equipped modern armies.] (II) (See abstract, page 48)
- (81) ZUSAMMENARBEIT VON KAMPFWAGEN UND ARTILLERIE IN DER ANGRIFFSSCHLACHT. [Cooperation of tanks and artillery in offensive battles. The friction between tanks and artillery in the attack has been exaggerated. The two arms are quite different, yet they have the common purpose of making a way for the infantry. This necessitates their cooperation. This must be effected by the leader. In a terrain such as is common in Europe affording shelter, hilly, and cut up, a far reaching observation essential to artillery is almost impossible. These conditions are however suitable for the approach of tanks, giving them cover and enabling them to bring the close in fighting up to the foe. On the other hand in open country the artillery is supreme and here things are unfavorable for the tanks. The tank can supplement the artillery by attacking while the latter changes positions in the advance. Tanks will often run on to antitank defenses for aid against which they must be able to call on batteries in readiness. Cooperation must be effected through armored artillery liaison detachments, observation tanks, and observation aeroplanes.]
- (82) UBERWINDUNG VERSEUCHTER GELÄNDEABSCHNITTE. [Overcoming of gas infected areas.] A plea for more troop training in the overcoming of areas infected with gas. A review of the article from "Voyenny Vyesnik" of September 15, 1931. Gassing of large areas

will be common in future wars. The use of specialists who strew sand with which chloride of lime is mixed enables the troops to pass through unhurt. Other remedies include straw blanketing, paths strewn with chloride of lime, special bridges, peeling off of the surface soil, or equipping troops with protective clothing.

- (83) DAS POLNISCH-RUMÄNISCHE BÜNDNIS. [The Polish-Rumanian alliance.]
- (84) WAHRES FÜHRERTUM. [True leadership.]
- (85) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: SELBSTZUCHT DES VORGESetzten. [Out of the workshop of the troops: Discipline of the superior.]
- (86) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 2. [Tactical exercise No. 2.] First continuation. Zone attack of an infantry division. Solution of first situation.

18 November 1931

- (87) DIE EINSTELLUNG DER MÄCHTE ZUR AUSRÜSTUNGSPRAGE. [The line-up of the Powers in the disarmament question.]
- (88) KAVALLERISTISCHE GEGENWARTSGEDANKEN. [Cavalry today.] (See abstract, page 32)
- (89) SIND ARTILLERIEMASSEN NOCH NÖTIG? [Are artillery masses still needed?] Generalleutnant Goldner
- (90) DAS PROBLEM DER MARSCHEICHERUNG. DARGESTELLT AN SCHWACH AUSGERÜSTETEN UND NEUZEITLICHEN HEEREN. [The problem of march security in weakly equipped modern armies.] (III) (See abstract, page 48)
- (91) DIE ABWEHR DES STURZBOMBERS. [Defense against dive-bombing.]
- (92) FINNISCHE GRUNDSÄTZE FÜR DIE VERTEIDIGUNG. [Finnish principles of defense.]
- (93) VON DER UNTEROFFIZIERSCHULE ZUR FÜHRERSCHULE. [From the school for non-commissioned officers to the school of leaders.]
- (94) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 2. [Tactical exercise No. 2. Attack of an interior infantry division.] Second continuation. Discussion of solution: Continuation of the situation at 11:45 o'clock; Division order; Division order for preparation for attack; Artillery order for preparation for attack by the division.

25 November 1931

- (95) DIE OPERATIVE BEDEUTUNG DER OSTPREUSISCHEN FESTUNGEN IM WELTKRIEGE. [The strategic meaning of the East Prussian forts in the World War.] Generalmajor Klingbeil. (See abstract, page 49)
- (96) DAS PROBLEM DER MARSCHEICHERUNG. DARGESTELLT AN SCHWACH AUSGERÜSTETEN UND NEUZEITLICHEN HEEREN. [The problem of march security in weakly equipped modern armies.] (IV) (See abstract, page 48)
- (97) DER EINFLUSS DER WAFENWIRKUNG AUF DIE GEFECHTSFORMEN DER INFANTERIE IM ANGRIFF. [The influence of fire power on the combat formations of the infantry in the attack.]
- (98) NAHKAMPFARTILLERIE IN DER VERTEIDIGUNG. [Close range artillery in the defense.]
- (99) EINE NEUE LUFTSCHAFFBASIS IN DEN U.S.A. [A new airship base in the United States.]
- (100) VÖLKERRECHT. [International law.] Konteradmiral Groos
- (101) UNIFORMFRAGEN. [Questions of the uniform.]
- (102) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 2. [Tactical exercise No. 2. Zone attack of an infantry division.] Third continuation. Continuation of the situation; Corps order for the attack; Division order for the attack.

4 December 1931

- (103) GLEICHES RECHT—NICHT ZWEIFACHEL MASE! [Equal rights—no double standard.] A con-

tinuation of the series of articles dealing with the status of Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, and Germany's grievances thereunder.

- (104) SCHLICKSALSFRAGEN DER GROSSEN KRIEGSFÜHRUNG IN DEN FAHREN 1917/18. [Fateful questions for the German Supreme Command in 1917-18.]
- (105) DER KAMPF UM DIE MANDSCHUREI. [The battle for Manchuria.]
- (106) DIE GASKAMPFSTOFFE DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT. [Gas warfare materials since the World War.]
- (107) DAS RECHT AUF DIE WAFFE. [The right to arms.]
- (108) DIE MILITÄRWISSENSCHAFTEN IM ROTEN HEERE. [Military science in the Russian Army.]
- (109) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE: STÖRUNGSFEUER SCHWERER MASCHINENGEWEHRE. [Out of the workshop of the troops: Harassing fire of heavy machine guns.] An account of a test of the employment of these weapons in this type of fire in a night operation, giving the situation, strength of units participating, number of guns, targets, percentages of hits obtained, as well as a discussion of the characteristics and limitations of the combat method.
- (110) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 3. [Tactical exercise No. 3.] Mission of Blue First Army: to attack. Mission of its 2d Division: to gain a certain position. Requirements (in the situation as outlined in detail): Decision of division commander, recommendations of artillery commander, orders and measures taken by division commander in agreement with artillery commander's recommendations.

11 December 1931

- (111) FRANKREICHS ABEÜBUNG, WIE SIE SEIN MUßTE. [French disarmament as it should be.]
- (112) DIE FORMEN DER KAVALLERIE UND BEWEGUNGEN UND KAMPF. [Cavalry formations in movements and combat.] A consideration of the German cavalry regulations of March 16, 1931.
- (113) SCHWERGEFÄNZTERE RIESEN ODER BEWEGLICHE ZWERGE? [Heavily armored giants or mobile dwarfs?] The author of the article in "Militär-Wochenblatt" of September 11, 1931, attempted to establish the idea that the "mobile dwarf" is the ideal tank and that the English Carden Loyd is, in some respects, the example of this type. The present contributor to this subject points out the need for middle weight and heavy tanks in employment during stabilized conditions as well as the use of light tanks in masses in certain situations.
- (114) "ON S'ENGAGE PARTOUT ET ON VOIT." [One engages everywhere and then sees.]
- (115) SIND ARTILLERIEMARSCHEN NOCH NÖTIG? [Are masses of artillery still needed?] The author concludes that masses of artillery are still indispensable to carry out the necessary missions in modern combat.
- (116) TAKTISCHE AUFGABE 3. [Tactical exercise No. 3.] Solution: Decision of division commander to attack; recommendation of artillery commander; orders given and measures taken.

22—REVISTA MILITAR (Argentina)

By MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

August 1931

- (1) TEORIA DEL CENTRO DE GRAVEDAD TÁCTICO. [Mass and tactical center of gravity.] (I) Mayor Best F.

An interesting, progressive study of the formation of mass, at the decisive point, in tactical operations, by an increase in depth and distribution of auxiliary weapons and artillery support.

- (2) LA FORTIFICACIÓN DE CAMPANA EN EL ATAQUE. [Field fortifications in the attack.] (I) Mayor Berretta P.
- (3) DESDE MI PUESTO DE OBSERVACIÓN EN PARÍS: EL TRANSPORTE MILITAR AÉREO. [Military air transports.] (I) Mayor Fantini Pertiné.

September 1931

- (4) LA MARCHA DE FLANCO DE LOS ALIADOS DE TUYUY A TUYÚ CUÉ. [The flank march of the Allies from Tuyuy to Tuyú Cué.] Coronel Beverina J.
An historical example of a successful out-flanking of a fortified position, in the War of Paraguay, 1867.
- (5) TEORÍA DEL CENTRO DE GRAVEDAD TÁCTICO. [Theory of the tactical center of gravity.] (II) Mayor Best F.
- (6) FORTIFICACIÓN DE CAMPANA EN EL ATAQUE. [Field fortifications in the attack.] (II) Mayor Berretta P.
- (7) NUEVOS PRINCIPIOS FRANCESES SOBRE EL EMPLEO DE LA CABALLERÍA. [Recent French doctrine regarding the employment of cavalry.] Coronel v. Dittfurth.
- (8) DESDE MI PUESTO DE OBSERVACIÓN EN PARÍS: EL TRANSPORTE MILITAR AÉREO. [Military air transports.] (II) Mayor Fantini Pertiné.

A continuation of a Military Attaché report, on developments in aerial transport in the French Army.

October 1931

- (9) LA INDUSTRIA EN LA PAZ Y EN LA GUERRA (CONFERENCIA). [Industry in peace and war.] Sr. Colombo L.
A study of the interrelation between military national effectiveness and industrial capacity, with special reference to the situation in Argentina.

- (10) DESDE MI PUESTO DE OBSERVACIÓN EN PARÍS: LAS GRANDES MANIOBRAS AÉREAS. [The great aerial maneuvers.] Mayor Fantini Pertiné.

A comparative study of the annual maneuvers for Air Forces, in principal countries (1931). Regarding England, the "frequency of attacks at low altitudes" is noted; competent observers agree that these flights "were a complete surprise and successful." The article attempts to bring out the combat characteristics of the principal types of aviation (pursuit, bombardment, etc.). The French air maneuvers (San Rafael) were designed to illustrate joint action with naval forces against fortified harbors.

- (11) PUNTOS DE VISTA PARA EL PLANEO DE TEMAS TÁCTICOS EN LA INSTRUCCIÓN DE OFICIALES. [Outline of tactical instruction for officers.] Tenl. Monferini J.M.

A continuation of a series of articles. Contains typical orders, for a division in the advance.

- (12) SON LAS AMETALLADORAS PESADAS LOS SOSTENER PRINCIPALES DEL COMBATE DE FUEGO DE LA INFANTERÍA? [The role of heavy M.G. in the combat of infantry.] Coronel Hassler H.

An interesting study of the increasing employment of machine guns during the World War, as a result of losses in man-power. While admitting the value of machine guns, in the defense of positions, the author believes that they have only limited application in the attack.

23—REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE MONDIALE (France)

By MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

January 1931

- (1) L'AMÉRIQUE ESPAGNOLE ET LA GUERRE. [Latin America and the World War.] (II) A historical study tracing the attitude and actions of the principal Latin-American countries, in the course of the World War. There are interesting data containing propaganda activities of the Germans, in those countries, particularly Chile.

- (2) LES RELATIONS FRANCO-ALLEMANDES EN 1911. [Franco-German relations in 1911.] Unpublished documents relating to the Franco-German crisis of 1911, on the subject of Morocco.

April 1931

- (3) LA PRÉPARATION DE L'ARMÉE RUSSE EN 1914. [The state of preparation of the Russian Army in 1914.] Villate.

Analytical study of the moral preparation of the Russian people for war, and the technical and material preparation of its Army. The author notes a marked absence of patriotic sentiment at the outbreak of war. Then follows a review of leading military and civil personages: Sonkominov, Brussilov, Grand-duke Nicolas, etc., and an analysis of the professional qualifications of the Corps of Officers. The next subject is a review of military organization and the technical and material resources, in mobilization.

- (4) L'AMÉRIQUE ESPAGNOLE ET LA GUERRE. [Latin America and the World War.] (III) A continuation of the previous study, bearing upon the political and diplomatic effect of the World War on Latin America. Contains interesting data regarding German propaganda, in intellectual fields.

- (5) LA VIE ET L'ŒUVRE DU MARÉCHAL JOFFRE. ESSAI BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE. [The life and work of Marshal Joffre.] Bibliography of contemporary works, books, essays, articles, etc., dealing with the personal life and official activities of Marshal Joffre. A valuable compilation for bibliographic research.

July 1931

- (6) L'ENTENTE ET LA GRECE PENDANT LA GUERRE MONDIALE. [The Entente and Greece during the World War.] Angel.

This study deals with the origin of the expedition to Saloniki, tracing events in a strictly chronological order. The inter-play of diplomatic negotiations is well represented. Venizelos, a prime factor in these negotiations, favored the Allies consistently, while King Constantine tried to evade the issue, until, in the end, he himself was forced to suggest landing in Greek ports.

- (7) L'EFFONDREMENT MILITAIRE DE L'AUTRICHE-HONGRIE. [The military collapse of Austria-Hungary.] (I) Capitaine Moreigne.

This study takes up the situation of the Austrian Army, in September 1918 after the ineffectual offensive of France, on the Piave, and traces the swift military and moral collapse of that Army. The study is grouped under the following heading: High Command: The distribution of mobilized forces; The action of GHQ; The material situation of the Army; The effect of blockade; Supply deficiencies; The morale situation; Desertions; Mutinies; Combat efficiency; Morale; Power of resistance. The study presents the picture of an Army which is slowly decaying. The High Command is characterized as notoriously inefficient. Nevertheless, the soldierly

quality of individuals was still sufficiently pronounced, to maintain a semblance of resistance. There are other factors to account for the sudden collapse of this war machine.

- (8) L'ENTRÉE EN GUERRE DE LA BULGARIE. [The entry of Bulgaria in the War, according to Bulgarian diplomatic records.] (I) It is known that Bulgaria signed an offensive treaty with Germany and Austro-Hungary, on September 6, 1915. This accord was arrived at after a period of intensive diplomatic negotiations with both the Central and Entente Powers. The decisive phase of these pour-parlers began in July 1915. The documents, reproduced in this article, permit one to follow these devious negotiations, from August to September 1915. While fragmentary, the papers are fairly complete as regards negotiations with Serbia.

24—REVUE MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE (France)

By MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

July 1931

- (1) SUCCES STRATÉGIQUE, SUCCES TACTIQUES. [Strategic and tactical success.] (VIII) Colonel Lotzeau.

A continuation of previous articles. The author has studied the relation between tactical and strategic success, in a profound review of the operations plans during the World War—initially, the "Schlieffen" plan, and its modification; Falkenhayn's and the breakthrough at Gorlice; Ludendorff's offensive against the British in 1918. The author concludes that "strategic success is the result of efforts based on a single, definite idea, to destroy the enemy forces. Tactical success, which has no strategic conception, will lead to only local advantages."

- (2) LES OBJECTIFS GÉOGRAPHIQUES. [Geographic objectives.] Contre-Amiral Castex.

A historical study of joint Army-Navy action in the securing of geographic objectives, which have a strategic significance.

- (3) LE PREMIER GÉNÉRALISSIME DES ARMÉES RUSSES. [The Commander-in-Chief, Russian Army. The Russian Front, 1915.] Général Danilov.

A Russian account of the operations, in the Eastern Front, in 1915. Good, collateral material to available German studies.

- (4) LA GUERRE SUR LE PLAN DES RÉALITÉS. [War in its realistic aspects.] Chef de bataillon Delmas.

A study of the psychological elements in the training of soldiers, with reference to the technical characteristics of modern warfare. The author believes that moral qualities, psychic stamina will still be essential, in a war of endless technical possibilities.

August 1931

- (5) LA DÉFENSE DE LA POSITION FORTIFIÉE DE NAMUR EN AOÛT 1914. [The defense of Namur, August 1914.] Lieutenant-colonel Desmazes.

An historical study of the defense of Namur, through mobile troops, as an example of the strategic and tactical value of organized defensive positions, within the zone of action of an Army. The author compares the defense of Namur—as an incident of the war of movement—with the defense of Fort Douaumont, under siege operations. The author believes that this defense absorbed a large part of the German mass of maneuver, of the right wing (150,000), a circumstance aided by the cautious advance of General Gallwitz.

- (6) DU RÔLE JOUÉ PAR LE TERRAIN À LA BATAILLE DES ARDENNES. [The influence of terrain on

the Battle of the Ardennes.] (I) Lieutenant-colonel Pugen.

A study of the operations of the French Fourth Army, in the Belgian Ardennes, August 22, 1914, with the particular aim to trace the effect and influence of the difficult terrain on that front, on certain tactical events. This article is an important corollary to the French E.S.G. study "La Bataille des Ardennes," available in a partial translation, at this School.

- (7) LES TENTATIVES DE MANOEUVRES D'AILE APRES LA BATAILLE DE LA MARNE. [The French enveloping maneuver, after the battle of the Marne.] Lieutenant-colonel Variot.

A study of the operations of the Sixth French Army, from 10-16 September, the employment of the XIII Corps on the right bank of the Oise, and the entry into line of the Second Army. The attempt at envelopment of the retreating German Armies failed, because Manauy lacked energy in pursuit and was tied to the pace of the British E.F. The gap between them was filled by French cavalry.

- (8) LA CRYPTOGRAPHIE MILITAIRE DES PUISSANCES CENTRALES. [Military cryptography of the Central Powers.] The author believes that the code and cryptography service of the Central Powers was superior to the Russian service, during the War. He quotes the radio message of the cavalry corps commander Marwitz. The service of the Allies, on the Western front was considered superior to that of the Central Powers.

- (9) LE MARÉCHAL MACDONALD ET LA DÉFENSE DU BAS-RHIN. [Marshal MacDonald and the defense of the lower Rhine.] Capitaine Regnaud.

An historical study of the failure of MacDonald, to effectively close the lower Rhine, as ordered by Napoleon (Nov.-Dec. 1813), due to the increasing resistance of the civil population and the unreliable Flemish-Dutch troops.

- (10) LE IER CORPS DE LA BELGIQUE A LA MARNE. [The French I Corps from Belgium to the Marne.] (I) Lieutenant-colonel Larcher.

A study of the command of an Army Corps, in a war of movement. This is a continuation of "The Campaign of the I Corps, in Belgium" (R.M. September 1930). This study deals with the retreat of the I French Corps, fatigued from the severe fighting in Belgium. This retreat led to the Battle of Guise. The object of the retreat was "to get out of the wooded zone (Ardennes) in order to allow the artillery to effectively support the infantry." The study is valuable to show dispositions, within a Corps, in a retrograde movement (Aug. 26-27-28, 1914).

September 1931

- (11) LA RECHERCHE DE LA DÉCISION. [The quest for decision.] (I) Général Faugeron.

An historical study, to determine the element of "decision," in modern warfare and the art of command. The author reviews briefly, the events in 1914, particularly the "Battle of the Ardennes," which was not carried to a decision; he believes that the elasticity of the French disposition, their mobility in escaping a dangerous situation, saved the day, and a capacity of continued resistance, which was not properly evaluated by the German High Command.

- (12) DU RÔLE JEUÉ PAR LE TERRAIN A LA BATAILLE DES ARDENNES. [The influence of terrain on the Battle of the Ardennes.] (II) Lieutenant-colonel Pugen.

A continuation of Col. Pugen's study on

the operations of the French Fourth Army, August 22, 1914. This operation was conducted in the unfavorable terrain of the Belgian Ardennes. The author covers the subject under the following headings: The unforeseen battle; Action of the cavalry, since Aug. 20th; The tired troops; Terrain favorable for the special training of German infantry; Difficulties of liaison; Terrain opposed to effective employment of artillery.

- (13) L'AVIATION EN GUERRE DE MONTAGNE. [Aviation in mountain warfare.] Capitaine Seive.

A study of the employment of aviation in mountain warfare, in liaison with other arms. The observations of the author are based on the operations of the French 35th Air Regiment, stationed near the French-Italian frontier, i.e., mountainous terrain. The subject is treated under the following headings: (1) The effect of terrain on flight operations; (2) Allotment of aviation units to maintain service; (3) Missions; (4) Matériel.

- (14) LE IER CORPS DE LA BELGIQUE A LA MARNE. [The French I Corps from Belgium to the Marne.] (II) Lieutenant-colonel Larcher.

This instalment covers the movements of the Corps for counterattack. The Germans were pressing heavily on the III and X Corps and d'Espérey expected to relieve them with his counterattack. The exasperating period, under shell fire, during the assembly-phase, is described in considerable detail; the 1st Division was particularly exposed. Finally, on the afternoon of the 29th, the two divisions were ready and moved forward in high morale. The instalment closes as the Divisions advance on Hill 150 north of Bretagne.

- (15) INTÉRÊTS RUSSÉS ET JAPONAIS EN MANDCHOURIE. [Russian and Japanese interests in Manchuria.] This is a timely article, considering actual events in the Orient. The author traces the inter-relation of Russo-Japanese interests, in Manchuria, and explains how Russia and Japan went to war in 1905. He believes that Russia is again involved. The presence of Bolshevik Russia and a bolshevized China are bound to cause considerable trouble. He believes that Japan will not relinquish what she now holds.

October 1931

- (16) LA RECHERCHE DE LA DÉCISION. [The quest of a decision.] (II) Général Faugeron.

The author continues his critical analysis of World War operations. Chapter II deals with the Marne and stresses the vital importance of the Sixth French Army, newly contributed, as the only available mass of maneuver of the French High Command. It is held that the operations of the French, against v.Kluck's Army were indecisive because "the enemy was not contained, (fixed) before the maneuver of envelopment" was launched. Chapter III—From the Marne to the Yser. This plan of the operations consisted of almost identical measures, by both adversaries—the extension of their west flank, by lateral troop movements, at the expense of the Alsace-Lorraine front. The result was a series of attempts toward envelopment, which pushed the front toward the north. It became largely a question of available transportation and available reinforcements. Both sides are hard pressed, in lack of munitions and men.

- (17) LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE. [The government of the "Défense Nationale."] (I) Chef de bataillon Guigues.

- This article deals with the provisional government, for national defense, instituted at the collapse of the Second Empire, 4 September 1870. It is a historical study of the power of improvisation, in an epoch of national disaster, when France was able to gather enough military strength to continue the war.
- (18) *LE 1ER CORPS DE LA BELGIQUE A LA MARNE.* [The French I Corps from Belgium to the Marne.] (III) Lieutenant-colonel Larcher.

This is a continuation of a previous instalment in the August and September numbers, of the study, entitled "The command of a corps in the war of movement." This instalment covers the preliminary operations of the Battle of Guise, (a) the débouchement of the I Corps; (b) the occupation of Hill 150 by the 2d Brigade; (c) the march of the 1st Brigade from Hérie on Chaulieu; (d) the artillery on Hill 120-162; (e) first waverings in the front line; (f) the employment of the 4th Brigade.

- (19) *LA 10E ARMÉE RUSSE ET LE DÉSASTRE D'AUGUSTOVO.* [The Tenth Russian Army and the disaster of Augustovo, 21 February 1915.] (I) Lieutenant-colonel Aublet.

This study deals with the operations of the Tenth Russian Army, during the great German winter offensive, in February 1915, in East Prussia. The material is based on official Soviet documents, particularly the archives of the Tenth Army, and organic units. The German dispositions are not particularly mentioned, as other records cover them elsewhere. 1st Part: The general situation; The German attack of February 7th and 8th; The terrain; The mission of the Tenth Army; Situation and battle order of this Army; Operations of the Tenth Army until February 6th; The German situation; The German attack; The 7th and 8th February; The detachment Wirballen; The center of the Tenth Army; Results of the combats of the 7th and 8th February; Measures taken by the Tenth Army, on that date; Orders for the 9th of February. (Annexes)

- (20) *LA CAMPAGNE DE 1918 ET LA BATAILLE DU 15 JUILLET.* [The campaign of 1918 and the Battle of July 15th.] Général Goudot.

The introductory chapter to a series, dealing with the German offensive in 1918 and the Entente counter-measures; a review of collateral events in that year. The collapse of Russia and the advent of American reinforcements. General situation, in the spring of 1918. A comparison of the German and the Allied plans. The Allied directives.

November 1931

- (21) *LA RECHERCHE DE LA DÉCISION.* [The quest for decision.] (III) Général Faugeron. Chapter IV.—The resignation of Falkenhayn. While acknowledging this leader's great energy, the author believes that Falkenhayn was dominated by events; on reaching the Yser, Falkenhayn had given up hopes of a decision in the West. Verdun became a "moral" offensive; its strategic possibilities could never be decisive; consequently, this operation does not fall in the category of "battles for decision."

- (22) *LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE.* [The government of National Defense.] (II) Chef de bataillon Guigues.

In this part the author deals with "Organization and officer personnel." As stated previously, this is an analytic study of the successive steps in improving a national force. Chapter I covers the National Guard. Officers. Discharge and selection. Critique of the elective system. The election of officers by their

subordinates, is characterized as "scandalous." Chapter II. Administrative councils, in divisions. The mission of this council extended to the procurement of personnel and supplies, in military districts. Chapter III. Study of officer procurement.

- (23) *LA 10E ARMÉE RUSSE ET LE DÉSASTRE D'AUGUSTOVO.* [The Tenth Russian Army and the disaster of Augustovo, 21 February 1915.] (II) Colonel Aublet.

Part II.—From 9-11 February. The defeat of the detachment "Wirballen." This is a pretty detailed study of the operations—and misfortunes—of the XX, III, XXVI and III Siberian Corps, during these critical days. Two sketches (Nos. 4 and 5) aid in fixing the situation. It is obvious, that in the south, the offensive of the Eighth German Army, had run up against severe resistance, while in the north, the German plan succeeded (Tenth Army), and exposed the center of the Tenth Russian Army to envelopment. The Russian High Command did not realize this promptly. Consequently, the forced withdrawal revolves around the left wing, the center becomes the right, and the XX Corps on the extreme tip of the marching wing is exposed to envelopment.

- (24) *LE 1ER CORPS DE LA BELGIQUE A LA MARNE.* [The French I Corps from Belgium to the Marne.] (IV) Lieutenant-colonel Larcher.

The narrative continues to cover the operations as follows: The attack of the 2d Brigade. The 1st Brigade occupies Clancieu (19 o'clock). The 4th Brigade marches on Bertaigemont (18 o'clock). Pétaïn, then Brigadier, distinguished himself in the skillful leading of his units. The attack of the 8th Infantry on 142-147. This section describes the approach march of a regiment and subsequent movements, under fire, until the advance was stopped. The 4th Brigade occupies Bertaigemont. The 2d Division occupies Sains and Richaumont. The orders of General d'Espérey for the night of August 29-30. The various operations, at this time, had begun to crystallize into a success. The 2d Division was firmly supported by the X Corps. Pétaïn's Brigade, with troops from the III Corps were advancing successfully, on Bertaigemont. In the center, the 10th Division appeared seriously engaged. There was one questionable circumstance—a lack of prisoners and captured matériel. General d'Espérey gives the order "to throw the enemy across the Oise, tonight." The fatigued conditions of the 1st Division does not deter him from this plan. There prevailed a distinct impression of victory in the I Corps, however, d'Espérey estimated that the Germans had suffered more losses than his own hard-pressed units; exploitation of success, appeared to him the essential thing, at this time. The order of the 1st Division for night attack.

- (25) *LA CAMPAGNE DE 1918 ET LA BATAILLE DU 15 JUILLET.* [The campaign of 1918 and the battle of 15 July.] (II) Général Goudot.

Chapter II.—The tactical preparation. The battle, since Foch took command, was coordinated by Directive No. 4, with additional instructions of January 24, 1918. The essential of these instructions is "organization in depth, to force the enemy to displace artillery, before attacking the M.L.R." This chapter contains interesting extracts from the correspondence of General Gouraud's with G.H.Q., and represents an accurate analysis of his view on "elastic defense." (Map No. 2 "Successive position of the Fourth Army in July 1918.") The subsequent material covers

the disposition and order of the opposing Armies, in the Champagne (pp. 241-246). The chapter on "Intelligence" is interesting, as depicting French reconnaissance and surveillance measures, which resulted in increasing evidence of the impending German attacks. Chapter III deals with the frustrated attack, the artillery preparation and the advance of the infantry. The author concludes that of all the operations of 1918, the victory in the Champagne must be considered as of extraordinary importance. The strategic and tactical situation of the Germans was such, that the attack of July 15th represented a final but decisive effort. The frustration of this effort, in the Champagne, was the turning point in 1918.

31—INFANTRY JOURNAL

September-October 1931

- (1) THE TACTICS OF BUSH WARFARE. Major Peard
- (2) STRATEGY OF THE CENTRAL POWERS IN THE WORLD WAR. (I) Lieutenant Colonel Chaffin
- (3) OBTAINING THE ZERO OF A MACHINE GUN FOR INDIRECT LAYING. Captain Ware
- (4) ATTACHMENT FOR FIRING .22 CALIBER AMMUNITION WITH THE BROWNING MACHINE GUN FOR INDOOR INSTRUCTION. Captain Thompson
- (5) NOTES FROM THE CHIEF OF INFANTRY

November-December 1931

- (6) INFANTRY TACTICS. Brigadier General Cocheu
- (7) LEADS IN INFANTRY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRING. Lieutenant Greene
- (8) WAR POLICIES. Major Eisenhower
- (9) ANTI-TANK DEFENCE. Captain Hinterhoff, Polish Army
- (10) THE YORKTOWN SESQUICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION. Lieutenant Lovell
- (11) NOTES ON ANIMAL SWIMMING. Captain Yeuell
- (12) THE CONSERVATION OF M.G. AMMUNITION ALLOWANCES. Captain Reynolds
- (13) INSIDE DOPE ON ONE R.O.T.C. UNIT. "First Lieutenant (Permanent Grade)"
- (14) ANTI-AIRCRAFT TACTICS FOR MOVING COLUMNS. Lieutenant Ostberg
- (15) STRATEGY OF THE CENTRAL POWERS IN THE WORLD WAR. (II) Lieutenant Colonel Chaffin
- (16) ARMORY TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. Colonel Waldron
- (17) THE PLANE VS. THE BULLET. Lieutenant Colonel Sharpe
- (18) THE LEAGUE IN MANCHURIA. Lieutenant Colonel Beukema

32—REVUE D'INFANTERIE (France)

By MAJOR R. C. SMITH

July 1931

- (1) LES INFANTERIES ÉTRANGERES.—V. L'INFANTERIE JAPONAISE. [Foreign infantry. V. Japanese infantry.] (See abstract, page 41)

September 1931

- (2) LE COMBATTANT AUX PRISES AVEC LA SOUFFRANCE. [The combatant at grips with physical distress.] A continuation of the series in which the author discusses the effect of physical pain of the combatant and the efforts for its alleviation.
- (3) LE PLAN EN RELIEF EN SABLE. [The sand table.] Capitaine Payen.
A short description of a sand table that is similar to the one in use in our service.
- (4) RECUEIL DE CONSEILS A L'USAGE DES JEUNES TIRAILLERS FRANCAIS. [Collection of advice

for the use of young French Colonial soldiers.] Lieutenant Bresson.

Primarily for those who will see duty with regiments in North Africa.

- (5) LE SERVICE EN CAMPAGNE DE L'INFANTERIE. [Infantry field service.] Lieutenant-colonel Besnard. (concluded)

The author discusses billeting, the service of security outposts, advance guards, etc., and the approach march.

- (6) CONNAISSANCE ET EMPLOI DES ARMES ET ENGINS DE L'INFANTERIE. [Knowledge and use of infantry weapons.] Commandant Faillie. (concluded)

Includes a discussion of the French conception of the "base of fire."

- (7) LIAISON INFANTERIE-ARTILLERIE. [Infantry-artillery liaison.] Lieutenant-colonel G.

Based on a German article, the suggestion is advanced that some infantrymen should be given sufficient training in artillery technique so that if the artillery observer with a rifle company or other front line unit, is a casualty, he may be temporarily replaced by infantry personnel.

33—ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL (Great Britain)

September 1931

- (1) ANTI-TANK DEFENCE. Captain Hinterhoff, Polish Army.

October 1931

- (2) NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN WARFARE. General Sumterall
- (3) A RECONNAISSANCE FROM FORT SANDEMAN TO THE GOMAL RIVER (10TH A.C.C., R.T.C.)

November 1931

- (4) THE CAREER OF THE AVERAGE REGIMENTAL OFFICER, AND THE DIFFICULTY OF FINANCIAL INCREASE: How can (1) his conditions, or (2) his training, be improved?
- (5) GEORGE THOMAS, FREE-LANCE GENERAL. Morrison
- (6) PALESTINE OPERATIONS, 19TH SEPTEMBER TO 31ST OCTOBER, 1918

December 1931

- (7) THE CARDEN-LOYD LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS TANK
- (8) THE AUSTRÖ-DAIMLER SIX-WHEELER TYPE A.D.G. Hacker
- (9) AIR-COOLED MACHINE GUNS. Captain Dawson

35—CAVALRY JOURNAL

September-October 1931

- (1) MANEUVERS OF 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION. Major Clark
- (2) CAVALRY AND MECHANIZED FORCE. Brigadier General Hawkins
- (3) CHASING THE "TRANSVAAL WOLF." Lieutenant Colonel Edwards
- (4) COMMUNITY INTEREST IN NATIONAL GUARD. Colonel Waldron

November-December 1931

- (5) ARMY EQUESTRIAN TEAMS IN PAST OLYMPIC GAMES. Major Grimes
- (6) SOME RANDOM OBSERVATIONS. Lieutenant Colonel Burnett
- (7) THE EFFECT OF MECHANIZATION UPON CAVALRY. Major Smith (Kansas National Guard)
- (8) THE McCLELLAN SADDLE AND ITS PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS. Lieutenant Colonel Whiting
- (9) USE OF PACK BY OTHER THAN MEMBERS OF RIFLE PLATOON. Captain Merrill

- (10) ANTI-AIRCRAFT TACTICS FOR MOVING COLUMNS. Lieutenant Ostenberg
(11) "THE CAVALRY," FROM FRENCH REVUE DE CAVALERIE

36—CAVALRY JOURNAL (Great Britain)

October 1931

- (1) THE CAVALRY AT ARRAS, 1917. Major Preston
(2) MODES OF USING THE FIREARM IN THE CAVALRY FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE PRESENT DATE. Payne

37—REVUE DE CAVALERIE (France)

By MAJOR N. B. BRISCOE

July-August 1931

- (1) LA 3^e DIVISION DE CAVALERIE AUX MANOEUVRES DU DIJONNAIS. [The 3d Cavalry Division in the maneuvers at Dijon.] Général Boucherie.

An interesting account, including 7 situation maps, of the operations of a cavalry division in reconnaissance and attack. This is particularly interesting to us at this time as the French cavalry division includes a mechanized regiment with portée artillery in addition to two mounted brigades.

- (2) QUELQUES ASPECTS DE LA DIVISION DE CAVALERIE MODERNE DANS LA "MARCHE A L'ENNEMI." I^{re} PARTIE. [Some aspects of the modern cavalry division in the "march to the enemy."] Part II. Chef d'escadrons Trémau.

A continuation of a tactical study of a concrete situation initiated in the May-June number of the "Revue de Cavalerie." Army cavalry on a mission of reconnaissance is the subject for a discussion of aerial reconnaissance, terrestrial reconnaissance by motor and by horse, and the organization of reconnaissance detachments, and of the march columns. Several points in the conclusion are worthy of note, such as the problem of marching units of so many different speeds in a manner favoring tactical employment, the constant watch for obstacles for protection from enemy motor detachments, the constant guarding against incursions by such detachments, the holding "grouped in the hand of the chief" of the mechanized regiment, "the element of force" of the division, and a warning against its dispersion.

- (3) DRESSAGE ET MONTE A L'OBSTACLE DU CHEVAL DE CONCOURS. [Training and jumping of the show horse.] (III) Capitaine de Fréminville.

The illustrations by Captain d'Halewyn add much humor to a very readable treatise on horse training, the third of a series.

- (4) EXPERIENCE DE RAID DE CAVALERIE EN MAROC ESPAGNOL. [Experience of a cavalry raid in Spanish Morocco.] Spindler.

An account of a march of 350 kilometers in eight marching days of a ten-day period with a column of 257 horses, over a route of road and trails.

- (5) DISCOURS PRONONCÉ PAR LE GÉNÉRAL BRÉCARD A LA FÊTE FÉDÉRALE DES "DIABLES BLEUS." [Address by General Brécard at the general fête of the "Blue Devils."] The address includes some light on the history of these famous Chasseur-a-Pieds by touching on certain high points in their career.

- (6) "LES QUATRE VIEUX" (II). Le régiment de Chamborant. ["The Four Old Ones." II. The regiment of Chamborant.] The second of a series of articles on old regimental treats of the Second Hussars, organized in 1734.

September-October 1931

- (7) LES GÉNÉRAUX DE CAVALERIE TOMBÉS PENDANT LA GRANDE GUERRE. LE GÉNÉRAL ROUSSEAU. [The cavalry generals who fell during the Great War. General Rousseau.] A four-page account of the career of General Jean-Louis-Théodore-Lucien Rousseau who commanded the 137th Brigade, and was killed 20 September 1914 at Cormicy in the German attack on Rheims.

- (8) LA CAVALERIE. [The cavalry.] Major Brenet.

An introductory note by the editor cautions the readers that "the study, full of ideas, will be read and meditated upon with fruit by all cavalrymen" but that it presents the personal theories of the author. In other words, is not official. Some twenty odd pages discuss division and corps cavalry division, ending with conclusions that the infantry division: (1) Should have cavalry "hippomobile," essential for reconnaissance in the zone of action and for protection of the infantry division; (2) Should not be content with a ring of more or less distant patrols, but must have the best of safety measures; (3) Needs protection against armored vehicles. Therefore the infantry division should have a regiment of cavalry organized as at present. The corps should have a regiment of cavalry "automobile." The cavalry divisions should be hippomobile rather than automobile, but it is essential not to mix them.

- (9) "LES QUATRE VIEUX" (III). Le régiment d'Esterhazy. ["The Four Old Ones." III. The regiment of d'Esterhazy.] A history, being the third of this series, of the 3d Hussars, or Regiment d'Esterhazy, organized 1764.

- (10) CAVALERIES ÉTRANGÈRES. LA CAVALERIE ALLEMANDE. [Foreign cavalry. The German cavalry.] Chef d'escadrons Florange.

The introduction calls attention to the proportion of cavalry in the 100,000-man German Army, 3 divisions of cavalry to 7 divisions of infantry. The allowable organization under the Treaty of Versailles is discussed, running on to transgression of the treaty, tactical tendencies, instruction, motorization, composition of the cavalry division, the reserves of the German cavalry, and in the conclusions brings out the claim that German cavalry is ready for active operations, following this with tables showing actual and theoretical organizations and schedules of training of cavalry reservists.

- (11) LA GRANDE ET LA PETITE ÉCURIE DE VERSAILLES. [The grand and small stables at Versailles.] Lieutenant-colonel Sarault. Descriptions and pictures of the royal stables of the Palace of Versailles.

- (12) DRESSAGE ET MONTE A L'OBSTACLE DU CHEVAL DE CONCOURS. [Training and jumping of the show horse.] (III) Capitaine de Fréminville.

Captain de Fréminville continues his treatise and Captain d'Halewyn's sketches humorously bring out some of the points.

38—FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

September-October 1931

- (1) DIVISION ARTILLERY. General Culmann, French Army
(2) ORGANIZATION, ARMAMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY. General Summerall
(3) AUTOMATIC RIFLES FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AIRCRAFT. Major Kirkwood

November-December 1931

- (4) THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF FIELD ARTILLERY

- (5) GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG. Lieutenant Bennisson
- (6) FIELD ARTILLERY R.O.T.C. AT OREGON STATE COLLEGE. Major Bowley
- (7) FIELD LINE CONSTRUCTION. Major Evans

39—JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY (Great Britain)

October 1931

- (1) "TWELVE YEARS AFTER." The problem of ammunition for the artillery of the field army; shrapnel and high explosive. By "Peripatetic"
- (2) THE MECHANIZED UNIT IN THE FIELD. The organization of, and problems of the staff in connection with, the maintenance services for its vehicles. Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro
- (3) THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SUPPLY OF 18 PDR. AMMUNITION IN THE FIELD. Major Beckett
- (4) THE 38TH (WELSH) DIVISION IN THE LAST FIVE WEEKS OF THE GREAT WAR. Major-General De Free

40—REVUE D'ARTILLERIE (France)

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL L. P. HORSFALL

July 1931

- (1) ÉPHÉMÉRIDES DE L'ARTILLERIE. [Dates and events in the history of artillery.] (I) Short notes on events in July of various years pertaining to artillery.
- (2) ALLOCUTION DU GÉNÉRAL MAURIN, INSPECTEUR GÉNÉRAL DE L'ARTILLERIE, AUX OFFICIERS ÉLÈVES D'ARTILLERIE A FONTAINEBLEAU. [Address of General Maurin, Inspector General of Artillery, to the students of artillery at Fontainebleau.] The General's remarks mostly pertain to the military duty of young officers; but he also expresses some views on the rôle of artillery in combat, and on liaison with the infantry and aviation, which he illustrates with examples from his own war experiences.
- (3) EN MARGE DES RÈGLEMENTS SUR LE TIR. Le problème d'inclinaison et le problème de l'évent. [Marginal notes on the firing regulations. The problem of elevation, and the problem of fuse setting.] (I) Général Pagézy.
A rather elementary discussion of methods of calculating firing data. This installment covers the determination of the elevation of the piece under normal conditions.
- (4) RÉSUMÉ DES TRANSFORMATIONS DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'ARTILLERIE DE 1919 A 1930. [Résumé of the changes in the organization of the artillery, 1919-1930.] (I) Capitaine Basset.

A study of the laws affecting the reorganization of the artillery upon a peace basis after the war.

- (5) AU SUJET DU TRANSPORT DE TIR INVERSE. [The subject of transferring the firing data from one battery to another firing on the same target.] Capitaine Aixier.
A discussion of the technical problem of transferring firing data between batteries, giving short-cuts and practical methods.

August 1931

- (6) ÉPHÉMÉRIDES DE L'ARTILLERIE. [Dates and events in the history of artillery.] (II) Important events in August of various years of interest to artillerymen.
- (7) EN MARGE DES RÈGLEMENTS SUR LE TIR. Le problème d'inclinaison et le problème de l'évent. [Marginal notes on the firing regulations. The problem of elevation and the problem of fuse setting.] (II) Général Pagézy.
An explanation of methods of using the firing tables to calculate firing data.
- (8) LA BATAILLE DES FRONTIÈRES. Le déroulement de la bataille. [The battle of the frontiers.

The progress of the battle.] (I) Colonel Valarche.

This installment gives a discussion of the German and French plans at the opening of hostilities in August, 1914, and the German version of the events in Lorraine. The data is taken largely from the French official account, "Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre," and the German source, "Weltkrieg, Reichsarchiv." A good map is provided which is useful in following the text.

- (9) ESSAI D'UNE TABLE DE TIR MÉCANIQUE POUR LE CANON DE 75. [Test of a mechanical firing table for 75-mm guns.] Capitaine Frévolet-Leygonie.

The article gives a discussion of the principles involved, and a description of the construction of a mechanical apparatus to compute firing data, developed two years ago. It is admitted that the mechanism is not entirely satisfactory in its present form. Several fine photographs of the machine are used to illustrate the text.

- (10) RÉSUMÉ DES TRANSFORMATIONS DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'ARTILLERIE DE 1919 A 1930. [Résumé of the changes in the organization of the artillery, 1919-1930.] (II) Capitaine Basset.

A brief statement of the effect of certain French laws on the artillery. Much of the data is in the form of tables.

September 1931

- (11) ÉPHÉMÉRIDES DE L'ARTILLERIE. [Dates and events in the history of artillery.] (III) Notes on events of interest to artillerymen in September of various years.
- (12) EN MARGE DES RÈGLEMENTS SUR LE TIR. Le problème de l'inclinaison et le problème de l'évent. [Marginal notes on the firing regulations. The problem of elevation and of fuse setting.] (III) Général Pagézy.

This installment gives methods of calculating fuse settings.

- (13) LA BATAILLE DES FRONTIÈRES. Le déroulement de la bataille. [The battle of the frontiers. The progress of the battle.] (II) Colonel Valarche.

This series of articles on the operations in the Ardennes at the beginning of the World War in August, 1914, started with the August 1931 issue of the "Revue d'Artillerie" (see also Jan., Feb., March issues). They will be of special interest to Groups VIII, IX and X. Historical Research, who are studying phases of these detached but interrelated meeting engagements. This installment gives the French version of the operations of the French First and Second Armies on the right flank, and the German version of the German Fourth Army, in the center of the line. The author is well known as a military writer, and draws some interesting lessons in strategy and tactics from the operations described.

- (14) CONSTRUCTION GRAPHIQUE DES QUEUES DE TRAJECTOIRES. [Graphical construction of the tail end of trajectories.] Colonel Viant.

A method for the graphical solution of firing table problems pertaining to that portion of the trajectory near the target.

- (15) MÉTHODE COMBINÉE DE LA PHOTOGRAPHIE AÉRIENNE DE DU RÉPÉRAGE PAR COUPS FUSANTS HAUTS. [A method of using aerial photography in high burst fire artillery registration.] Capitaine Krebs.

The method gives an auxiliary means for artillery registration by using aerial photographs made from directly over the target to determine corrections.

October 1931

- (16) ÉPHÉMÉRIDES DE L'ARTILLERIE. [Dates and events in the history of artillery.] (IV) Notes on events of interest to artillerymen in October of various years.
- (17) LA BATAILLE DES FRONTIÈRES. Le déroulement de la bataille. [The battle of the frontiers. The progress of the battle.] (III) Colonel Valarche.

Another installment describing the French version of the operations of the French Third and Fourth Armies in the center, and the German version of the Battle of Charleroi. This is of special interest to the groups in Historical Research who are studying and translating foreign versions of certain phases of these battles, some of the sources being by the same author.

- (18) MISE EN DIRECTION RAPIDE DE LA PIÈCE DIRECTRICE DANS LE CAS DU NO 126 DE L'INSTRUCTION GÉNÉRALE SUR LE TIR DE L'ARTILLERIE DU 20 MARS 1922. [A rapid means of giving the direction to the base piece of a battery in Case No. 126 of the General Instructions of March 20, 1922, for the fire of artillery.] Colonel Roy.

A technical description of a graphical method of orienting the base piece, when the target is visible only from an observation post, and the OP is visible from the battery commanders station, and the gun is visible from both stations.

- (19) LES ORIGINES DE LA BALISTIQUE INTÉRIEURE. [The genesis of interior ballistics.] Colonel Aizier.

A study of the development of the use of gunpowder as a propellant.

- (20) PROCÉDÉ RAPIDE DE DÉTERMINATION DES ZONES D'ACTION DE NUIT. [A rapid process of determining the zones of night action.] Lieutenant Idate.

A technical description of a rapid graphical process to determine the zones in which listening apparatus for antiaircraft fire will be effective for use at night. The problem concerns the relative locations of antiaircraft guns and listening devices.

- (21) ANGLETERRE: UN NOUVEAU TYPE DE CATAPULTE. [England: A new type of catapult.] Describes a machine operated by compressed air to launch heavy airplanes.

November 1931

- (22) ÉPHÉMÉRIDES DE L'ARTILLERIE. [Dates and events in the history of artillery.] (V) Selected dates and events.

- (23) LA BATAILLE DES FRONTIÈRES. Le déroulement de la bataille. [The battle of the frontiers. The progress of the battle.] (IV) Colonel Valarche.

A continuation of the account of the engagements on the frontiers at the outbreak of the World War. This installment gives the German version of the Battle of Charleroi, 23 August, 1914, which involved the French Fifth Army and the German Second Army. It also touches upon the action of the German First and Third Armies on the flanks. This series of articles is of special interest to Groups VIII, IX and X, in Group Research, who are studying the Battle of the Frontiers this year.

- (24) UN NOUVEAU ARMAQUE UNIVERSEL. POUR LE RÉGLAGE PAR COUPS FUSANTS HAUTS. [A new universal graphic chart for the adjustment of firing, using high burst fuses.] Chef d'escadron Morel.

A technical discussion of a method of using specially trained observers and calculators, to adjust artillery fire on a terrestrial target,

located on the map, but not visible to ground observers.

- (25) LE GÉNÉRAL BUISSON D'ARMANDY (1794-1873). [General Buisson d'Armandy, 1794-1873.] Capitaine Basset.

An historical sketch concerning the conquest of Algeria, and inspired by the International Colonial Exposition at Paris.

41—COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

September-October 1931

- (1) THE R.O.T.C.—KEY TO NATIONAL DEFENSE. Major General Hagood
- (2) THIRTY YEARS OF SEACOAST TARGET PRACTISES. Major Crawford

November-December 1931

- (3) METAL MIRRORS, NIGHT GLASSES AND OSCILLATORS. Major Robison
- (4) ANTI-AIRCRAFT TACTICS FOR MOVING COLUMNS. Lieutenant Ostenberg
- (5) WAR POLICIES. Major Eisenhower
- (6) THE YORKTOWN SESQUICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION. Lieutenant Lovett
- (7) ROCKET VS. AIRPLANE. Lieutenant Irvine
- (8) THE LEWIS UNIVERSAL IMPACT AND TRIAL SHOT CHART FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. Captain Lewis
- (9) INSIDE DOPE ON ONE R.O.T.C. UNIT. By First Lieutenant (Permanent Grade)

43—REVUE DES FORCES AÉRIENNES (France)

July 1931

By MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

- (1) LE RENSEIGNEMENT DE L'AVIATION DE LA DÉFENSE ET LES OFFENSIVES ALLEMANDES POUR LA PÉRIODE EN 1918. [Air intelligence in the German breakthrough offensives in 1918.] Général Armengaud. (This is a valuable analysis of the subject; accompanied by maps showing routes and reconnaissance missions in June 1918, on the front "Maubeuge—Sedan.") (See abstract, page 31)
- (2) EMPLOI DE L'AVIATION DANS LA GUERRE NAVALE. [The employment of aviation in naval warfare.] Capitaine Serre.

The author, as naval officer, emphasizes the close liaison between naval and air force, and the increasing importance of aviation in naval warfare. The text is divided into an analysis of: (a) Reconnaissance and security missions; (b) Combat missions. A study of these missions, and specific cases of tactical employment, lead the author to the conclusion that naval aviation requires a distinct organization, to form an integral part of the general navy organization, as well defined as for instance the destroyer squadrons. Methods of employment, consequently, fall under the category of naval warfare, and should be guided by naval experience.

By CAPTAIN W. F. SAFFORD

August 1931

- (3) LA DOCTRINE DE L'AVIATION FRANÇAISE DE COMBAT EN 1918. (I) [The doctrine of French combat aviation in 1918.] Général Voisin.

The development of combat aviation during the war was tremendous; but the doctrine of its employment varied little. The development may be divided into two distinct phases: (1) to the middle of 1917; and (2) 1917-1918. Author then reviews the two periods; the first, of offensive warfare only; and the second, of a combination of offensive and protection of observation planes. Interesting from an historical viewpoint or research.

- (4) EMPLOI DE LA PHOTOGRAPHIE AÉRIENNE POUR L'EXÉCUTION DES LÈVÉS TOPOGRAPHIQUES A

GRANDE ÉCHELLE. [The use of aerial photography for the execution of topographic maps of large scale.] Lieutenant-Colonel de Fontange.

History of such work, in France, briefly sketched; together with comments on the necessity of proper maps, importance of mosaics, etc.; means, methods details of the work. At present the whole of France is being photographed for the correction of old maps and for making new. The usual scales are 1:10,000 or 1:20,000 but for more important areas 1:5000 will be used. Equipment and apparatus commented upon as well as the problems encountered.

- (5) LES CHAMPS DE TIR AÉRIENS SUR CIBLES AU SOL ET L'INSTRUCTION DU TIR AÉRIEN DANS LES RÉGIMENTS. [Aerial fields of fire on ground targets and instruction of aerial fire in the regiments.] Lieutenant-Colonel Guyomar.

Ground targets should represent foot troops—or rather ground troops of various kinds—and such targets should be used by combat aviation. Airplane silhouettes should not be used as ground targets—as is now the practice, in France. "Photographic firing" does not call for corrections for relative speed during time of flight of bullet. It is planned to use reduced charges and small panel targets.

- (6) LA D.C.A. EN ALLEMAGNE. [The "D.C.A." (antiaircraft defense) in Germany.] Sketch of development: before the war, situation on mobilization in 1914, during the first year of the war, in the navy, territorial antiaircraft defense, from 1916 to the end of the war, naval antiaircraft and territorial antiaircraft defense during same period. Lessons learned from the war concerning the use of the "D.C.A." in a modern army. This last is the most interesting as it gives the German instructions relative to antiaircraft defense, which do not differ materially from our own. (From "Die Luftwacht")

- (7) REGLE A CALCUL POUR LA RÉSOLUTION DE TOUS PROBLÈMES USUELS DE PHOTOGRAPHIE AÉRIENNE. [Calculating ruler for the solution of all the usual problems of aerial photography.] Capitaine Petitot.

Necessity and desirability of a simple means of calculating rapidly essential problems of photographic missions by pilots, observers, dark-room personnel, interpreters, correctors, and the users of aerial photos. Description of the Petitot ruler—a kind of slide rule. Application to problems, with many typical problems presented and solved. Apparently a valuable and useful instrument which it would be well for our own forces to investigate.

- (8) LE MATÉRIEL DES AVIATIONS NATIONALES. [Material of the aviation of various nations.] Keystone bi-motor bombardment (US); Two-seater pursuit (US); Boeing single-seaters, biplane and monoplane (US); The Curtis 'Hell Diver' (US); Curtiss two-seater observation (US); Two-seater combat Chance-Vought; Single-seater navy Boeing; Curtiss single-seaters pursuit, Y.P. 20 and X.P. 10; Two Berliner-Joyce pursuit planes; The display of two-seater reconnaissance planes at Villacoublay; The military Fokker.

September 1931

- (9) L'APPEL DES MORTS. [The call of the dead.] Commandant Astruc.

While the activities of pursuit aviation are well known, appealing to the imagination of the romantic, observation aviation has remained the "poor relation." The article appeals to the layman in an endeavor to enlighten him on the work, necessity, utility, and glory

of the missions and the extreme bravery, courage and devotion of pilots and observers on this duty.

- (10) LA DOCTRINE DE L'AVIATION FRANÇAISE DE COMBAT EN 1918. L'aviation de combat indépendante (2e période). [The doctrine of French combat aviation in 1918. (Independent combat aviation).] (II) Général Voisin.

Continuation of a series of articles of historical interest and research. This installment deals with the second period, the last year of the war. Contrary to other arms, practice preceded theory; regulations and rules grew from experience, which, in turn, came from the kind, quantity, and development of matériel, tactics adopted because of this matériel, and "tendencies" of the aviators. Specifically, the author discusses the situation and organization in the spring of 1918, tendencies of mass action, doctrine of the offensive, protection of observation aviation and notes on the employment of the British Royal Flying Corps.

- (11) L'AÉROSTATION D'OBSERVATION ALLEMANDE PENDANT LA GUERRE 1914-1918 ET PRINCIPES D'UTILISATION D'APRÈS-GUERRE. [German observation aerostation during the war 1914-1918 and principles of utilization since the war.] Général Patart.

After a few remarks about the situation before the war when the Germans felt that dirigibles and airplanes, coupled with the more rapid movement of armies, had largely nullified the use of captive balloons and had halted their development, the author discusses organization and employment from the mobilization to the end of 1915. During the war of movement and the beginning of the period of stabilization the results accomplished were by no means brilliant. However, larger balloons, better and more powerful field glasses, etc., and the necessary development of a winch operated by a gasoline motor showed promise. Passing then to a consideration of the organization and employment from the end of 1915 to the end of 1917 the author sketches the main problems encountered and developed. Similarly the period from the end of 1917 to the Armistice is treated. Most important to us, however, are the lessons of the war and the German post-war regulations; these are much like our own.

- (12) A LA RECHERCHE D'UN ÉQUIPEMENT DE SÉCURITÉ POUR L'AVIATEUR. [Research for protective equipment for the aviator.] Médecin-Capitaine Flamme.

A very interesting and instructive article in which the author decries equipment which immobilizes the warrior; especially where it prevents quick movements under abnormal conditions—a matter that has always impressed the layman. Considering the locations of most injuries received in accidents, the author then discusses protective equipment, with suggestions as to changes to eliminate undesirable features, not merely of personal equipment but in plane construction. He also urges a careful investigation, particularly by a medical expert, of all accidents and experiments for study and improvement of equipment. Here is a big field of research.

- (13) CONTRIBUTION A LA RECHERCHE D'UN CODE DE SIGNAUX FACILE ET CLAIR ENTRE TERRE ET AVION. [Contribution to the research of a clear and easy signal code between the earth and airplane.] Lieutenant-Colonel Maignan.

Reprinted from the August number of "La Revue d'Infanterie." Concerns itself with a purely technical matter pertaining to the French Army. One point, however, is im-

portant: all ground troops should have a uniform code which should be read in an indicated direction.

44--ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY (Great Britain)

October 1931

- (1) THE IMPROVEMENT OF MOBILITY OF AIR UNITS FOR INTER-REINFORCEMENTS BETWEEN COMMANDS. Flight-Lieutenant Bladin.
- (2) THE IMPORTANCE OF NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE BY AIR. Squadron-Leader Whitham
- (3) THE 1930 WEST AFRICA FLIGHT. Squadron-Leader Howard-Williams
- (4) RENEWED REFLECTIONS ON DAY-BOMBER FORMATIONS, 1918. Group-Captain Pattinson
- (5) A CRITICISM OF "WAR IN THE AIR." Squadron-Leader Colyer
- (6) THE HEAVY FIGHTING AEROPLANE: A REPLY. Wing-Commander Douglas
- (7) AIR MANEUVERS AT DUNKIRK
- (8) ALLOTMENT OF AIR UNITS TO LARGE FORCES

45--MILITARY ENGINEER

November-December 1931

- (1) BRITISH MILITARY MINING, 1915-1917. Major Harvey
- (2) WEATHER EFFECT ON MILITARY CAMPAIGNS. Lieutenant Commander McAldie
- (3) THE GOODYEAR ZEPPELIN AIRSHIP DOCK. Watson
- (4) THE DIVISION QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT. Major Rowe
- (5) MORE PHILIPPINE REMINISCENCES. Major Sapp
- (6) FERRYING WITH PONTON EQUIPMENT. Lieutenant Noyes
- (7) EARLY HISTORY OF AMERICAN SUBMARINES. Cable

46--ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL (Great Britain)

December 1931

- (1) MECHANIZATION AND DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS. Part III. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzpatrick
- (2) THE PRINCIPLES OF COMBINED OPERATIONS. Brigadier Dobbie
- (3) BRIDGING ON THE CHITRAL ROAD, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE N.W.R. PORTABLE TYPE STEEL BRIDGE. Lieutenant Anderson
- (4) REPORT ON CONCEALMENT FROM THE AIR. Major Dening

47--SIGNAL CORPS BULLETIN

September-October 1931

- (1) ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SIGNAL COMMUNICATION. Lieutenant Simmons
- (2) THE ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE--ITS SCOPE AND PURPOSE. Lieutenant Colonel McCain
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- (11) TRIUMVIRS OF GERMANY'S DESTINY. Hindenburg, Bruening and Groener, who share the dictatorship of the Reich in its critical hour, present a contrast in personalities, but all three are soldiers who have known war.
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Section 3

TRANSLATIONS OF FOREIGN-LANGUAGE ARTICLES

EXPLANATION

The entries from foreign-language periodicals in the Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles (Section 2) include concise digests of the articles. Section 3, within the limitations of available facilities, translates in full or abstracts a few of the more important of such articles.

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**ARMENGAUD, Général, French Army.—Air intelligence in the Ger-
man breakthrough offensives in 1918.** [Le renseignement de l'avia-
tion de la défense et les offensives allemandes pour la percée en 1918.]
(Revue des Forces Aériennes, July, 1931) Translated by Major C. A.
Willoughby

The author presents a study of the effect of air reconnaissances, in the coming two major German offensives, in March and July 1918. In the course of the analysis, a comparison is made between aerial reconnaissance in 1918, when the operative tactical situation was one of frontal attack and the penetration of an organized defensive position, and the situation in 1914 which was one involving a series of mobile flank attacks.

In 1918 the Germans depended for a successful penetration on the measures which they could adopt to deceive the enemy regarding their offensive plans. Hindenburg believed surprise to be out of the question. He

therefore decided on a plan of dissimulation which was successful due to camouflage, the hiding of his dumps, and troop movements by train at night, and at the last moment.

The French Command did not consider a surprise possible in the March offensive, and relied mainly on ground intelligence, supported by close air reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance at this time was extremely difficult, because the French did not possess air superiority.

The High Command at this time had a preconceived idea that a German offensive would take place in the Champagne. Both Wilson and Foch had come to this conclusion.

The author believes that air reconnaissance reports were not sufficiently conclusive, in conjunction with intelligence from ground sources, to allow the General Staff to arrive at such a conclusion.

The March offensive in consequence became a surprise to the Allies and a partial success for the Germans.

After the offensive the Allied Command decided that air intelligence had been seriously at fault. A memorandum for air reconnaissance was issued, which explained that the weakness of reconnaissance as an integral part of intelligence lay in the following causes:

- (1) The precautions taken by the enemy to hide their preparations and so insure surprise;
- (2) The extreme height at which the reconnaissances were carried out;
- (3) Insufficient long-distance reconnaissances;
- (4) Insufficient interest and action by Commanding Officers.

The rapidity with which the enemy was able to concentrate his forces and to open an offensive, made most sources of intelligence of little value. That fact made air reconnaissance doubly valuable, as it could supply the information obtained immediately.

Special steps were also taken to collate the air intelligence from the whole front. The improvement which resulted was marked.

In the July offensive therefore, the Allied Command was accurately informed by air reconnaissance of:

- (1) The German preparations for an offensive;
- (2) The probable front on which the offensive would face.

This time there was no surprise, and the attackers were to encounter a forewarned enemy with forces equal to his own.

In conclusion, the writer finds that during mobile conditions at the beginning of the war, air intelligence, although unorganized, supplied good information, as for example at Morhange, Luneville and the Marne, because successful concealment was impossible.

For a real successful offensive, he points out that air superiority is an essential, as only then can air reconnaissance be carried out with success.

The events of March to July, 1918, give one the most convincing arguments to suppose that the defeat or victory of a nation lies in its air inferiority or air superiority, more than in any other form of tactical superiority.

Cavalry today. [Kavalleristische Gegenwartsgedanken.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 18 November 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

I.—THE NATURE OF SUITABLE MODERN CAVALRY

The treaty of Versailles has left Germany with three cavalry divisions but has made it impossible to organize and equip them in a modern manner. Hence she can keep step with this as well as with other military progress only in a theoretical spiritual way. She must not however lose herself in Utopias; she will not speculate concerning the cavalry of 1960 but stay to the necessities of the present.

The first question is "Does the leader of today need mobile units and to what purpose?" The answer depends on the conception one has of war today. The author does not believe in trench warfare as a thing of the future. He sees the mission of the leader to be: to strive with all means through an annihilation strategy to force a decision before the personnel and matériel on both sides has been so augmented that there will no longer be room nor mobility, and a position warfare again sets in.

If one accepts this as the mission of the leader, and bears in mind that modern reconnaissance makes it much more difficult to surprise the enemy, then one perceives the urgent necessity of the mobile unit. The quicker a mobile unit moves against vulnerable points the less time there is for the enemy to undertake defensive measures. But the mobile unit must not only get there quickly but with a combat strength which will cause a decisive success. But mobility and combat strength are conflicting elements. The mobile units cannot have the strength in personnel of an infantry unit. In the cavalry, for example, part of the strength is lost in the horse-holders. Herein lies the reason for the relative ineffectiveness of the army cavalry of 1914 and 1915.

But there are remedies. One is the use of masses, i.e., the increase of effectives by the multiplication of squadrons. One cannot name a great cavalry leader who has not achieved success by employing this principle. The other remedy is the motor. Its essence is power and power permits the combination of speed and the combat strength which it is capable of transporting. It has of course its limitations. The horse is still the most mobile over all kinds of country. If a horse drops out that means the loss of one man only; if a motor fails there is a more serious decrease of strength. The mounted man can approach through cover; the motors cannot and are therefore more vulnerable. However important they are in reconnaissance they cannot effect a tight reconnaissance and security screen. One need but think of mountains, swamps, large woods, nightfall and fog to realize this.

The solution must come with time. One wishes that it may be found between technical illusion and conservative persistence.

In what form can the motor be put at the disposal of the cavalry to supplement by mobility its small combat strength? Three types of motor combat elements come into question.

Next to motor units there are trucks carrying infantry and also artillery. They have a considerable combat strength but no extensive mobility and so are essentially defensive in nature.

Secondly there are mechanized forces—infantry and artillery on special mobile vehicles able to operate on all kinds of terrain. They are a great aid to cavalry but they are very expensive.

Lastly there are armored car units, with attached mechanized artillery. They are next to cavalry in mobility, but are clearly only offensive units, and very expensive, as well as subject to rapid deterioration.

II.—CAVALRY LEADERSHIP

The chief mission of army cavalry is to attack in flank and rear in order to bring about a decision. Pursuit, delaying action, screening, covering withdrawals, even defensive, are missions which may fall to the army cavalry. The leader must use his army cavalry only if the purpose warrants it. It is a mistake to "keep it busy," to use it for other purposes, to fatigue it by purposeless marches. It must never be forgotten that the army cavalry is a sensitive weapon which is to be thrown in ruthlessly only when the mission demands it, but which needs days of rest to gather new strength.

When the leader decides on the use of the army cavalry it must be allowed freedom. It cannot be commanded from afar. It must not be split up by orders of the High Command. The use of the cavalry corps "Brecht" in the battle of the Masurian Lakes shows that even such a true leader as Ludendorff did not always succeed in using his army cavalry properly.

Now as to cavalry tactics. No longer is the cavalry division to be held tightly in hand unified. Today it must attain distance, and not expose itself in long vulnerable march columns to its most dangerous foes, the armored car and the aeroplane.

It must advance by units, with distances between them, and continuously. Level stretches must be taken at the trot. In hard going the horses, especially the draft animals, must be spared. This type of advance is the best protection against aeroplanes and armored cars.

The author favors small subordinate units which strive for the same goal. "March separately; strike unitedly."

The march is easier with a minimum of transport.

The advance must not be a rigorous scheme—columns may have to be formed on occasion in proximity to the enemy.

When the enemy is encountered immediate attack is necessary. Lengthy preparations are never, transverse movements are seldom proper. Without battle one does not conquer even in the back of an enemy.

The reconnaissance area of army cavalry is on the flank of the army. The chief agent of distant reconnaissance is the aeroplane, next comes the armored car, then the cavalry. An army is like a man in the dark of night: his ear (the flyer) apprises him of the enemy from afar, his eye (the armored car) dimly perceives the outlines, but only his outstretched hand (the cavalry) fixes the real location.

III.—THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY

The author disregards the question of "2 or 3 regiments per brigade or 2 or 3 brigades per division"—4 or 6 regiments. Personally he prefers the cavalry brigade of 3 regiments.

The kernel of the cavalry, the cavalry corps, he believes, will more easily find an outstanding leader than to have to find similarly competent leaders for separate divisions. The corps must have artillery, engineers, signal troops and trains, as well as armored cars, and observation aviation. He does not believe, however, in the mixing of horse cavalry and motors within units, but believes they should be kept separate.

Whatever may prevail the fundamental is not subject to change: To lead battle cavalry means to build masses.

Change of attack direction by a deployed division. A lesson from military history. [Verwerfung einer entwickelten Division nach der Flanke. Eine kriegsgeschichtliche Lehre.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 11 September 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

The II Bavarian Army Corps had advanced between 21 and 25 September 1914 by forced marches from southeast of Namur, where it had been detained, to the area north of Peronne. From the Headquarters of the Sixth Army, to which it belonged, it had received the order for the 26th of September to attain the south bank of the Somme at Bray in order to bring about a decision there in the battle, which had been raging for several days, by encircling the enemy's left wing. But the left division (3d Bavarian Infantry Division) had been held up for a long time by enemy cavalry, and then, in the evening before the village of Maricourt, it had run on to insuperable resistance. The right division (4th Bavarian Infantry Division) had advanced through Sailly—Combles—Guillemont, and, at 10:00 AM, had just begun to rest between these places, when, hard against its right flank, south and southwest of Bapaume, enemy columns appeared by surprise, which later proved to be the 81st, 82d, 84th and 88th French Territorial Divisions. The 4th Bavarian Infantry Division had available only the 7th Infantry Brigade consisting of 7 battalions, because the 5th Reserve Infantry Brigade (6 battalions), which had been the last to detain, was still a whole day's march in rear. Nevertheless, a quick decision to attack caused a serious reverse to the enemy. This was effected by the


4th Field Artillery Brigade (11 batteries). The infantry suffered only minor casualties. But the battle had been extended into the night. At last the troops had betaken themselves, in a condition of readiness for combat, to a cold and short rest in the area Le Transloy—Lesboeuks—Ginchy—Guilleumont.

For September 27th the 3d Bavarian Division had been ordered anew to advance through Maricourt—Bray to the south bank of the Somme. However, the 4th Bavarian Infantry Division had to shake off the beaten enemy territorial troops and then advance to Fricourt. Thus it had renewed the attack at 6:00 AM. In the meantime the enemy had withdrawn from the field so that the Division undertook a blow in the air.

At the same time it swerved somewhat to the left. Just before 10:00 AM—looking northwest—there stood, completely deployed and widely disposed, the 7th Infantry Brigade, 5th and 9th Infantry Regiments, 2d "Jäger" Battalion, on the heights on both sides of Flers, while the detachments of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade (2d and 11th F.A. Regiments) had accordingly moved to and through Gueudecourt—Lesboeuks—Ginchy. It appeared that the moment had come for the start of the advance towards Fricourt. On the one hand to engage and pursue the beaten and retreating French territorial divisions there had, in the meantime, appeared new units in the plan, namely the XIV Reserve Corps, which had been detrained in the last few days at Cambrai, and the Army Cavalry Corps I and II with 4 cavalry divisions. The XIV Reserve Corps was approaching—screened on the right flank by the Army Cavalry Corps I (Guard Cavalry Division and 4th Cavalry Division)—from the northeast towards Bapaume, while the divisions which had arrived of the Army Cavalry Corps II (7th Cavalry Division at Gueudecourt, 2d Cavalry Division at Morval) were to advance in the direction of Albert in front of the right wing of the II Bavarian Army Corps. On the other hand the 3d Bavarian Infantry Division needed immediate help. It had attacked the village of Maricourt at dawn, encircling from northeast and southeast, but had suffered a severe reversal.

If the 4th Bavarian Infantry Division now turned towards the southwest that meant an advance to the extreme left flank. Under other circumstances it would have been easy and simple to change the broad and shallow formation of the 7th Infantry Brigade through a turn to the left into a march column on the road Gueudecourt—Flers—Longueval, and to connect the 4th Field Artillery Brigade accordingly. But it was very likely that the enemy would be met again by the Division in the vicinity of Montauban. It therefore had to develop in the new march direction ready for combat, and advance in this formation. This required the creation of at least two march columns. The order issued by the commander of the 4th Bavarian Infantry Division at Combles at 9:50 AM contemplated this. It prescribed two march columns. The group "Weniger" (5th Infantry Regiment, I/11 F.A. Regiment) was to assemble east of Longueval and advance on the road Longueval—Maricourt, in the first instance to the crossroads 500 m. east of Montauban. The group "Henigst" however (9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Jäger Bn., 2d F.A. Regiment, II/11 F.A. Regiment) was to assemble at Lesboeuks and go by the road Ginchy—Guilleumont—Montauban, also in the first instance as far as the crossroads 500 m. east of Montauban. The 5th Chev. Regiment north of Gueudecourt received the order to ride ahead towards Montauban. The enemy was to be attacked wherever met on the way.

This order reached the leaders of both march columns at Flers ("Henigst") and Ginchy ("Weniger") at about the same time, 10:45 AM, so that its dispatch consumed almost an hour, although it was but a distance of 6 kilometers. A warning order dispatched at 9:25 AM through an adjutant in a motor car did not arrive until 11:18 AM at the "Henigst" group. The reason for these delays is certainly to be found in the quick advance which the troops had made in the morning. This had forced the leaders to frequent and quick changes of place. They had, in truth, sent word of



their new locations as required. But these messages, if they reached their destinations, were often at once outdistanced. The situation did not permit of establishing telephone connections. A similar situation obtained between the two groups themselves. The orderlies had to seek the staffs where they had concealed themselves and this took time. But other friction also ensued.

The group "Weniger" had quickly prepared itself for the march, as it had only simple and short movements to make. The 5th Infantry Regiment assembled at noon in Longueval on the road running north and south through the village. But then word was received that three French battalions were in the Bois des Foureaux and also that Bazentin le Grand was occupied. It was clear that the march on Montauban would be possible only when this threat on the right flank was abated. Therefore the regiment turned to the right again and developed at 1:30 PM on the northwest edge of Longueval for attack on the Bois des Foureaux.

The I/11 F.A. Regiment brought into positions two batteries northwest of Ginchy and one battery southeast of Longueval, both to support this attack and to hold back the enemy at Bazentin le Grand.

In the meantime the group "Henigst" had commenced its march. The 9th Infantry Regiment (less II Battalion) and the II/11 F.A. Regiment had been assembled southeast and east of Flers; the 2d F.A. Regiment south of Gueudecourt. But not until 1:00 PM did the battalions and detachments take the road to Ginchy. The 2d Jager Battalion and II/9 Infantry Regiment had begun to move at 11:30 AM from Flers—Nord but had first, as ordered, gone in the direction of Lesboeufs. On this road—just as happened with the 2d F.A. Regiment—it ran into the 7th Cavalry Division which, just at that time, was en route from Gueudecourt for the heights south of Flers. The two battalions also came under enemy shrapnel fire which forced them to go cross country under cover of the terrain. Thus much time was lost. Not until 1:30 PM did the 2d Jager Battalion reach Lesboeufs. In the march column of the "Henigst" group the I/9 Infantry Regiment furnished the advance guard. The II/11 F.A. Regiment, the 2d F.A. Regiment, and the III/9 Infantry Regiment, with machine gun company, followed, considerably spread out. The 2d Jager Battalion and II/9 Infantry Regiment—moving from Lesboeufs—were considerably in rear. From Ginchy the march led to the crossroads east of Guillemont. This village was passed on the south. Just north and west of Guillemont the 2d Cavalry Division had been established since noon. It had to halt there when it was learned that Bazentin le Grand and Montauban were occupied. Its horse batteries had unlimbered on the west edge of Guillemont and engaged in an artillery duel with French artillery at Contalmaison. The 3d Bavarian Infantry Division, which was assigned to the 5th Reserve Infantry Brigade, had from the north through Montauban—Corney encircled the veritable bastion stronghold of Maricourt, so that its right wing was stretched to Guillemont. It lay now on the west edge of Bois de Bernafay, engaged with strong enemy forces in Montauban. The group "Henigst" had thus, as its point reached Bois de Trones at 2:00 PM, moved on to the combat area of the 3d Bavarian Infantry Division and 2d Cavalry Division. The indications showed everywhere. Ginchy and Guillemont were in flames and crowded with troops and transport.

But the commander of the 4th Bavarian Infantry Division in Combles was aware of these things and they caused him to move to the right, and indeed so far that the attack of his division hit the left flank of the enemy whose center opposed the 3d Bavarian Division. For this purpose an officer of the General Staff went by motor to head off and deflect the troops which were still at Montauban. He went first to Guillemont and ordered the commanders of the 7th Infantry Brigade and 4th F.A. Brigade to place their battalions and regiments at and northwest of Longueval in readiness for an attack on Mametz. In the march column of the "Henigst" group which stretched back to Guillemont—Ginchy—Lesboeufs the individual battalions and detachments were now turned off by the shortest routes

towards Longueval. The group "Weniger" had in the meantime—if for another reason—turned to the right and at 3 o'clock gained the Bois des Foureaux in which actually only weak enemy forces were present. Notwithstanding the fact that the group "Weniger" had thus unconsciously made room for the group "Henigst" nevertheless in and about Longueval the troops of the 4th Bavarian Division crowded up into a fairly small area. It was lucky that the enemy artillery avoided the place. Even then it was 4:00 PM before the 4th F.A. Brigade stood ready northwest of Longueval and not until 5:00 PM was it possible, after the enemy was driven out of Bazentin le Grand, for the 7th Infantry Brigade from Longueval (9th Infantry Regiment and 2d Jäger Bn.) and from the Bois des Foureaux (5th Infantry Regiment) to develop for attack against Mametz. A decisive blow was no longer possible, inasmuch as darkness was setting in, though, in the course of the night, the Bois de Mametz and the gorge of the Mulde were gained without combat.

The approach march to the left flank and the development had thus taken the 4th Bavarian Division 6 to 7 hours, although its withdrawal from its erstwhile opponent had been made easy for it, and although the road distances were hardly 5 to 10 kilometers. In peace time such movements are accomplished on the maneuver ground much more quickly, and in war games and conferences they are reckoned as involving a much smaller time element. No imagination, however lively, can portray the conflicts that occur in the changes of real warfare. To depict them is impossible. The troops of the 4th Bavarian Division were undoubtedly exhausted by forced marches. They had withstood a battle in the days just preceding and had not slept. As on the morning of September 27th a short advance demonstrated that the foe had disappeared, it was natural that the need for rest and care became paramount. The units, too, needed reorganization. Enemy searching fire, crossing of units, and stoppages, burning villages and congested roads slowed the march. At the last moment the Division saw itself forced, by an unforeseen change of situation, to move a goodly piece sideways on the base line, which movement also involved all kinds of inconveniences.

The enemy on the right flank also roused himself anew. He could not be neglected. If then, in spite of this, the troops were able, in the darkness, on entirely unknown terrain, and in a situation which had not been cleared up at all, to commence the attack and gain ground, this service is their best witness. That the approach march to the flank took much time is not their fault nor that of their leaders, but, rather, due to the unavoidable friction and incident of war. The import of such circumstances is all too lightly appreciated in peace time.

v.FABER DU FAUX, Major German Army.—**Considerations for revision of the reconnaissance paragraphs of F. u. G. (Conduct and combat of the combined arms—Regulations German Army.)** [Gesichtspunkte für eine Umarbeitung der Aufklärungsziffern der F. u. G. (Führung und gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen.)] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 4 September 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

In the articles entitled *Neuzeitliche Erdaufklärung* [Modern ground reconnaissance.], in the 18, 25 November, and 4 December 1930 issues of the *Militär-Wochenblatt*, the author tried to portray the cooperation of motor and horse in reconnaissance. The experiences of the autumn maneuvers in all countries and the exceptional technical advances require that we revise our regulations, Pars. 132 to 166, on Reconnaissance by cavalry ("distant," "close," and "combat").

Distant reconnaissance is the chief mission of cavalry. Battle with the enemy cavalry must be enjoined down to the smallest units. These units should be equipped with the latest in weapons, protective means, and mobility.

The possibility of a motorized forward wave instead of a reconnaissance detachment with patrols depends on armor protection and terrain mobility. It may often suffice that the point only be armored.

The maneuvers in all countries have shown that the reconnaissance wave of the first line must be motorized, if tactical superiority is to be maintained in the entire reconnaissance area. The horse is just too slow for this. Motorized reconnaissance has the advantage of the elements being brought forward quickly from places of security, and of being kept to a minimum strength, not possible with the mounted units.

The motors must be made part of the cavalry regiments and their commanders made responsible for their employment, not, as the case of the maneuvers of the 5th French Cavalry Division, assigned to them at the last moment and operating independently.

Other missions than those now given in the regulations are essential for the mounted reconnaissance detachments and the regulations must be changed. Distant reconnaissance is the mission of the Air Corps and of the advanced motor elements. No longer will this mission be the burden of the mounted troops.

Heretofore the longest distance which the reconnaissance detachment could be sent ahead of the mass of the cavalry division was a matter of several days' march, determined by the situation. Today, when the enemy may appear with motorized units such an isolation of a mounted reconnaissance detachment with all its impedimenta of transport is unthinkable. There are therefore the alternatives of making the reconnaissance detachments so strong—as contemplated in the "Reconnaissance Regiment" of the regulations—that it can maintain itself far into the enemy's country, or, as the regulations mention as the exception, to rely on strong reconnaissance patrols with distant objectives. But even these solutions are unsatisfactory as opposed to motorized forces. A mounted reconnaissance detachment is too vulnerable and too much bound to roads. It is too highly visible and too slow in withdrawal from a motorized enemy. The distant patrol would be preferable. Without transport it may elude the enemy, and stay out for some days and stay in touch by short wave radio.

The proper sphere of mounted reconnaissance is the "close reconnaissance." This enters when aerial, motor and distant mounted patrol reconnaissance have so defined the situation that division into regimental sectors is indicated. It may be carried on by a Reconnaissance Squadron in the regimental sector of 3 to 5 kilometers breadth. The squadron carries on close and battle reconnaissance to 10 or 15 kilometers distance, with its patrols 15 to 30 kilometers distant from the regiment.

The principles of distant, close and combat reconnaissance do not change, except that the use of motors entails some variants from former practice. They must be used economically, must not "stick" to the enemy, must not subject themselves to the danger of extensive casualties, and must constantly return to the main body to enable their use at the critical points.

The paragraphs of the regulations concerning reconnaissance by divisional cavalry likewise do not contemplate the use of the motor. In the infantry division we have had the reconnaissance detachment, its strength fixed by the regulations. This unwieldy unit will serve no longer. Every infantry division must have more than a troop of cavalry for combat reconnaissance and liaison and more than a troop of lightly armored reconnaissance vehicles for the close reconnaissance. The paragraphs of our regulations should be entitled "close and combat reconnaissance by mixed units."

To insure tactical supremacy in the reconnaissance area there is necessary, moreover, the latest armament, without curtailing mobility. For close reconnaissance a small calibered semi-automatic rifle is needed. A machine gun effective to 1800 meters must be furnished to the mounted troops to be carried on pack animals. For long range fire, machine guns

mobilized on motors must be provided as a reserve for the regimental commander.

Armor-piercing weapons cannot be dispensed with. They should be motorized and armored. Three per regiment are essential.

For quick combat of strong points a light minenwerfer is needed, to be carried on armored motor.

The equipment of engineer troops for defense against tanks becomes increasingly important. The carrying of an adequate supply of mines on a motor vehicle would increase the safety in No Man's Land.

The use of short wave radio for dispatch of reconnaissance information will augment the mounted messenger. A light radio station for sending to the rear must be motorized.

If these demands are met, the cavalry will maintain its tactical superiority in the reconnaissance area.

FISCHER, Oberst, German Army.—Defense against tanks today.
[Tankabwehr von heute.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 11 October 1931)
Translated by Major A. Vollmer

The purport of this article is to show how the development of antitank guns has lagged behind that of tanks. The author is evidently an authority on the subject. The result of the situation is, so he says, that the modern tank is invulnerable to present counter weapons; it may appear with impunity, and effectuate its own fire. Thus its zone of action becomes enlarged. The claim for certain antitank weapons that they can penetrate the armor of modern tanks at 300 m. is beside the point. Before arriving at that distance the tanks could have already had considerable success, and the time necessary for a modern tank to go the rest of the way is so short that it would afford little chance to combat it effectually. The range of an antitank gun must be effective at 1000 meters, and such a gun must have instant and considerable mobility. Long barreled guns and slow burning powder as well as increased calibre (4.7 cm), armor penetration, and adequate bursting fragmentation come into question.

The antitank gun must be motorized. It must be armored against infantry fire, and shrapnel, but weight will prevent it being armored against shell. Its essential mobility will be its best defense against the latter.

The place for the new antitank gun is close up to the combat zone of the infantry; if the chief strength of the infantry is dissipated by tanks, the best antitank guns farther to the rear will not help matters.

Modern tanks are likely to prevent the participation of the infantry in combat; it appears almost as if they will eliminate it. But the tank can be blinded, as for example by rifle grenades filled with suitable explosives. These, however, are but secondary measures, and do not represent an actively organized defense by proper combat methods.

The author concludes with the observation that these foregoing requirements for a proper antitank weapon do not represent a Utopia; the new American experimental gun of Watertown shows this in several respects.

Disarmament. [Abrüstung.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 18 October 1931)
Translated by Major A. Vollmer

In entering the November 1918 Armistice, Germany trusted to Wilson's 14 points. The 4th Point, Part V, and Article VIII of the Versailles Treaty, as well as the Allied reply to Germany of June 16, 1919, all committed the other powers to an immediate disarmament. Germany has disarmed. Her army is reduced to 100,000 volunteers with 12 year service obligation. She has neither heavy guns, tanks nor aeroplanes. Her frontiers have no protective establishments. Her fleet is reduced to a few ships.

Of the few rights left to Germany by the treaty of Versailles, disarmament of the other powers is one. Twelve years have gone by and many

transactions on this subject have transpired, but no disarmament of the other powers has occurred.

The prepared agenda for the February 1932 Disarmament Conference has been commented on by Count von Bernstorff, the German representative. He states that the German government will have to reject it, inasmuch as it leaves out the most important points. The German attitude is not only that it is able to insist, under treaty provisions, on the immediate disarmament of the other powers but that this disarmament shall proceed by the same methods and to the same extent as occurred in Germany. The agenda limits consideration to the reduction of the numbers of active soldiers in peace time, without consideration of reserves. Matériel is not mentioned for reduction—tanks, airplanes, heavy guns are omitted from consideration. That makes disarmament ineffective. Lastly the agenda provides that the earlier agreements shall not be affected by those which may be arrived at in this conference. This means for Germany a reaffirmation of the treaty of Versailles.

The members of a league of nations must possess equal rights. The distinction between victor and vanquished can no longer be allowed to poison the world—if peace is to reign instead of hate, and if a league of nations is to have any meaning. France intends to avoid disarmament and perpetuate her mastery in Europe by the cry of "threatened security."

It is not France, with her steel girdle of fortresses and strongest military establishment in the world, who is threatened, but, rather, disarmed Germany whose frontiers lie open, bordered on west and east by strongly armed neighbors.

As Chancellor Brüning has said: "What arouses our people is the fact that, after the first shock of disillusionment in the absence of Wilson's 14 points from the treaty of Versailles, now not even the only provisions favorable to us which were left in that covenant are being observed by the other parties. The promise made to us that our enforced disarmament would be followed by the voluntary disarmament of the others has not been carried out. Many nations continue arming by dishonoring the agreements and thus they endanger the safety and peace of the world. This is an intolerable situation."

Japanese infantry. [Les Infanteries étrangères. V.—L'infanterie japonaise.] (Revue d'Infanterie, July 1931) Translated by Major C. A. Willoughby

This is a study of the organization and character of Japanese infantry. The author points out the preponderance of infantry officers in the present Japanese Army: in a list of 29 corps or division commanders, 19 are infantrymen. Considering that the future theater of operations, for Japanese Armies, is probably the neighboring Chinese territory, such a war will be a war of infantry, of movement and maneuver. The author covers successively: organization, armament, tanks, noncommissioned officers and officers, training and tactical doctrine. Under training, the author calls attention to certain factors: through careful training, Japanese infantry is capable to march 50 km. a day, for extended periods. To preserve control, troops remain in march columns until they come under artillery fire; camouflage is highly developed. Offensive combat follows the normal tactical procedure, now observed by all modern armies.

Defensive combat is oriented toward an early resumption of the offensive, and the importance of counterattacks is stressed.

Machine guns and automatic weapons are employed in enfilade, whenever practicable.

The mobile unit made responsible for march security. [Der "bewegliche Verband" als Träger der Marschsicherung.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 18, 25 September 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

In recent issues of the *Militär-Wochenblatt* there have been a number of articles on the "mobile unit" as a necessity for each infantry division. In the present article the purpose is to add march security as a mission for this unit. Thereby it is purposed to obviate the difficulties involved in obtaining security adequate in this day of new weapons and mobility.

The German "F.u.G." (conduct and combat of the combined arms) requires the advance guard to insure the continuity of the march, secure the main body from surprise, to brush aside weak enemy bodies, and give the main body time and space to develop for combat against stronger enemy forces. The reconnaissance still belongs to the divisional cavalry. The French "réglement de l'infanterie" calls the advance guard an "organ de reconnaissance et de protection immédiate." So Clausewitz likewise states (Book 5, chapter 7), "Every unit which is not completely prepared for combat needs an advance guard to apprise it of the enemy's approach and to reconnoiter for that purpose before the enemy becomes visible."

Reconnaissance and security are not always distinguishable, hence by advance guard will be meant all advanced units charged with either of these missions—in our usage (German) that is, both divisional cavalry (reconnaissance detachment) and advance guard.

The article reviews the history of advance guards from Frederick the Great's time through the World War. After the World War the urge was again for a war of movement—so the advance units had to become still more mobile. This was unfortunate for Germany because the treaty of peace allowed only one squadron per division. The new regulations (F.u.G.) still retain the distinction of troop (divisional) cavalry (chief mission: reconnaissance) and advance guard (chief mission: security). Similarly the French "réglement de l'infanterie" distinguishes between the division reconnaissance detachment ("Groupe de reconnaissance divisionnaire") and actual advance guard ("avant-garde") which latter is again divided into "échelon de reconnaissance" and "échelon de combat." The Italians have in each division a mobile group ("corps celere," 2 squadrons, 2 cyclist companies, armored cars, and motorized artillery) whose mission consists of reconnaissance and the reduction of important points for security of the advance.

The inadequate organization of the Reichsheer (German National Army) resulted in the theoretical concept of a modern division (F.u.G., II, p. 270). Instead of the divisional cavalry it was decided, following the example of other nations, to substitute a mixed unit in the form of a divisional reconnaissance detachment. Its strength (2 squadrons, 1 cyclist company, 1 armored car train), permits close reconnaissance ahead in the sector of the division. But it is not adequate for the further mission of security nor for the other missions connected with combat mentioned in F.u.G. 171 (occupation of important points and railroad centers, search of large woods, blocking or keeping open of defiles, etc.). Thus the division still needed an advance guard. But the increased range of artillery and the increased radius of motorized and mechanized troops makes security by march formation inadequate. The patrol screen is easily pierced, the advance guard gets into enemy fire; it is questionable whether it can afford the main body sufficient time for development for combat.

The French solution is to develop the march columns early when a meeting engagement is probable. But this means slowing down of the march rate.

There is thus proposed a measure which will combine march celerity with a high degree of security.

This possibility is seen in such a strengthening of the divisional reconnaissance detachment that throughout the entire area in which the division is to advance it will be able to carry out the reconnaissance as well as the

march security, and likewise perform the other combat missions above mentioned. We will call this henceforth by the name "advance guard" to cover its two-fold purpose the better. To insure security and continuity of march to the main body we believe this advance guard can operate with its reconnaissance units in front, and behind them, prepared for combat, its other units on a broad front, each with its own sector. The missions of this advance guard can be performed only when it can advance rapidly and across country. For this it must be motorized and able to go cross country.

The advance guard must not be entirely motorized. For certain purposes the horse is still more suitable than the motor. The kernel of the advance guard of an infantry division must be a cavalry unit, supplied with armored cars for distant patrol. This must be followed by a shock unit of motorized heavier weapons and artillery, supported by infantry in trucks, equipped with bicycles. To supply the advance guard with light tanks is still questionable—hence in the theoretical construction of this new unit it is to be limited according to the circumstances. Lastly, motorized engineer and signal troops are essential to this advance guard.

The strength of this advance guard would be about as at present, 1/3 to 1/6 of the total strength—thus 2 to 3 battalions and as many batteries.

According to the present strength of the reconnaissance detachment (2 squadrons, 1 cyclist company) we arrive at 3 squadrons for the reconnaissance echelon with supporting weapons of 12 light machine guns, 1 machine gun platoon, and 1 infantry accompanying gun (armored car defense). For the shock unit one infantry cyclist battalion on trucks (to be called a "Jäger" battalion) is proposed. In this unit also will be 3 motorized batteries (cross country) and 3 motorized machine gun sections, one of the batteries to have 10 cm guns. The machine gun sections to be divided into half sections of 2 guns each. There would be 4 armored cars in two sections.

This advance guard should be in existence in peace time as a regular unit divided into 3 echelons—reconnaissance, security, and combat.

Thus the following organization results:

- a. A horse regiment of 3 rifle squadrons, 1 machine gun squadron (3 platoons), one accompanying gun platoon of 3 guns, and if necessary an additional rifle squadron for partition among the infantry regiments.
- b. A motorized artillery detachment of 2 batteries, field guns 16, 1 battery 10 cm. guns.
- c. One "Jäger" (cyclist) battalion on trucks of 3 "Jäger" companies, 1 machine gun company (3 platoons for "Jäger" battalion, 3 platoons for security echelon), 1 motorized accompanying gun platoon (3 guns).
- d. Staff with armored cars, engineer and signal companies.

RUPPRECHT, Kronprinz von Bayern (Bavaria).—My war diary. [Mein Kriegstagebuch.] In 3 volumes. Berlin, 1929. [M 9403-E4-E.43-B92 (RU)] Abstracted by Major C. A. Willoughby

CONTENTS: I. The Command of the Sixth Army: Concentration and initial engagements; Battle of the Saar; The transport to the north wing; Battles of Northern France and Belgium; Transition to position warfare; Spring operations around Arras, 1915; Fall operations at Arras; La Bassée and the winter of 1915; Verdun and its consequences for the Sixth Army; The battle of the Somme.

II. The Command of the Army-Group Crown Prince of Bavaria; The Somme (continued); Politico-military elements 1916-1917; The Entente offensive in the spring of 1917; The battle in Flanders; The tank battle of Cambrai; The "Michael" offensive in March 1918; The "Georg" offensive in April 1918; Final offensives; Retreat and revolution.

III. Documentary appendices and special entries (diary) regarding: Battle in Lorraine August-September 1914; The Loretto Heights, 3 March 1915; The attack on Neuve Chapelle, 12 March 1915; Entente attacks near Arras 1915; The assault on Gieseler Heights, 21 February 1916; Plan for an offensive near Arras 1916; Gas attacks by the 11 Bavarian Corps, 27-29 April 1916; Peace tentative, 1916; Draft for operations in 1917; Origin of operative plans for 1918; Index.

The War Diary of Field-Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria is one of the more important war books, in the class of memoirs of the great

commanders, and must be considered as authentic historical source material. For any comparative study of the operations of the B.E.F., in Flanders, this work must be regarded as a complement, since Prince Rupprecht became the chief opponent of the British from October 1914 until the end of the War, first as Commander of the German Sixth Army and later as Commander of a Group of Armies.

The editor was assisted by the Prince's two Chiefs of the Staff, Generals Krafft von Dellmensingen and von Kuhl, who have added footnotes where the Prince's diary does not agree with entries in their own. He has provided a story of intense interest to military students.

The Prince was forty-five years of age at the outbreak of war. The general impression left by his diary is that he was a good judge of men and a hardworking officer.

How far he was master in his Army and Group of Armies is not apparent. General von Krafft—in time of peace Chief of the General Staff of the Bavarian Army—was transferred by Falkenhayn's orders to command the Alpine Corps, and was succeeded by the redoubtable General von Kuhl, the Chief of the Staff of the First (Kluck's) Army. His reputation for carrying on without consulting his chief is notorious. On the 9th of August, 1918, after the "black day," the Prince complains that:

"There is too much telephone conversation, and the commanders of the Groups of Armies and Armies are nearly entirely short-circuited by direct conversations between the Supreme Command and their Chiefs of the Staff. Just recently an Army commander said to me, 'I don't really know why I am here, as everything is always already settled before I am asked.'"

Events at the beginning of the war possess no special importance except for showing the curious views of the German Supreme Command.

Deceived by the apparent success in the first encounters in Alsace, as in the Ardennes, the Supreme Command ordered a pursuit by the Sixth Army through the Trouée des Charmes. Moltke, after telling the Prince verbally to continue the attack, almost simultaneously sent him a written order to withdraw, to prepare for transfer to the western wing. He records, "Evidently the Supreme Command has completely lost control of its nerves."

In the Prince's diary the "Race to the Sea" assumes quite a new aspect. Falkenhayn "only sent fresh forces to the outer flank when a new opponent had appeared there; thus he always left the enemy the first move, and, besides, was always too late with his counter-measures."

The first German plan on finding the B.E.F. in Flanders was for the Sixth Army to stand on the defensive. The Prince however decided that it was best for his Army to attack, to get Kemmel and the hill range beyond, and so to divide the enemy's forces, and then drive them to the north into the sea.

The break-through point was then shifted north, to the southeast of Ypres. Meantime the envelopment from the coast having also failed, the German forces engaged there drifted south, and the struggle became concentrated about Ypres.

The Prince comments: "How the Sixth Army is to continue the attack on Ypres is a puzzle to me. The available forces for it have already proved insufficient." And he says next day: "The strengths of the divisions are mostly down to one half."

At this period the most desperate attempts were made to keep Italy out of the war. Among other things, \$150,000 was paid monthly from the Imperial Treasurer to the Italian press to influence opinion.

Wild ideas seem to have struck the Supreme Command; in January, 1915, it expected "very soon" three great attacks.

When Falkenhayn arrived with Dr. Haber to discuss the first use of gas, the Prince was "not only unsympathetic to the use of cloud gas, but

thought it a mistake, as the enemy will use the same means, and, as the prevailing direction of the wind is west-east, he will be able to release gas ten times more often than we against him."

The Prince got into trouble with the Supreme Command for the failure of and heavy losses in the counter-attack at Neuve Chapelle (March, 1915). He states that the German losses were 8,600, which makes them little less than the British, which were 11,652.

Festubert is recorded as "a partially successful attack."

Coming to the Loos period, the attack was expected in September. But Falkenhayn on 3d of September was of opinion that "the French were no longer capable of any offensive. It turned out that, on the front attacked by the British, at Loos, the situation became "highly critical," and in Champagne, it was "for a time nearly desperate."

Discussing the fighting on the 4th of February, 1916, with his corps commanders, the Prince said:

"Actually the French in Champagne and the British at Loos succeeded in getting through to our second position. If they had possessed stronger reserves and had brought them up in time, they would have made a complete break-through."

The Prince had no faith in a success at Verdun. On the 24th day of January he writes:

"If it really succeeds in gradually overcoming the five strong positions, one behind the other, the enemy will not be decisively beaten. The capture of Verdun would at most increase the world's opinion of us; if it does not succeed, we shall have made a sacrifice in vain, and shall suffer a heavy loss of prestige."

The Prince finds that his own men were getting war-weary; the reduction of the ration had told on their spirits.

The Prince points out a serious deterioration in the officer class:

"Many people have become officers who would never have done so in peace time on their qualifications, people who lack the necessary preliminary education, and what is worse, tact and devotion to duty; they look after themselves first, and then after their subordinates."

On the 28th of August, 1916, Crown Prince Rupprecht took over command of the Army Group containing the First, Second, Fourth and Sixth Armies, with headquarters at Cambrai. One is struck with the extraordinary state of depression which prevailed on the German side during the battle of the Somme, "the greatest, longest and heaviest-in-losses of the entire war." The only reserve of the Army Group was the 11th Division; the Second Army had no reserve until the 23rd Division arrived later. Not only were there no reserves, but "a renewed warning of the Director of Field-Ammunition, saying that gun ammunition must be used sparingly."

As regards the troops, the Prince says:

"Our troops on the Somme front are for the most part not the best. The old experienced officers and men decrease steadily in numbers, and the reinforcements have not the same soldierly instruction and training."

The losses of the First Army, north of the Somme, since the 24th of June had been 125,000 men; south of the Somme, however, only between 50,000 and 60,000.

On the 6th of September came the first direction for reconnaissance with a view to a withdrawal to economize troops and shorten the line.

On the 8th of September Hindenburg arrived to pay his first formal visit. The German Crown Prince expressed the opinion that, "if the losses continue, we must make peace before we are completely exhausted."

The Army commanders were at this time in a state of special depression. As regards the German retirement from the Somme, Ludendorff at first spoke of the Hindenburg line as a "coefficient of safety."

On 4 February 1917 came the news that the United States had broken off diplomatic relations. The Prince remarks:

"I scarcely believe that the Americans will actually fight us, except perhaps on sea; they will probably confine themselves to doing what they have already done to our damage, that is support our opponents with money and deliveries of war material."

After the declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare, he quotes a neutral as saying:

"It is a remarkable and strange feature of this war, that in it the greatest Land Power seeks the decision on sea, and the greatest Sea Power on land."

It has frequently been said that the Germans knew nothing of the troubles in the French Army in 1917, but on the 10th of July he notes that "information of unrest, mutinies and sabotage come from all parts of the country (France)," and that mutineers have been shot and things are working up for revolution.

The first rumors of the Passchendaele offensive are mentioned on the 9th of July, and on the 23rd, "all observations and intelligence point to a great offensive in Flanders." When it came on the 31st of July, the Prince records that his "mind is quite at rest about the attack, as we have never disposed of such strong reserves."

But the losses soon alarm him. On the 5th of August is the entry:

"The divisions which must now be pulled out of the line had average losses of 1500 to 2000 men, while the losses in a 14-days' tour of service in the battle of the Somme were, on the average, 4,000."

The Cambrai attack "came as a complete surprise." Ludendorff became very nervous and inquired on the telephone about a thousand details, which had a very upsetting effect."

The German casualties in 1917 which had to be replaced amounted to 1,200,000 and the replacement for them was inadequate.

The Prince was present at the conference of the 11th of November, 1917, to settle the place and time of the spring offensive. Rupprecht, remembering Ypres 1914, did not think the German army strong enough for the purpose, and repeated more than once his opinion that "Ludendorff, who got his experience chiefly in the East, underestimates the danger of the attack coming to a standstill."

On the 19th of February Rupprecht definitely told the Kaiser of the difficulties of the attack:

"We might succeed in taking the enemy's first position, but it is improbable that we shall achieve more than a partial defeat of the enemy, and the making of a great pocket in his defense system."

In a letter on the 21st of March, the Kaiser most embarrassingly "announced a complete victory." Ludendorff "was beside himself, and very dissatisfied with the Seventeenth Army." Then it turned out that the right of the Second Army had not made progress expected, while the Eighteenth Army "repeatedly sent in reports as regards points reached which greatly anticipated facts." His plan as it developed was first to break the front of the B.E.F., and then for the Eighteenth and Second Armies to swing south and meet the French coming up to help the Allies. The Prince considers that the 27th of March was the turning-point. During the previous night Ludendorff stopped the futile attacks of the Seventeenth Army. Ludendorff's final strategy before Amiens "only led to the piling up of divisions where the resistance was then the stoutest."

The Lys offensive failed because it was carried out with too few divisions on too narrow a front. The truth of it, Ludendorff and the C. of S. of the Fourth Army lost heart, and, expecting a British counterattack, settled between themselves to stop it.

The rest of the diary tells of the gradual falling off in numbers, fighting power and morale of the German forces.

On the 17th of May the Prince writes:

"The increasing deterioration in the morale of the troops is making me anxious . . . The morale is lowest among the older reservists brought from the East to the much-feared Western theater."

The first serious trouble with the troops recorded is on the 25th of June, when reservists coming up by train refused to obey orders.

On the 21st of September even Hindenburg, at Mons station, was greeted with cries of, "Kill him." On the 12th of October "marauding increased in a most frightful way: whole bands of marauders prowled around, and rob and steal in combination with the natives."

The 8th of August attack was a complete surprise.

Ludendorff comes out of the record rather badly. His explanations at conferences were remarkably clear, "but in consequence of his great irritability (in January, 1918) it is extremely difficult to do business with him." His interference in minute details and his habit of dealing with staff officers over the heads of their generals have already been mentioned. His nerves frequently gave way; even in July, 1917, he appeared "terribly overtired, and towards evening often completely exhausted." In July, 1918, Ludendorff had "a dramatic scene with the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, in which he demanded that the Navy must make sure that no American troopships reached France. Otherwise the war was lost."

The volumes of appendices contains a most valuable collection of documents, proposals and plans for, and reports on, operations, and letters from the Prince to his father. These latter picture the situation in 1918 as even more desperate than does the diary.

The new French cavalry training regulations. [Die neue französische Ausbildungsvorschrift für die kavalierie.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 4 September 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

That cavalry is indispensable is now the unanimous verdict in all armies. But it must be a cavalry organized on modern lines. What to call it is a question. The French for a time called it "light division" but have returned to the old name; the Italians call it "quick corps."

The old esprit is to stay with it. For battle on a wide front, surprise, quick withdrawal, operations on flank and in rear, remain as its missions. Three points are changed; no longer will it engage in mounted combat in large masses, it will need a much heightened fire power, and officers' patrols will not be sent long distances into enemy territory. "The number and fire power of machine weapons will make it impossible for patrols to penetrate deeply into the enemy's territory and remain there." Effective fire and dismounted combat are the requirements now added to mobility. The number of horses is to be kept to the minimum.

The new division is constituted as follows:

- 2 cavalry brigades each of 2 regiments
- 1 regiment motorized Dragons (dragons portés) 3 battalions
- 1 artillery regiment of 2 mounted "groups" (7.5 cm cannons) and 1 group on trucks (now 10.5 cm cannons)
- 1 detachment armored cars of 3 squadrons, each of 4 troops (total 36 cars)
- 1 engineer cyclist company
- 1 signal company, 1 radio section
- 1 cavalry division bridge train.

For particular missions more or less reinforcement is contemplated by infantry in trucks, artillery (especially heavy howitzers and guns) and air corps.

The author of this German review of these French cavalry training regulations expresses serious misgivings at the variety of the elements to be included in the French Cavalry Division—riders, cyclists, vehicles with four and others with six horses, trucks for personnel, others for cargo, trucks which can go cross country, others which are limited to the roads, fast armored cars and slow tanks, artillery which can move at the gallop, and that which moves at 10 to 12 kilometers per hour on trucks. To lead this array, keen leadership will be demanded or disaster would ensue. Is such an array still mobile? Can it still be lead by orders from the saddle in the wonted cavalry fashion?

Two elements of the new division are more closely examined—the regiment dragons portés and the armored car detachment.

The Dragon Portés has not yet attained its ideal organization. It is planned to set up two battalions on cross country vehicles, one on trucks. At present cyclist battalions stand in part instead of the former. Only the machine gun companies are as yet cross country. The fire power of this unit is considerable, namely that of an infantry regiment. To conduct it will be difficult as long as three different rates of march have to be considered. It is intended first to bring up the cross country battalion as closely as possible before unloading, this to be followed by the cyclists who are confined to the roads, and lastly by the battalions on trucks who have been limited to the roads passable for them. This partition will necessitate always a careful march table and plan of routes. It is instructive that this regiment is—both in the offense and defense—to be placed in the critical point.

The other new unit is the armored car squadron. They have a speed of 45 to 70 kilometers per hour and are lightly armored. The regulations do not dedicate them to distant reconnaissance missions; this is secondary. They are rather, to operate in the front line as an accompanying weapon for the infantry. "The regulations say explicitly they are intended to appear by surprise, to carry on close combat for a short time and break it off quickly—all in all a particularly mobile weapon in the hands of the leader." Thus they have also been used in the maneuvers of recent years. So their use is like that of tanks but, as the regulations state, they are not to be set against a prepared position. For this they are not armored heavily enough.

Among some examples of the employment of the new cavalry division as selected by the German author-reviewer in this article is the following:

"At the commencement of hostilities and without awaiting the concentration marches it may be advantageous to break into the enemy's territory to seize his sources of strength, disturb his mobilization and approach marches, or finally to secure a pledge."

The German reviewer intimates that this cavalry division organization is conceived solely for operation on a "west front" against Germany—elsewhere it may be resolved into one with different missions.

Problem of march security in weakly equipped modern armies.

[Das Problem der Marschsicherung. Dargestellt an schwach ausgerüsteten und neuzeitlichen Heeren.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 4, 11, 18 and 25 November 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

This discussion has especial reference to Germany's present army of treaty limited strength and restricted equipment; hence it is not, except in part, of general application and interest.

The cases are developed of the requisite march security when one of the opponents is of modern type, or of obsolescent type, or motorized, while the other is of any one of these types.

The special consideration is the use to be made of artillery in march security. The thesis is that the artillery, especially in the type of army which is Germany's, can no longer be employed (as prescribed by the German regulations [Pars. 169 to 179 incl.—"Sec. G. March Security"]—entitled "Führung und Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen" 1921 [Direction and combat of the combined arms]) by putting it in rear in positions of readiness (Überwachungsbatterien) until the head of the march column attains certain objectives. Rather must security be maintained by an advance guard in fan formation coupled with the utilization of the artillery forward.

(II. Vormarsch eines neuzeitlichen gegen ein veraltetes Heer. [Advance of a modern against an obsolescent army.] 11 November 1931)

This continuation extenuates on the possibilities and probabilities of the situation in one of the combinations of opposing armies listed in previous article; in this case an advance of a modern against an obsolescent army.

As mentioned heretofore this series of articles has especial reference to Germany's present army of treaty limited strength and restricted equipment, and is therefore not, but in small part, of general application and interest.

The second part, here in question, furthermore, is highly discursive, replete with conjecture, and inconclusive.

The third part (18 November 1931) is a continuation of the consideration which pertains especially only to the army of Germany under the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles, giving in this part the third case of the combinations of opponents.

The concluding article of this series (25 November 1931) is conceived to fit the special case of Germany who, chiefly due to the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles, is denied such equipment as aeroplanes, tanks, sufficient cavalry, etc. It is therefore a consideration without application or interest to other armies. This fourth installment treats the last of the combinations of opponents, an advance by a modern against a modern army.

KLINGBEIL, Generalmajor German Army.—The strategic meaning of the East Prussian forts in the World War. [Die operative Bedeutung der ostpreussischen Festungen im Weltkriege.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 25 November 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

"Fortresses attain their full value only in connection with the maneuvering army, because, alone, they cannot repel invasion. They gain their importance only as points of support for the operating army in the open field." Moltke's military works, Vol. IV, War teachings, Part I, page 182.

This thought of the great strategist reappears again and again in his operation plans (Schroeter: "Die Bedeutung der Festungen in der Großen Kriegführung auf Grundlage der Moltkeschen Operations-entwürfe." [The meaning of fortresses in the great war leadership, based on the principles of Moltke's operation plans.]; Reichsarchiv: "Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918." [The World War 1914-1918.] Vols. 1-7.; Schroeter: "Die Bedeutung der Landesbefestigungen im Weltkriege." [Land fortifications in the World War.])

From this point of view the strategic importance of the East Prussian fortresses in the World War is to be investigated.

Since 1892 the strategic plan for the campaign in East Prussia was based on the idea of reaching a decision, in the war of two fronts, first in the west against France, while a delaying defense was to be instituted in the east in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian armies. In the event of the withdrawal in the face of overwhelming Russian forces (which perforce had always to be considered) the German operations would find their support in the fortified Vistula—Nogat line (with the fortress belt Thorn, and

the bridge heads on the east bank and Culm, Graudenz and Marienburg) as well as in the further extensions from the Vistula across the Warthe (Posen) to the Oder.

The concept was, however, not one of lengthy defense, but rather of withdrawal at one point and decisive attack at another.

This defense was unusually difficult in that it involved East as well as West Prussia, a 600 kilometer frontier from Thorn to north of Memel, one which was encircled from the south and east by Russian territory, and so open to envelopment from two directions.

On the one hand, it was desirable not to relinquish this strictly German country, with its rich sources of supply for armies and population, as well as being important, from a strategic point of view, to hold it to aid Austria-Hungary. Its retention for this purpose was required to afford a concentration area for a later concentrated offensive from East Prussia and Silesia against Warsaw.

But on the other hand, to attain these ends it was not expedient to set the weak German forces in motion heedlessly, for it was important to conserve these against a time of future decisive operations when they were to be strengthened by reinforcements from the west.

This difficult problem was not to be solved by the purely defensive, inasmuch as the Russian numerical superiority lent itself to encirclement, which made every position untenable. Only by skillful employment of interior lines, and dauntless quick offensives could a victory be expected in such a situation.

An important role was played in this situation by the Masurian Lakes on both sides of Boyen (Lötzten with the weaker barricades at Rudczanny, Nikolaiken, Bartlickhof, Schimonken, Kulla-Bücke) for they separated the Russian armies advancing from south and east, and so enabled the defender to dispose of one army after the other. In multifarious problems and war games of the Chief of the German General Staff, General Field Marshal Count von Schlieffen, this idea recurred again and again (Groener "The Testament of Count Schlieffen") and it had become a common possession of the new generation of leaders. The similarly proposed extension of this barricade line to the north across the Masurian Lakes to the vicinity of Angerburg was not realized due to lack of means. Instead, in order to broaden the dividing area of the Masurian Lake chain, a row of light barricade forts were constructed (1901-1906) in extension (Rudczanny) to the west (south of Ortschaften) which could, at least, delay the breakthrough of Russian cavalry.

In the east of the province there was a dangerous loophole, between the Masurian Lakes and the Pregel, of 60 kilometers in breadth. To close this, General von Kluck, as commander of the I Army Corps, had proposed the fortifying of Insterburg, and the strengthening of the Angerapp Valley by machine gun block houses, but this had not been accomplished. (v. Kluck, "Wanderjahre—Kriege—Gestalten. [Apprenticeship—Wars—Personages.], page 116.) More serious was the lack in the naturally weak area between Thorn and Ortschaften of any fortifications. Its fortification, recommended by General von der Goltz, likewise failed due to insufficient means.

The key to the land defense of East Prussia was the fortress of Königsberg. Moltke in 1861 in his "Über die strategische Bedeutung der Preussischen Festungen für die Landesverteidigung." [Strategic importance of the Prussian fortresses for the land defense.]; Frobenius, "Geschichte der Preussischen Ingenieur- und Pionier-korps" [History of the Prussian engineer and pioneer corps.], Vol. I, page 164, had denominated Königsberg as the "point of support." General von der Goltz ("Denkwürdigkeiten," page 199) had likewise often advocated its further fortification. He planned an East Prussian defense without support on the Vistula, and expected to await in Königsberg, in cooperation with the East Sea Fleet, the eventual reinforcements from the west. For this would be required a "Port-Union

line" from the northeastward Fort belt at Königsberg to the Port of Cour-land.

Undoubtedly (Reichsarchiv, Vol. II, page 42) an extended fortification system—such as the French systems on the Italian and German fronts—would have made the operations east of the Vistula much easier.

Thus the German forces in 1914 had to try to solve their problems in East Prussia against a great numerical superiority and without the advantages of an extended fortress system.

But the East Prussian fortresses, as we shall show, had an influence on the operations on both sides.

Under the protection of the frontier troops (I and XX Army Corps) supported by the fortress of Lötzen, the approach march was completed by the Eighth Army intended for the defense of the German east front. According to the first plan of the commanding General von Prittwitz the area of Lötzen was to constitute, in the Schlieffen sense, the turning and support point for all projected operations in East Prussia. Delaying due to the danger to the rearward communications, and therefore preferably letting the Russians advance to the Angerapp, it was intended to prosecute a battle of annihilation against the Njemen Army by operating in the lake regions, in the vicinity of the Angerapp, north of Angerburg, and then to turn with all forces against the Narew Army. On the other side, in the Russian approach march ("Njemen Army from the east; Narew Army from the south") the separating effect (caused by the 60 kilometer lake area around Lötzen) materialized as expected.

Out of this separation grew the strategic difficulties of the Russians from which they were not in a situation to rescue themselves. Against Lötzen they intended to send a sufficiently strong security echelon (the II Russian Corps of the Narew Army reinforced by heavy artillery) because they believed that a German attack could be expected from that quarter.

When von Prittwitz decided to break off the battle of Gumbinnen against the Njemen Army, because he believed the base of the Eighth Army on the Vistula was endangered by the advance of the Narew Army, then the utilization of the flank protection of the Masurian Lakes, by the German (Gumbinnen) east group passing them, again became acute.

The General Quartermaster von Stein at this time had an idea of an attack of the Eighth Army along the lake chain towards the south against the east wing of the Narew Army. This became impossible due to the proximity of the Njemen Army. Likewise a withdrawal march of the German east group westwards of the lakes was no longer in question.

In any case it was important that the lake area at Lötzen should be denied the enemy and thereby the separation of the two Russian Armies be maintained as long as possible. To this end it had to be assured that the barricades set towards the east could not be opened from behind. Therefore it was ordered by the new High Command (Hindenburg—Ludendorff), as soon as they came into power, that these positions be secured from attack from the west. For this purpose the 6th Landwehr Brigade, due to the lack of other forces, had to withdraw from the garrison of Lötzen for field service. In the fortress remained only the most necessary forces (4½ battalions, mostly Landsturm, 1 squadron, and a number of older guns). These however, sufficed to hold the weak fortress against strong Russian superiority.

The placing in readiness and reorganization of the Eighth Army for the battle of annihilation against the Narew Army (Battle of Tannenberg) was supported by the fortresses of Lötzen and Königsberg; while the Army of Rennenkampf (who felt his flank threatened from Lötzen and believed that strong forces [two corps] would have to be swung in against Königsberg) was now brought to a situation of waiting. Thus it was made possible for the commander of the Eighth Army to bring up all his forces for the battle of Tannenberg except 1½ infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. On

the Russian side, however, the fortress of Lötzen, with its small garrison, kept occupied the 1st Cavalry Division, and in part, also, the VI Army Corps during the period 20 to 25 August. The last two had been placed by the Narew Army at Ortelsburg for protection eastwards. Thus needed elements of cavalry reconnaissance as well as reinforcements for the main effort were lost to the Russians. On the Pregel—Deime line to Königsberg the advance of the north wing of the Njemen Army came to a halt.

Also, during the defense of the Njemen Army in its naturally strong and fortified position back of the Deime, Alle, Omet, the flank protection against Lötzen occupied considerable Russian forces (43rd Infantry Division, another infantry regiment, and the entire artillery of the 76th Reserve Division). The Russians, thereby, probably counted on a German advance from Lötzen, but not on a daring detour around the south of the lakes.

In the advance of the German Eighth Army for the Battle on the Masurian Lakes the lake fortifications served as a line of departure and secure rear base for the 3 corps on the right German wing. These fortifications made it safe to separate the German forces set northwards against the Russian front from the decisive strong German south wing. After the destruction of the Narew Army began it became less probable that the Njemen Army would decide to come out of its strong position, with Königsberg a threat to its flank, in order to launch a counterattack at the right moment.

After the battle on the Masurian Lakes and the marching off of the main forces of Hindenburg to West Poland, the Eighth Army, remaining in East Prussia, had the the difficult problem of holding the reinforced enemy with half of the former strength.

Covered in rear by Königsberg and in flank by the Masurian Lakes, this army succeeded in defeating the second great offensive of the Njemen Army, and later, in the continuing battles between Njemen and Angerapp, in dominating the East Russian front. Then, in November, when this army had to send three divisions to Thorn nothing was left to be done except to go into prepared defensive positions at Lötzen and back of the Angerapp. It now profited them that the little fortress "Boyen" had been augmented to a big fortress of "Lotzen," of 75 kilometers circumference, as a skeleton for points of support, with conjoined lines of defense. Now, no less than four Russian Corps, reinforced in part by reserve divisions, pressed on the lake position and north of it. Reinforced by Landsturm and artillery the 39th Landwehr Brigade alone, in widely separated positions, held off the numerically superior foe, until it could be reinforced by part of the I Army Corps.

The Russian Tenth Army had had the mission "to break the opponents defense in East Prussia, throw him back of the line of the Masurian Lakes, and then to go into position with the First Army on the lower Vistula." This mission, however, was frustrated on the line of the Masurian Lakes—Angerapp. However, the withdrawal on 26 November of the German troops at Miawa on the East Prussian south front plainly showed the acuteness of the situation. Fortifications in the vicinity of Allenstein would have eased the situation.

In the approach march to the winter battle in Masuria the fortress of Lötzen gained an importance such as it had in the battle of the Masurian Lakes. The Eighth Army, newly concealed behind the lake chain, joined the Tenth Army, which came from north of Darkehmen, for an advance through Lötzen to the winter battle. Just east of the chain of lakes was the south wing of the Russian position, strongly fortified. The German plan was to engage this position in front with the Landwehr division "Königsberg" and the left wing of the Eighth Army until a double envelopment by the Tenth Army in the north and by the right wing of the Eighth Army in the south, through Arys—Johannisburg, could be completed. Then the center was to break through the position. In spite of great difficulties and strong threats in flank by Russian replacement troops, the Njemen

Army was decisively defeated, even though the great success was not equivalent to the strategic purpose. This ended the conquest of Prussia as a strategic objective of the Russian Army direction.

In retrospect we see that the fortresses were of great aid to the operations and that, if these fortresses had been made more complete and extensive in peace time the pressure of a war on two fronts would have been less.

Lastly it is concluded that the more troops which could have been spared by a more extensive fortification on the east front, the stronger would the forces have been in the western theater where the chief decision was sought.

Terrain as a factor in warfare. [Das Gelände als Element der Kriegführung.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 4 September 1931) Translated by Major A. Vollmer

The author traces the attention paid to this factor in the successive epochs of modern military history, showing how adequate appreciation thereof achieved success in one period, while in another, fine spun strategical theories, without sufficient concern for it, spelled disaster. By terrain he means all natural or artificial objects both in the combat zone and rearwards, including mountains, swamps, cities, fortresses, roads, railroads, bridges, canals, rivers, etc.

In the opinion of the reviewer the author's most interesting example of the determining influence of terrain, of the many taken from the World War, is found in the initial German strategy on the west front. Here he states the dominating encirclement idea by a wheeling to the left on the pivot: Diedenhofen—Metz, gave no heed to the facts, (1) that the theatres of the flank armies in this maneuver were entirely different in character—those in which the First and Fifth German Armies operated, (2) that before each Army lay formidable rivers and before the center extended forests, and (3) that along the entire front there were strong fortresses to subdue. To be sure at first the obstacles only hindered but did not halt the German advance and the doctrine of ruthless encirclement seemed to have been justified. But then the right wing came into the area before Paris while the left came to a standstill before Verdun. It was the situation of Paris—Verdun and the French southwest front, Toul—Epinal—Belfort, which upset the German war plans and created the circumstances which brought about the battle of the Marne.

Ways and means for forming the main effort. [Mittel und Wege der Schwerpunktbildung.] (Militär-Wochenblatt, 11 August 1931) Translated by Captain F. During

The tactical principle of "main effort" is old, but the number and strength of the battle means and the increased energy in execution of this principle is new. The object of battle is the destruction of the enemy. It is assumed that the attacker is always stronger, either in numbers, matériel or morale. The new large weapons aid the defender to a great degree and make it harder for the attacker. To attack on a wide front with strength equally divided will cost too much in casualties, is too complicated, and takes too much time in bringing up ammunition, troops, and matériel. Therefore the attacker desires to break through the defender in one or two places, and if successful, to push to advantage. This is the main effort. Terrain, disposition of the defender and the effective employment of the attacker's artillery are usually the deciding factors, where the main effort is to be made. The disposition of the defender is very seldom known, if the defender "knows the game," for he "shows his cards" only when the attacker forces him to do so; therefore the terrain is a more decisive element than the disposition of the defender in selecting the area of the main effort. We must not forget here however, that as a rule the defender has a better

knowledge of the terrain, than has the attacker, and when the terrain is less favorable for defense, but favorable for attack, the defender, by proper placing of machine gun nests, etc., artificially equalizes the terrain. Sometimes in favorable terrain for advancing infantry, the attacker cannot effectively employ his artillery. This means that the effective employment of the attacker's artillery is perhaps the largest factor in selecting the main effort. All in all, the selection of the main effort is a very difficult one.

It is essential that commanders, in addition to map study, should make personal reconnaissance, and have patrols constantly report conditions of terrain. It is a grave error, for a commander to decide offhand on the main effort, without having some knowledge of the enemy's disposition and a good knowledge of the terrain. The commander, before deciding on the main effort, should ask himself the following questions:

Where does the terrain permit covered approaches and assembly areas;

Where are favorable heavy machine gun positions;

Where are suitable observation posts for artillery;

Where can the combined fire of all weapons get the best result?

What can the lower units do, when the Army orders a main effort?

When an army attacks, the division which is to make the main effort usually gives the main effort to an infantry regiment, which in turn gives it to a battalion and finally we find that the main effort of an army has come down to a company. Should the division making the main effort give equal strength to all parts of its front? No, all divisions should have a main effort, by giving one regiment a smaller frontage and the support of the mass of the artillery and tanks. Commanders have the following means to make the main effort effective:

- (1) The boundary of the unit making the main effort is narrow, thereby making for depth and strength;
- (2) By assigning to the main effort especially qualified troops;
- (3) Attachment of heavy infantry weapons and communications troops;
- (4) Placing reserves in rear of troops making the main effort;
- (5) Increased munitions supply—also giving munitions transport priority on roads;
- (6) Attachment of tanks and battle aviation;
- (7) Consolidation of artillery fires in the area of the main effort.

This is the most important means of assisting the main effort.

Section 4 SUBJECT INDEX

to
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles

MILITARY SUBJECTS.—In this category the subject headings are arranged, alphabetically, according to the Library system of subject-indexing books and periodicals. All military subjects are grouped under certain main headings and these, in turn, are divided into subheadings pertaining to the major group. Therefore, in locating periodical articles on military subjects, they should be looked for under the following main headings:

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
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
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Section 6 BOOK REVIEWS

MILITARY

Oertzen, Oberst von.—**Rüstung und Abrüstung.** Eine umschau über das Heer- und kriegswesen aller Länder. [Armament and disarmament. Survey of the armies and military activities of all countries.] Berlin, 1931.....M 103

CONTENTS: Verlauf und Ergebnis der bisherigen Abrüstungsberatungen; Berichte über das heereswesen der einzelnen Staaten: Deutschland; Ausland; Übersicht über heeresstärken und heeresausgaben. Berichte über einzelne Zweige des heereswesens.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

At the height of the influence of the German General Staff, prior to the War, an annual review of Armaments was published under the name of "Löbellschen Jahresberichte"; the present volume is a continuation of the Löbell series, at intervals of 2 years. In the past, this series has enjoyed confidence for accuracy and reliability.

In some aspects, it is a counterpart to the "Annual Yearbook for Disarmament," but written from a purely professional viewpoint; it can also be regarded as a supplement to our own "Current Estimates," as published by G-2, War Department. At any rate, it is a condensed reference work, to determine the military organization of many countries, ranging from Afghanistan to Soviet-Russia.

To the military mind, the arrangement of the text is attractive, as the general army organization is in tabulated form, very similar to our own "Tables of Organization," and there are numerous sketch-maps showing territorial organization and distribution of larger units. The text is divided into three parts:

- I—Effect and tendency of current disarmament conferences
- II—The Armies of the World
- III—Special reports on Arms of the Service.

The book is valuable to the G-2 Section, as a statistical reference work to supplement the G-2 "Current Estimates."

Becker, General G.—**L'Infanterie d'apres-guerre en France et en Allemagne.** [The infantry after the war in France and Germany.] Paris, 1930.....M 404-C.44

CONTENTS: Dans le Corps de bataille; Dans la bataille; Au combat; A la Caserne et dans les camps.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR J. H. VAN VLIET

A brief review of the present day organization of, and types of weapons in the French and German infantry. Discusses in a very general manner the combat employment (fire and movement) of the infantry battalion.

Brief arguments are introduced showing that auxiliary arms and new weapons must be kept up to date, but the paramount requirement is to have sufficient infantry and not be carried away with the idea that the next war will be won by mechanical, air, or gas forces.

Taktische Aufgaben im Rahmen des verstärkten Inf.-Regiments (mit Lösungen). [Tactical problems of the reenforced infantry regiment with solutions.] Berlin, 1923.....M 404-J1-C4-C

CONTENTS: Vorwort; Taktische Aufgabe Nr. 1 (Grenzschutz); Taktische Aufgabe Nr. 2 (Kampf um Engen); Taktische Aufgabe No. 3 (Verfolgung); Taktische Aufgabe Nr. 4 (Infanterie

bei einer kav. Div.); Taktische Aufgabe N. 5 (Nachhut); Taktische Aufgabe N. 6 (Zeitendeckung); Taktische Aufgabe No. 7 (Versendung von Reserven); Taktische Aufgabe No. 8 (Anmarsch zur Entscheidung); Taktische Aufgabe No. 9 (Angriff gegen Feind in Stellung). (Tactical Problem No. 1—Frontier defence; No. 2—Combat in defiles; No. 3—Pursuit; No. 4—Infantry with a cavalry division; No. 5—Rear guard; No. 6—Flank guard; No. 7—Employment of reserves; No. 8—Approach march; No. 9—Attack against enemy in position.]

TRANSLATION OF PREFACE BY MAJOR C. A. STOKES

In the summer of 1921, the new training text "conduct and combat of the combined arms" containing a series of practical examples for the common good of our new army, was the inspiration for the following problems which appeared during the winter of 1921-1922 in the supplement "Der Wehrwort" of the "Deutschen Soldaten Zeitung." The lively interest which these problems aroused not only in the officer corps but also among the noncommissioned officers and men caused the publication of these problems as a collection to be supplemented in the second edition by a detailed discussion of the orders involved. To the young officer who is preparing himself for the district test, they will serve as an aid. They will stimulate the older officers to renewed interest in war games and exercises. They will be discussed finally with noncommissioned officers and soldiers whose imagination and independent thoughts animate and awaken many dormant characteristics of leadership.

We shall forget the actuality of war through the material disarmament of our people and thereby become also intellectually defenceless. May the little book counteract this.—"Offene Worte" Publishers.

Borchert, Major M.—**Der kampf gegen tanks.** Dargestellt an den Ereignissen der Doppelschlacht bei Cambrai. [The battle against tanks. The double battle at Cambrai.] Berlin, 1931..... M 405-C.43

CONTENTS: Einführung; Der englische kampfwagen und seine Bauart; Die Tanktaktik der Engländer im Jahre 1917; Kriegsgliederung des Tankkorps bei Cambrai; Die Tanktaktik bei Cambrai unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Einsatzes der englischen Tankbataillone; Deutsche Massnahmen nach der Tankschlacht gegen kampfwagen-Angriffe (Tanks); Erfahrungen der 2. Tankbrigade nach ihrem Einsatz bei Cambrai; Zeitungsausschnitte der Auslandspreme über die Tankschlacht bei Cambrai; Schlusswort.

[PREFACE. Description of the English Mark IV tanks and their structure; Tank tactics of the British in 1917; Units composing the tank corps at Cambrai; The tank battle at Cambrai, with special regard to the entrance into the line of the English tank battalions; Later German counter tank measures; Translation into German of the 2d Tank Brigade bulletin of 14 December, 1917, giving observations based on experience gained at Cambrai; Reports in various newspapers concerning the tank battle at Cambrai; Concluding remarks.]

REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL L. P. HORSFALL

The author of this book was in command of the motor transport troops of the German Second Army during the battle of Cambrai. He claims the honor of a personal interview with the Kaiser after the battle, at which time he showed him captured tanks and demonstrated their use.

The author has collected various facts, largely from personal notes and observations made at the time, concerning the tank action at Cambrai; but makes no claim to presenting a complete picture of the battle. His objective is to make certain data available for comparative study in connection with the present day tactics of this modern weapon. He considers this of utmost importance, because the Versailles Treaty prohibits tanks in the German Army, and they must devise means for counter tank action. The translation of the table of contents gives a fair idea of the subject matter included. He divides the battle into two phases: the tank battle, 20-29 November, 1917, and the counter-offensive, 30 November-7 December, 1917.

In his conclusion he says that the tactical usefulness of tanks was to destroy wire and cross trenches, and this was limited by their weight and slow rate of advance.

Hylander, C. J.—**Cruisers of the air.** The story of lighter-than-air craft: from the days of Roger Bacon to the making of the ZRS-4. 1931.....M 409-C

CONTENTS: Preface; Introduction; Ideas, fanciful and practical; Ideas become realities; The idea spreads to other countries; The balloon goes a-voyaging; The balloon becomes dirigible; The dirigible airship emerges; The non-rigid airship; The semi-rigid dirigible; The rigid dirigible proves its worth; The development of the airship in the United States; The airship goes a-voyaging; The modern airship; Illustrations.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR H. F. NICHOLS

This is a compilation that follows the development of the lighter-than-air craft from the hot-air balloon of the Montgolfier brothers in France, in 1782, to the ZRS-4, completed in Akron, Ohio, in 1931, a non-technical work that should be of interest to the layman as well as the technician.

The author covers the historical development of the simple balloon into the modern dirigible, or steerable balloon. In doing this he emphasizes the trend in France in favor of the non-rigid type, in Germany, the rigid, and in Italy, the semi-rigid dirigible. Many famous names appear.

A French army officer, Meusnier, about 1784, gave us the internal balloonet, today an integral part of all non-rigid airships. Another Frenchman, Giffard, in 1852, first used motive power, a 5 HP steam engine. The Tissandier brothers, also French, in 1883, tried the electric motor, and, with a motor-driven airship, the "La France," Renard and Krebs, in 1884, first travelled a planned course and returned to the starting point. A German, Paul Haenlin, in the 1870's, first used an internal combustion engine, the motive power that was to make possible the modern dirigible balloon.

The development continued, in the late 1890's, through the efforts of Santos-Dumont and Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin. Count von Zeppelin, who, in 1863, served with the Union cavalry in our Civil War, began in 1896, at the age of fifty-six, his tremendous labors that were to result by 1919 in the construction of one hundred and fifteen airships. His story is epic.

The modern British and American rigid airships are of German origin or based on Count Zeppelin's development. The later chapters of the book, covering the British R-33, R-34, R-100, and R-101, all rigid dirigibles, the Italian built semi-rigid Roma, and the rigid Los Angeles, Shenandoah, and ZRS-4, are well worth the military student's time.

Gamble, C. F. Snowden.—**The air weapon.** Being some account of the growth of British military aeronautics from the beginnings in the year 1783 until the end of the year 1929. Vol. I: November 1783—August 1914. London, 1931.....M 409-C.42-C

CONTENTS: Preface; Introduction; The history of military aeronautics in Great Britain from the beginnings in 1783 until the formation of the Balloon Section of the Corps in Royal Engineers in 1890; The development up to the formation in 1909 of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; The Air Battalion and the Royal Flying Corps; The period of growth; Appendix; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR M. F. HARMON

This volume contains a very complete history of the birth and development of the British Air Arm from the middle of the eighteenth century until the beginning of the World War. It is replete with detail and would be of value to one who cared to make this particular subject one of close study or research. However, in the light of subsequent developments in military aviation, this first volume contains little of value to the military student.

References used are unusually complete and facts seem to be based on ample authority.

Subsequent volumes (II and III) yet to be published, dealing as they do with the period of the war and up to include 1929, should contain much of interest and value to the student of military aviation.

Schlieffen, General Fieldmarshal Count Alfred von.—**Cannae**. In 2 volumes. (Translation from the German). 1931.....M 501-A.43

CONTENTS: Vol. I: Foreword; Introduction; List of maps; The battle of Cannae; Frederick the Great and Napoleon; The campaign of 1866; The Prussian and Austrian concentration; The campaign of 1866 in Germany; The campaign in Bohemia of 1866 until the evening of June 30th; Königgratz. The campaign of 1870-71; From the concentration of the armies to the retreat of the French across the Moselle; The advance of the Germans to and across the Moselle—The battles of Colombey—Nouilly, and Mars la Tour; The battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat; The battles of Beaumont and Sedan.

This book was first brought to the attention of this School in 1916 by a lecture delivered by Colonel Wilson B. Burt, Infantry, as to the observations of the United States military mission headed by General Joseph E. Kuhn on its visit to the German armies in 1915 and 1916. It was subsequently translated at The Army War College and individual officers in attendance there sought copies. At various times efforts were made to have it published in English. The stumbling block, both commercially and officially, was the necessity for reproducing some one hundred maps or sketches and without these the text would lose much of its military value. Furthermore, it was necessary to obtain the authority of the heirs of the author as well as that of the publishers. Thanks to their courtesy this has been satisfactorily arranged. This School has now undertaken this task, without any expectation of profit, in order to make available in English to the officers in attendance here a truly great modern military book. It is great because of the position and prestige of the writer and its influence on the conduct of the World War. It is modern since no one can attempt an understanding of many of the phases of the last war without the background of the military theories herein presented. Furthermore, these theories must be weighed, whether accepted or denied, in whole or in part, in the major conceptions of a future war should, unhappily, such occur. I have read and re-read my typed copy from the War College days with a set of photostat maps, certainly to my advantage because of the clear concise statements of the military campaigns which serve as the background and occasion for the presentation of the author's theories. Whether the theories are correct or not, each one must judge for himself. In any case they should be known and understood by officers attending this School. (Foreword)

STUART HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Commandant.

26 June, 1931.

The work of General Field Marshal Count von Schlieffen, as Chief of the General Staff of the German army, took place remote from publicity. Since the World War, however, his name is mentioned by all. It came to be known that it was his spiritual heritage which, at the beginning of the war, brought to the German arms their great successes. Even where his doctrines were misapplied, his schooling of the General Staff remained, nevertheless, a priceless possession. * * *

Strictly, the Cannae studies of Count Schlieffen are not presentations from Military History. They comprise, rather, a conversational document of instruction. . . . In everything which Count Schlieffen wrote the two-front war which threatened Germany hovered before him. . . .

Notwithstanding the sharp delineation of the Cannae doctrines Count Schlieffen was no schematist. He knew that in war many means lead to the goal. . . . (Introduction)

BARON VON FREYTAG-LORINGHAVEN,
General of Infantry, Retired,
German Army.

Kirby, Major S. W., & Kennedy, Captain J. R.—**Tactical schemes with solutions.** Suitable for preparation for promotion and Staff College entrance examinations, and for practice in applying tactical principles. Series II. London, 1931.....M 503-A1

CONTENTS: Authors' preface; Foreword. Scheme 1—Advance guard; Scheme 2—Battalion and brigade attack; Scheme 3—Outposts in close contact; Scheme 4—Exploitation and pursuit; Scheme 5—Rearguard (reconnaissance and occupation of a position); Scheme 6—Rearguard (reconnaissance of rear positions and withdrawal in daylight); Appendix—Order of battle.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

"Tactical schemes with solutions, Series II," is a continuation of Series I. (Reviewed in RCMW No. 42, page 61.) This volume is complementary to the other and fills in the gaps. The problems are worked out in the same manner with complete solutions and notes in each case but deal with phases of the battle which were not covered in the previous series; for example, Series I contained the problem of outposts when outside striking distance of the enemy, Series II deals with the problem when forces are in contact. In Series I the action of a division in a withdrawal and rear guard was described. This series carries the problem down to the brigade, battalion and company. More complete problems are dealing with administration and intercommunication.

One of the chief merits of these problems is the detailed solutions and notes given. The samples of orders, estimates and messages given should be very useful in clearing up matters of form and procedure.

This Series is of interest to the Command and G-3 Sections.

Kirby, Harold Lewis.—**Meteorology as related to the operation of aircraft.** 1931.....M 607

CONTENTS: Foreword; Requirements; Value of meteorological data; Sources of meteorological data; Pilot's interest in weather reports; Atmosphere; Temperature; Convection currents; Pressure; Pressure variation in relation to flying; Movement of the atmosphere; Winds; Upper air study; Atmospheric moisture and condensation; Clouds; Fog; Details of weather maps and forecasting; Thunderstorms; General; Meteorological instruments; Index to illustrations; Index to all subject matter.

REVIEWED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL O. WESTOVER

This book was written primarily to serve the needs of pilots of the Army and Navy air services, commercial pilots, aircraft operators, and applicants for an airplane pilot's rating. It is largely a compilation of known facts regarding the science of meteorology, presented in such a way that the opinions and conclusions of the author and of experienced pilots, based on observation and experience, appear in the discussion of related meteorological data.

The arrangement of the book is rather cumbersome and not conducive to a ready understanding of the part which meteorology plays in aircraft operations. It is believed that any book dealing with meteorology as related to the operation of aircraft should first acquaint the reader with meteorological terminology, conditions, and factors; then enumerate the fundamental sources and means of gathering meteorological data; then discuss the interpretation of such data in the preparation of weather forecasts; then give the means installed in airplanes or provided at operating stations for the information of pilots; and finally discuss the application of all means and data in the determination of conditions suitable for flying on any day, at any time and place, or over any route. After the reader has learned the various meteorological conditions and the means for collecting and evaluating meteorological data, he should be in a better position to understand and appreciate a discussion of the application of each and all of the meteorological factors and data to practical flying. Not alone is this essential to insure imparting practical knowledge of the factors affecting safe and sane flying, but also to inculcate in the minds of readers

certain definite and positive rules or maxims covering the safe practical operations of aircraft.

The author's description of clouds, pressure areas, thunder storms, air currents and meteorological instruments is very complete and affords a comprehensive reference on such subjects. The diagrams and illustrations given in the book are particularly applicable and excellent.

There has long been need for a book which would give pilots or applicants for pilot's license practical information concerning the weather and meteorological data over and above the general knowledge which would be imparted in a book on elementary meteorology. This book is a step in the right direction. Much of the meteorological data contained therein will be too advanced for application by the average aircraft operator or new pilot. Experienced flyers will find it of value for ready reference. Much more space could be devoted to practical meteorology; that is, the direct application of a knowledge of meteorological conditions or data in the planning and actual accomplishment of flights. A chapter dealing particularly with meteorological deductions made in the air during flight would be particularly appropriate and of incalculable value to pilots. The experience to furnish such a chapter exists, and only awaits collection, compilation, and evaluation by some competent and experienced authority.

A copy of this book is of value as a reference book to the Air Corps Sub-section, Command and General Staff School, and should be kept on file in the Library.

Moodie, William.—**The crown of honour.** Being stories of heroism, gallantry, magnanimity, and devotion from the Great War of 1914-18. London, 1930.....M 9403-B4.42

CONTENTS: Foreword; Stories of Belgium; Stories of France. Stories of the British Empire. The morale of the troops; The Navy and Mercantile Marine; The land forces; The far-flung line (Canadians, Anzacs, etc.); The air forces; The cross for valour; Flotsam and fine gold; The roll of honour and the final tribute. Stories of other Allies; In lighter vein; The other side of war; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR M. B. NAVAS

This is a collection of short stories of heroism, self-sacrifice and courage of the World War. It gives the reader a birdseye view of those who played such an important part in the shaping of the destinies of so many nations by presenting a rapid succession of pictures, not only of the rulers and great leaders who will live in history forever, but also of the ignoble soldiers, the destitute women who gave their men to the great cause.

The first chapter, "Stories of Belgium," gives us examples of the supreme self-sacrifice and bravery of the Belgians; the humble soldier who was loyal to the end; the heroic priests who inspired the men with their devotion and of the three little girls who dared to parade through the streets wearing the colors of their flag when it would have meant death to exhibit the flag itself.

The "Stories of France" present personal episodes about those great men, Joffre, Foch, Petain and Nivelle, and also introduce us to such characters as the Officer with the spirit of D'Artagnan, with his audacity and gaiety in the face of death itself, to the "simple soldier" who so willingly gave his life to his country, and to the poor peasants who believed that the Maid of Orleans was keeping the Germans from Paris.

Over half of the book deals with numerous stories of the British Empire in which the characteristics and temperament of the Britisher are in evidence, slightly different from the preceding chapter dealing with the Latin races.

We see Lord Kitchener who inspired his soldiers not only to meet a glorious death but also to do the even harder task of maintaining morale equilibrium and discipline in the dull humdrum of everyday service. We also see the Prince of Wales fighting bravely at the side of the humble British soldier who on several occasions failed to recognize his noble com-

mander. There are also many examples of the valiant heroism of "Tommy Atkins" who was really at his best when the ordinary soldier might be contemplating suicide or desertion.

The last three chapters of the book, although short, are most interesting. "Stories of the Allies" give us a picture or two of the Americans, Italians, Serbians and Russians deeds of heroism. "In Lighter Vein" the author has had the keen sense of humor to seek out from the mire of tears and horrors of this great war, a few chuckles, maybe a laugh, and a smile through bitter tears, by giving us a few humorous incidents and "good stories." "The Other Side of the War" furnishes us with a few incidents of the patriotism, humanity and gallantry of the enemy, fighting also for their country, their ruler and their God.

Schäfer, Oberstleutnant Theobald von.—**Generalstab und Admiralstab.** Das zusammenwirken von heer und flotte im Weltkrieg. [General Staff and Naval Staff. Cooperation of army and fleet in the World War.] Berlin, 1931.....M 9403-D4.43

REVIEWED BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

A critical study of joint Army and Navy operations during the World War. The author traces the pre-war contact between Army and Navy, and holds that no plan of effective cooperation, between the War and Navy Departments had been devised. Admiral v. Tirpitz states in his "Memoirs" (pp. 228-264) "the plan of operation of the Navy was kept a secret and was not coordinated with the Army effort, etc." The effect of naval cooperation was underestimated, if not entirely ignored.

Initially the German General Staff failed to establish liaison with the Admiralty Staff; in the first period of the War, there was reluctance to employ the Navy in major operations; it appears that the Emperor interposed personally.

The pamphlet contains brief investigations, under the following headings:

- How could the Fleet support the operations on land? (p. 26)
- Harassing British transports; (p. 29)
- The battle on the coast of Flanders; (p. 37)
- Denmark and the East Sea. (p. 40)

Palat, General.—**La part de Foch dans la Victoire.** [The part of Foch in the victory.] Paris, 1930.....M 9403-E4-D.44-B92 (FO)

REVIEWED BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

Clemenceau's book, "Comment j'ai nommé Foch," as well as his "Grandeur et misère de la Victoire," have a somewhat critical tendency regarding Foch, to a point of questioning his moral strength and to challenge Foch's strategic leadership during the World War.

General Palat seeks to prove Foch's part in obtaining victory, and the relative importance of his decisions. His statements are carefully documented, with extracts from current orders, GHQ decisions, extracts from Foch's personal and official records and other pertinent evidence.

As such, the book represents a valuable compilation of historical data, as collateral material to a general history of operations on the Western Front.

Alexander, Major General Robert.—**Memories of the World War, 1917-1918.** 1931.....M 9403-E4-C.73-B92 (AL)

CONTENTS: Introduction; Lorraine, February, 1918; Training centers of the 1st Corps; Replacement system of the A.E.F.; The British in front of Amiens; The Highlanders; A British School of arms; With the French in the Vosges; General situation, Western Front, end of July, 1918; The Marne-Aisne offensive; The Vesle; August 5th-7th; In support behind the Vesle; Hostile air raids; To Mangin's Xe Armée—to the 77th Division; The 77th Division;

The 77th Division in the Vesle; Across the Vesle to the Aisne; On the Aisne; Under French command; Attack of the Ve armée; September 14th; From the Aisne to the Argonne; General situation: September 20th, 1918; Preliminaries to battle; The Forest—Communications; The American plan of attack; The eve of battle; The attack, September 26th; The second day; The attack continues; September 30th-October 1st; The attack of October 2d, Whittlesey's command; The line moves forward; Saint-Juvin, October 14th, 1918; Grand Pre, October 15th-16th, 1918; In Corps Reserve; Champaigneuille, November 1st, 1918; The pursuit, November 2d-6th; The Armistice; After the Armistice—The return to America.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR P. HAYES

In the foreword of this book the author states "These personal memories of service, written shortly after the war, have two ends in view. First, to tell the unvarnished truth and, second, to record my appreciation of the sacrifices, devoted service and determined valor of the troops with whom it was my great good fortune to be associated during the operations." The general tone and contents of the work are very aptly expressed in those few words.

The story is intimately and colorfully told. One is amazed with the amount of detail, and the intimate nature of the detail, which the author was able to collect and express in a book form. The work covers the part played and the period of service of the author in the World War.

The author has, in several instances, become personal in his observations and in the expression of his thoughts relative to certain individuals. While he may have had in his mind, a justifiable purpose in such an expression, the reviewer questions what was gained by such expression.

While the work deals with the personal experiences of the author, nevertheless the author has been able to draw a very clear and interesting picture of the World War as he saw and experienced it. There are throughout the text many pertinent and apt tactical principles expressed. The author has by means of repetition endeavored to drive home those tactical doctrines which he felt were all important.

Naturally, in view of the foreword of the book, the author takes this opportunity to give personal appreciation to several individuals by name. The Command and General Staff School is given credit for its great part in winning the war.

The book furnishes pleasant reading, and is of general interest to all officers. It is of particular interest to those officers who served in the 77th Division.

Charteris, Brigadier-General John.—At G.H.Q. London,

1931

M 9403-E4-D.42

CONTENTS: Preface; 1914—Corps Headquarters: Mobilization; First days in France; The retreat from Mons; The battle of the Marne; The Aisne and after; The first battle of Ypres. 1915—Army Headquarters: Preparation for Neuve Chapelle; Neuve Chapelle; Critical days at Ypres; The spring and summer of 1915; Preliminary to Loos; Battle of Loos; Sir Douglas Haig becomes Commander-in-Chief. 1916—G.H.Q.: Plans for the Somme attack; The Somme; The Somme successes. 1917—G.H.Q.: Discussions and rumors; The German withdrawal; Battle of Arras; Messines; Ypres again; Passchendaele; Cambrai and its aftermath. 1918—G.H.Q.: The Supreme War Council v. G.H.Q.; The German onslaught; The beginning of the end. Appendixes; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR F. A. DONIAT

The author, Brigadier-General John Charteris, was a member of Sir Douglas Haig's staff throughout the War. Each time Sir Douglas was promoted to a higher command he took the author with him, and during most of the War the latter was the Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Headquarters he was assigned to.

The book itself is a series of dated messages, memoranda, or letters, most of the letters being to his wife with intimate personal matters omitted. All of these are arranged in chronological order and read as though they were the author's journal.

The book gives an interesting picture of the author's personal life at G.H.Q. and his personal association with the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force. It gives a fair idea of the life at G.H.Q., but

does not go into the details of the work performed there, and only tells in a general way what his own work was. In several cases the author tells what he estimates that the enemy intends to do, on both the British and the French fronts. In several cases he shows how he and the French were in disagreement regarding the German intentions, and in each case of disagreement that he speaks of he shows that he was right in his forecast and the French were wrong. He specifically mentions several cases in 1918 when both French GHQ and General Foch badly misguessed the German intentions and refused to believe the British estimate which subsequently proved to be correct.

No tactical or strategical plans, or operations, are discussed in detail, and no maps are included.

Much space is devoted to discussing the political side of the War and commenting upon the many visitors to G.H.Q., principally British politicians and statesmen, though he seldom or never calls them by the name of "statesmen." He speaks at length of friction between the British cabinet on the one side and the War Office of G.H.Q. on the other. The author strongly defends Haig, Kitchener and Robertson, and at times Asquith, against Lloyd George, Churchill and other politicians, and against General Wilson whom he classes with the worst of the politicians. He believes that those whom he defends worked with heart and soul and intelligence for the cause of England. He believes Lloyd George, Churchill, Wilson and others to have been responsible for many of the disastrous side shows, such as the Dardanelles and Mesopotamian campaigns, and in addition believes that they frequently put their own political advancement way ahead of the general interests of their country. He refers to cases of double dealing of Lloyd George.

The book is very pleasant reading for the military man and the layman. It should be of value to the G-2 Section of this School and to anyone making a study of the following:

- The results which some of the intelligence sections achieved in attempting to forecast German intentions;
- Leadership of Sir Douglas Haig;
- Interference by British politicians in the conduct of military operations during the World War.

Schultze-Pfaelser, Gerhard.—**Hindenburg. Peace—war—aftermath.**

(Translation from the German by Christopher R. Turner.)

London, 1931.....M 9403-E4-E.43-P92 (HI)

CONTENTS: Publisher's foreword; The birth of a family; Home and childhood; War experiences as a subaltern; Staff officer and General and Corps Commander; The laurel-crowned General; Commander-in-Chief in the East; The Hindenburg and Ludendorff condominium; The collapse; Intermezzo; The presidential candidature; The President takes the oath; First Magistrate of the Republic; A breathing space; The tribute controversy; Democracy at the crossroads; Liberation; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR S. C. GODFREY

It is perhaps permissible for a biographer to be a hero-worshipper, provided his sense of critical, unprejudiced research is not blinded thereby. The present author is not above reproach on this score. The account of Hindenburg's military campaigns is worthless. The story of Tannenberg is pure legend rather than fact. Later the author states: "The Little Father kept two bloodhounds called Ivanoff and Brussiloff . . .;" and refers to "The Tsarist commander-in-chief, a savage with the German name of Ewert." Further comment is superfluous.

The remainder of the book is largely descriptive of Hindenburg's later political career. It may be of some interest to many who have admired the dignity and leadership which the old soldier brought to the office of President, his adaptability to the greatly changed conditions in the new German Republic, his patriotism which placed the nation above party

considerations. The keynote to Hindenburg's notable success has been perhaps best expressed in his own words: "The views acquired in the great school of duty which is the German army, will help me to do my work in peace-time, for they can be summed up in the saying that duty comes before rights."

"Even German humanity is not perfect," sighs the author. The reader will heartily agree, and will hope that a biography of Hindenburg may be produced less marred by such glaring imperfections.

Palmer, Frederick.—**Newton D. Baker—America at war.** In 2 volumes. 1931.....M 9403-F3-C.73-E3

CONTENTS: Vol. I: Let us proceed; Ready and unready; Gestures and action; The inevitable; Bricks without straw; Emotion and action; To show the flag; Under our own flag; The draft; "Your duty as officers"; Building the soldier cities; Our army of labor; The sword and the shield; Health, morals, religion; Exemptions and the draft; The mills of war grind on; The spur of disaster; Many soldiers and few ships; References. Vol. II: We make a King in France; A stern winter of war; The scapegoat of impatience; "What more can we do?"; The Secretary sees the A.E.F.; The integral army; Unified command; Back at his desk; Aviation—the reckoning; More power in fewer hands; Trial by battle; Heartbreaks; The great soldier odyssey; Justice; "The invisible armor"; High tide; Still the call for more; The Meuse-Argonne battle; What did names matter?; Mustered out; References; Illustrations; Index.

REVIEWED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL O. WESTOVER

These volumes are a valuable contribution to the literature and historical data pertaining to participation of the United States in the World War. The title of the book clearly indicates that its main purpose is to record the official responsibilities and activities of the then Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. The title is compounded and the volumes bear out the fact that the subject matter covers the essentials of American participation in the World War.

These volumes are a fitting corollary to Pershing's book "My Experiences in the World War." The unprecedented and almost perfect teamwork which existed between the War Department and the Commander-in-Chief of our Expeditionary Force can be better understood as a result of the work of this author. The volumes are illuminative in their disclosures of the intimate official relationship existing between the President, the Secretary of War, and those key-men in military, naval, civil, and industrial spheres who were responsible for projecting and perfecting the plans for American participation in the World War. Throughout the whole treatise there is reflected the record of the caliber of a man who was our Secretary of War—a man whose clear analytical mind and positiveness of decision substantiated the newspaper dispatch published the day after Mr. Baker's selection as Secretary of War, and which said of him: "He is a slim little man with a fighting jaw and a whimsical eye * * *. He is possessed of a clear analytical mind which has been called one of the most intellectual in the country."

The author deals chronologically with the events leading up to Mr. Baker's selection as Secretary of War, and those which preceded our entrance into the World War. A great deal of space is devoted to a discussion of the handicaps facing the War Department and the General Staff in the matter of preparation for war, and how these handicaps were in a large measure overcome by the adoption of policies for preparedness and the assumption of authority by Mr. Baker for initiating work for their accomplishment. The author does not attempt a chronological presentation of America's part in the World War. He does select chronologically and co-relate those essential activities, efforts, and influences, as well as obstacles, which form the record of wise decisions and a successful war effort. Taking each of these essential elements, the author then chronologically presents and discusses in a most interesting way the factors which had a bearing thereon and which influenced the final decisions of the War Department in the matter. Having had access to many confidential records of the Government, to the confidential cablegrams between the War De-

partment and the American Expeditionary Force, and to the personal papers of the Secretary of War, the author has been able to present, and it is believed quite impartially, an intimate picture of America's part in the war which has not been hitherto presented and probably never would have been presented by the Secretary of War himself. The modesty of Mr. Baker, both as Secretary of War and thereafter, causes him to refrain from any efforts to seek aggrandizement either for himself or the War Department as a result of our successful participation in the war. Mr. Baker's attitude is clearly reflected in the following extract from a letter written to F. H. Goff: "I am not so concerned as I should be, I fear, about the verdict of history. For the same reasons it seems to me unworthy to worry about myself, when so many thousands participated in the World War unselfishly and heroically who will find no place at all in the records which we make up and call history." This exposition of the responsibilities, activities and influences which affected the War Department's decisions prior to and during the World War is of value not alone to military and political students, but also to all patriotic citizens—if for no other purpose than to clarify in public opinion the relationship existing between the War Department and the Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces, about which there exists some conjecture since the publication of General Pershing's book. These volumes accomplish this purpose. The author, who served with the American Expeditionary Force, and who has written other books which cover phases of service in the A.E.F., has performed a creditable and laudable service in this regard. From the author's chapter on "We make a King in France" and "The Integral Army," the reader may infer criticism of General Pershing's policies by the author, and a disposition on his part to indorse Mr. Baker's suggestions as to such policies. It is believed that such a conclusion would be erroneous. The author's presentation of facts and policies related to the draft, to cantonment construction, to welfare work and moral standards for the army, to labor difficulties, to public criticism and official investigations, to preservation of the integrity of our expeditionary forces, to unified allied command, and to the relief of general officers, is quite comprehensive and especially interesting. Among other specific things, the author discloses in full the reasons for the rejection of Theodore Roosevelt's offer of a volunteer division, for the subordination of Major General Leonard Wood to War Department decisions, and General Pershing's objections to the Secretary's plan for General Goethal's assignment in charge of the service of supply of the Expeditionary Forces. These interesting volumes, without any apparent effort of the author to publicize Mr. Baker himself, leave the reader immensely impressed with the high caliber of our former Secretary of War and of his personal character and capabilities for meeting any situation into which he may be placed in the future by the expressed will of the elective mass of American people.

These volumes contain so much of value as a contribution to our war literature that it is believed they should be a part of every military library and of the libraries of military and naval officers, of members of Congress, and of men holding key positions in our political, industrial, commercial and social life.

Charbonneau, Lt.-Colonel Jean.—**Dans la boue Champenoise.** [In the mud of Champagne.] Paris, 1929.....M 9403-G4-J6

CONTENTS: Avant-propos; De surprises en surprises (Période du 15 septembre au 15 décembre 1914); La rude Ecole de la "Guerre de Tranchées" (période du 15 décembre, 1914 à juin 1915); L'Offensive libératrice de 1915 (période de mai à octobre 1915); La morale de cette histoire.

REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. C. DRAIN

This is a book dedicated to trench warfare, covering the operations of the French I Colonial Army Corps upon the Champagne front during the period September 1914 to September 1915.

The subject matter is treated in three phases, viz.,

- a. The end of open warfare and beginning of stabilized warfare;
- b. The rough school of trench warfare;
- d. The 1915 offensive.

The outstanding lesson is the failure to envisage trench warfare, in spite of the experience of previous wars.

This book is of interest to any military student who desires to study the development of trench warfare.

Moser, Lieutenant General Otto von.—**A short strategical review of the World War, 1914-1918.** (Translation from the German by 1st Lieutenant B. A. Dickson). 1921.....M 9403-H1-D.43

CONTENTS: Preface; Short strategical review; 1914; 1915; 1916; 1917; 1918; Short strategical examination of the World War; Strategical summary 1914; Situation at end of 1914; Strategical summary 1915; Situation at end of 1915; Strategical summary 1916; Situation at end of 1916; Strategical summary 1917; Situation at end of 1917 to 1918 offensive; Strategical summary 1918; Summation; Maps.

REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. GIBSON

This book aims to answer the questions as to whether the World War would have had a different outcome for Germany had she used to the utmost all of her national resources, spiritual and material.

Only conflicts of strategical importance are touched upon. That which today is common and general knowledge is omitted.

Certain comments of the author are valuable in giving what is probably the viewpoint of an important class of thinking Germans.

Germany was forced to go through Belgium because otherwise the British or French would have gone through. The sending of two corps to the Eastern Front and the German attack against the Toul—Nancy—Epinal front took troops from the German right wing which were essential to make the von Schlieffen plan succeed.

Von Moser thinks Joffre made his counterattack prematurely at the Marne. He states as follows: "Had the French Commander, freed from his heavy strategical worries, been better informed by his cavalry of the mistake of the army reserve behind the German wing army, he could have shown his generalship by postponing for a few days more, even at the price of lost terrain, his counter-attack on the German front and right flank. In that interim a greater number of French troops would have detrained in and north of Paris, and a disastrous defeat, perhaps decisive, of the Germans on the Marne would have been possible and even probable."

Territory, valuable strategically and tactically, was given up unnecessarily on the retreat from the Marne, particularly the Argonne Forest and the Argonne railway connecting Verdun with the west.

No campaign is to be won in modern war except by great battle victories. Falkenhayn made a grave mistake by assuming the defensive on the Western Front. Supreme authority and unity of command are essential. The Entente suffered greatly from differences of opinion and divided authority between Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Conrad.

The operations in the east during 1915 were pushed too far. Had they been halted at an earlier date the Germans in 1916 would have had 50 instead of 25 reserve divisions in the west and might have conducted a successful offensive.

The political strategy of Germany was bad in not renouncing all aims for conquest or annexations of territory in 1917.

The German homeland was physically and morally exhausted by the winter of 1917 and 1918. The attacking army reflected the condition of the people and was like a battleaxe whose shaft had only been shellacked to cover cracks and dents resulting from hard usage.

Tactical instead of strategical considerations governed Ludendorff's decision as to the time and place of attack on the Western Front in the spring of 1918.

The place and direction of the attack, at the junction of the French and British armies and toward Amiens, was not well selected. The French were thoroughly rested. The objective was relatively unimportant and distant. The attack should have been made on the line Ypres—Lens, through St. Omer to Boulogne. The weather prevented an attack in this area before April. Ludendorff believed he could not wait on account of the rapid arrival of American soldiers in France.

The third offensive of May 27-29 should have been halted on the line Soissons—Fismes. The deep salient to Chateau Thierry was untenable.

The fourth offensive, in the vicinity of Rheims should not have been made. An attack in Flanders which was planned to follow the 4th offensive had a strong chance of success.

The Allied Soissons offensive against the west side of the salient made an end to all further German offensive plans and possibilities and also gave the Allies the first exact insight into the greatly numerically weakened condition of the German Army.

The new British tank at Villers-Brettonneux was almost catastrophic in its practical moral effects.

Ludendorff failed on account of strategical errors, especially the inefficient effort of the first German drive as to time and place and the misplaced efforts of May and June.

The German Army was not defeated or crushed in the field by the genius of generalship but was forced to withdraw by huge numerical superiority due to the arrival of the American soldiers.

General v. Moser believes that had political conditions in Germany before and during the war unified the people completely, the people would have stood behind the army as a whole and the army would have been unbeatable.

This book has value to any student who desires a concise statement of German World War strategy.

Foerster, Oberstleutnant Wolfgang.—**Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des Deutschen Generalstabes.** [From the workshop of ideas of the German General Staff.] Berlin, 1931.....M 9403-H5-D.43

CONTENTS: Vorwort; Graf Schlieffen und die Erben; Der deutsche kriegsplan; Der unsichere Verbündete; Die kriegsplane der Gegner.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

Lieutenant-Colonel Foerster is well known as the author of "Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg," in which he revealed much, but not all, of the "Schlieffen Plan." His new book contains four long chapters on different subjects. In general, it is a defence of the German General Staff and its doctrine, and, having full access to the German archives, the author introduces a certain amount of new matter.

In the first chapter he offers a clue to the reason which made Moltke send forward the left wing (Sixth and Seventh Armies) to the attack, after it had defeated the French offensive in Alsace-Lorraine, instead of using its corps to strengthen the enveloping wing. At staff tours in 1906 and 1912 Moltke in his summing up unequivocally stated that "an offensive of the main French forces past the south of Metz into the Reichsland must bring to a halt the further march through Belgium and the wheel against the French left." But, as we know, Moltke did not stop the offensive wing on Paris. It would seem that he failed because he tried to carry out the complete Schlieffen idea, which was a Cannae, with double envelopment.

Colonel Foerster has to admit that the Schlieffen plan was designed for forces which the Reich did not possess when it was made. He gives

the whole story of the change from the elder Moltke's plans for attacking Russia first and standing on the defensive against France, and of the development of the plan actually carried out.

As regards war at sea, it is stated that the Admiral Staff agreed to attack the British fleet on declaration of war, and did not tell the General Staff that it had changed its plan.

The account of the French plans verges on the ridiculous. He does not seem to know where to look for the Russian plan of campaign, and has nothing concrete to say about it.

This book should be of interest to the G-2 Section of the Command and General Staff School.

Groener, Generalleutnant Wilhelm.—**Der Feldherr wider willen.**

Operative studien über den Weltkrieg. [The Commander-in-Chief against his will. Studies of operations in the World War.]

Germany, 1931.....M 9403-H6-C.43-C3C

CONTENTS: Vorwort; Der Nachfolger; Die deutsche Oberste Heeresleitung am 27. August 1914; Die Rette der Irrtümer in Lothringen; Die Kämpfe um die Maas-Linie bei der 4. Armee; Der Maas-Übergang der 5. Armee; Der Vormarsch der 3. Armee von der Maas zur Aisne; Le Cateau und St. Quentin; Dies nefastus; Der Übergang zu einer neuen Operation; Aushilfen?; Ruhe vor dem Sturm; Rückblick auf den Schlieffenplan; Die Schlacht; Der Rückzug; Nur in der Bewegung liegt der Sieg; Schuld oder Schicksal?; Verzeichnis der Skizzen.

[Preface: The successor; The German high command on 27 Aug. 1914; The rescue from the mistakes in Alsace-Lorraine; The battles on the Maas line of the 4th Army; The crossing of the Maas by the 5th Army; The advance of the 3rd Army from the Maas to the Aisne; Le Cateau and St. Quentin; Dies nefastus; The development of a new operation; Means of help; Peace before the storm; Retrospect to the Schlieffen plan; The battle; The withdrawal; Only in movement is victory; Guilt or fate; Index to maps.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

This is a continuation of a strategic study of the opening phases of the war begun in "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen." The latter book dealt with the Schlieffen theory of war and the battles of the frontier.

The title is not easy of translation. "A commander against his will" does not tell the entire colloquial meaning; the idea to be conveyed is that of a mental state of reluctance and hesitancy in assuming the responsibilities of Commander-in-Chief. As such, the title epitomizes the tendency of the book, an accusation of the errors of German G.H.Q., particularly the younger von Moltke.

General Groener was at the outset of the war, as lieutenant-colonel, Chief of the Field Railways at G.H.Q.—an important General Staff appointment—succeeded Ludendorff as First Quartermaster-General in the last days of the war. What he writes represents the best professional opinion of the old German Army. His second volume follows the lines of the first in describing the operations and making suggestions as to how they should have been carried out. General Groener has only one solution for one and every problem, which is envelopment of the Allied left flank.

We learn that "Count Schlieffen was much hurt that his successor, the younger Moltke, had no intellectual bond with him. The years 1906 (when Moltke became C.G.S.) and 1913 (when Schlieffen died) might have been of infinite use if there had not been a deep intellectual gulf between the two men."

General Groener confesses that the Germans committed an error in thinking that the victory in the battles of the frontier had been "overpoweringly great. After such (imaginary) successes there seemed no necessity to bring round large portions of the Sixth and Seventh Armies to the right flank, as planned." These Armies were ordered to push forward westward to complete the double envelopment of the French. It appears that double envelopment was actually included in the "Schlieffen plan," but "at a later period . . . when the decisively beaten French Army was driven by the left wing against the eastern fortresses and the Swiss frontier,"

Groener suggests that the Armies should have been regrouped after the battles of the frontier. This would have left General von Bülow free for command of the group of both Armies. The enveloping wing should then have pushed on towards and around Paris, while the center should have pursued a slow and steady advance.

For this plan the possession of Amiens and its railway center was most important. Kluck should not have bothered about fighting the British at Le Cateau, but pushed on southwest past them.

For the battle of Guise, General Groener has his sealed-pattern plan: Bülow's Army, leaving one corps to hold the Oise front east of Guise, should have marched southwest to envelop Lanrezac's left flank.

General Groener considers that "the germ of the Marne misfortune is essentially to be found in the events on the Oise." One must agree with him if he means that Bülow's Army, particularly the Guard and X Corps, lost so heavily that it was incapable of effective action at the Marne. "The day of victory at St. Quentin (Guise), the 30th of August, was strategically a day of misfortune, not of course on account of the victory, but because of the consequences which resulted from it." It led indeed to Kluck's Army turning south-eastward to envelop the Allies' left wing, and brought the German offensive wing between Paris and Verdun.

Groener claims that "with the wheel of the First Army over the Oise, the last trace of the Schlieffen plan disappeared." He proceeds to state that "the fundamental differences of Moltke's operative plan and the Schlieffen plan consisted in the double objective, the enveloping movement of the right wing through Belgium and the simultaneous attempt for a decisive victory, by the left wing, in Lorraine." In forming his plan Schlieffen took as basis that the French would stand on the defensive, as then seemed probable, and as it would have been appropriate even in 1914, in order to obtain full advantage from the nature of the theater of war and their fortress system.

It is admitted that "the German Army of 1914, as regards numbers, did not quite come up to the assumptions of the Schlieffen plan."

As regards communications, Groener thinks that if the plan for the wheel around Paris had been adhered to, the railways on that flank would not have been found much damaged.

Coming to the battle of the Marne, Groener regards all as going well up to the 9th of September, except at G.H.Q., where "a mistake had been made as regards the fighting power and resistance of the French Army. v. Moltke had expected a decision on the 8th, and it had not come. Except for Moltke's three confidants, no one knew how the battle stood."

The loss of the battle was due solely, he thinks, to the pessimism of Moltke and his assistants. Regarding v. Kluck's withdrawal from the Ourcq on G.H.Q. orders, Groener thinks that this was an occasion for disobedience on a grand scale, that Kluck "should have snatched the leading of the Armies out of the feeble hands of Moltke and forced the unstrategically inclined Bülow to do his will."

General Groener has hardly read the German Official Account. He will find that the Seventh and Sixth Armies were already retiring, beaten; the Fifth and Fourth and part of the Third pinned down by French artillery fire. He makes no suggestion as to who should stop the French Fifth Army and the B.E.F.

The study is of value to G-2 Section as a background for historical lecture on the World War, in the period August 1914 to September 30, 1914.

Willoughby, Major Charles Andrew.—**The economic and military participation of the United States in the World War.** 1931

M 9403-H6-C.73

CONTENTS: Preface; List of diagrams. Allied military situation 1914-1917; The problem; Mobilization, arms, clothing and equipment; Organization and Training; Overseas transportation; The service of supply, A.E.F.; Genesis of the First American Army; Americans at the front;

Military situation, spring 1918; The German offensives—Cantigny; The second battle of the Marne, May 27-August 6, 1918; Champagne-Marne defensive, July 15-18, 1918; Aisne-Marne offensive, July 18-August 6, 1918; The St. Mihiel operation; The Meuse-Argonne operations—September 26-November 11th, 1918; Health and casualties; A million dollars an hour; Brief histories of divisions, U.S. Army, 1917-1919; Bibliography.

REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL L. P. HORSFALL

The author, Major C. A. Willoughby, Infantry, was a student at the Command and General Staff School in the class of 1930-1931. He was interested in preparing a short history of America's part in the World War, with a view to publication in certain Latin-American periodicals, with which he had made contacts while on duty as Military Attaché in various South American countries. I encouraged him to proceed with the undertaking as his assigned subject in the current Historical Research course, and this volume is the result. The author deserves much credit in having completed it during the stress of exacting school duties.

Major Willoughby is an accomplished linguist. He uses French, German and Spanish, apparently, with equal facility. This has enabled him to consult many sources that have not yet been translated. In addition, his personal contacts and experience in dealing with Spanish speaking people, have guided him in selecting material that will hold their interest, increase their respect for the United States, and yet avoid giving offense. Aside from the value of this book in placing our participation in the World War before Spanish speaking Latin-America, which would have been impossible if undertaken as deliberate propaganda by United States official circles, this volume will be found useful as a handy reference book to those desiring a short authoritative summary of operations and actions in which we had a part during the eventful period of the latter part of the World War. The book contains a number of excellent diagrams and charts that show at a glance, a mass of statistics that would otherwise be dry and confusing reading. Copious footnotes are used throughout, to give references and quotations as authority for statements made in the text. Much source material was obtained from eye witness accounts and monographs by officers on duty at this School, who had a part personally in the events recorded. Such data is not available, ordinarily, to the usual research historian, and gives this book special value for accuracy and authenticity.

The author has stated the case of the United States very cleverly in many places, without in any way disparaging the efforts of other countries. There can be no doubt in the mind of the reader at the end, as to who won the war. The reaction, as a result of the publication of this book in Latin-American countries, can not be otherwise than favorable. They have been dependent too long on European sources for their only information concerning the World War. I have at hand a volume of what is probably the most widely read history of the World War, in Spanish, published in South America, "La Guerra Mundial de 1914-1918", Libro. III, of "Historia General Militar," Quito Imprenta Nacional 1924, by General Angel I Chiriboga N., who is at present, Inspector-General of the Ecuadorian Army. This book, according to the author, is based on texts employed in the Military Schools of France. The volume contains 504 pages; of this total, pp. 291 to 300, or 10 pages, are devoted to the American effort. It is probable that this ratio of pages represents accurately the relative merit attached to the American intervention. I quote the following significant comments:

"When war was declared, the American forces consisted of: (a) A Regular Army of 190,000 men, scattered over the immense area of the United States. There was no unit larger than a regiment; (b) A National Guard, composed of 150,000, initially employed along the Mexican border, but partly disbanded. The war caught the Army somewhat unprepared. There were no provisions to call or organize reserves. There was no law of conscription and the territorial organization of the forces had no relation whatever to war-time organization of larger units. The War Office had no General Staff, or branch divi-

sion, and the arsenals were not equipped to manufacture war materials on an intensive scale. (p. 291)

"(Referring to Armaments p. 295) It is true, that the major part of these materials was not manufactured in the United States, at least what was delivered before the Armistice, but were furnished by the British or the French. In spite of its formidable industry, the United States was unable to manufacture this equipment with sufficient precision. For guns, for instance, they had no designs of French types, until Sept. 1917, therefore it was only toward 1919 that American guns began to arrive. The same applies to the Browning Machine Gun, and aviation equipment, although the United States managed to fabricate the Liberty motor; consequently, the American Army remained entirely dependent on French industry until the end of hostilities."

The bar of language has placed little before the South American public that concerns the United States favorably, and I for one wish it were possible to recognize the author's efforts in this respect in a more official manner.

The appendices give a brief history of each American division, and an excellent bibliography of sources and collateral reading, much of which is available only at the Command and General Staff School Library.

The book has special value to the G-2 Section.

Willoughby, Major Charles Andrew.—**The Economic and Military Participation of the United States in the World War.** [La Participación de los Estados Unidos en la Guerra Mundial.] 1931.....M 9403-H6-C.73

REVIEWED BY PERCY ALVIN MARTIN, PH.D.,
Professor of Hispanic American History
Stanford University, California.

Though the work under review was written primarily for South American consumption it will be found very useful to citizens of the United States who desire a concise and authoritative account of the part which the American army and the American people played in the World War. The author, a member of the faculty of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, has spent many years in various official capacities in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. From his intimate associations with the armies of these republics, whose traditions hark back to the heroic days of Bolivar and San Martin, he is aware of the fraternal interest with which military circles regard the American army. But he also realizes that there exists a woefully inadequate idea of the extent of our economic and military participation in the World War. For this lack of appreciation of our achievements during the crucial years 1917-1919 our South American friends are not entirely to blame. Such accounts of the World War as they have available are, with rare exceptions, written in French, German or Italian, and their authors are in many instances prone to neglect or depreciate the contributions which the United States made to the defeat of the Central Powers. The work of Major Willoughby, written in flawless Spanish, should do much to correct such false impressions and give us the benefit of a truer perspective.

Broadly speaking the book falls into two sections. The first deals with the creation of our army of several million men and with the industrial and economic measures taken to supply and equip this enormous number of troops. The manner in which the entire industrial machinery of the nation was speeded up and utilized for the prosecution of the war is told in a graphic and convincing manner. The second and larger section of the book treats of the history and achievements of the American Expe-

ditionary Force on the battle front in France, with particular emphasis on the Aisne-Marne offensive, the St. Mihiel operation, and series of operations carried out in the Meuse-Argonne area. Though written for the professional soldier rather than for the layman the account is always lucid and at times exceedingly dramatic. The work contains two appendices, one containing brief histories of the various divisions of the army during the years 1917-1919, and the other a select bibliography.

Among the most arresting and valuable features of the book is the series of twenty-five diagrams which admirably supplement and clarify the account given in the text. They include such items as "Rifle strength of the Allied and German Armies on the Western Front, 1918," "Thousands of men drafted each month," "American telephone and telegraph lines in France, England and Germany," "Battle casualties of the American Combat Divisions," etc., etc. In preparing these diagrams the writer has placed various works under requisition, notably "The World War," by Brigadier General Howland, "The War with Germany," by Colonel Leonard P. Ayres and the "Final Report," by General John J. Pershing. A number of the diagrams were prepared by the author himself with the nomenclature, whenever necessary, in Spanish.

As a means of bringing home to our Spanish American friends the magnitude of the accomplishments of the United States in the World War, Major Willoughby has been conspicuously successful. The reviewer voices but one regret, namely that the publication of the Spanish version of this work should be limited to certain professional magazines of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Cuba. It is very desirable that a book of this importance be known in other Spanish American Republics, especially Argentina, Chile and Peru, and also, by means of a Portuguese translation, in Brazil.

Graves, Major General William S.—**America's Siberian adventure, 1918-1920.** 1931..... M 9403-H6-C.73-X.57

CONTENTS: Foreword; Illustrations; Introduction. Purpose of military intervention in Siberia; Aid to the Czechs; Before the Armistice; After the Armistice; Mobilization of Russian troops; The railroad agreement; Kolchak and recognition; Japan, the Cossacks and anti-Americanism; The Gaida Revolution; The debacle; Index.

REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL L. P. HORSFALL

I read General Graves' book with a great deal of interest. For some time, I have been curious as to what was really behind that strange expedition to Siberia. I am still in the dark. I cannot help but feel that much has been left untold. General Graves himself denies knowledge as to what it was all about. He says: "It has always been difficult for me, and I believe it is difficult for American readers, to understand why the United States ever acceded to the desires of England, France and Japan to send United States troops to Siberia."

I have talked to a number of officers who had a part in that expedition, and I have read a number of monographs written by such officers. They too confess not knowing at the time who was friend or foe. Many state that it would have been much easier for them to determine their daily course of action, had they had more definite information as to their mission.

The book sheds entirely new light on the part played by the Czechoslovaks. By aggressive action, they had gained control of the entire Siberian part of the Trans-Siberian railway, and their withdrawal to Vladivostok was never in danger. Furthermore, two months before the United States and Japan had announced the intention to go to their relief, the Czechoslovaks had decided to remain and help the Allies establish a new eastern front. The conclusions relative to the rescue of the Czechoslovaks, on the announced reasons for the expedition, differ widely from generally accepted ideas. General Graves makes it clear that no part of his mission included fighting Bolshevism. In this respect, seemingly, the War Department and

certain representatives of the State Department were working at cross purposes from the beginning.

A similar situation existed in the case of the Japanese contingent. General Graves sensed the point, but did not bring it out very well—perhaps he may not have known that the Japanese military authority vests only in the Emperor, and is not limited or controlled by the civil government. That fact may explain the wide difference between the announced policy of the Japanese government and the actual acts of her military representatives. General Graves leaves the impression that Japanese were there with an axe to grind.

I have been told that the publishers have been trying for some time to get General Graves to write up his experiences in this little known adventure. Finally, they sent two stenographers to take notes while he dictated, and with their assistance he finished the book. I am inclined to believe that at least one of them must have been a "split infinitive" stenographer, because of the careless editing in many places. The lack of continuity in some chapters also indicates that it was dictated to a large extent.

The author makes no attempt to give a detailed history of the events and military actions that took place, but gives a very good picture of the conflicting influences that were brought to bear to try to get the United States involved in a war against the Bolsheviks. General Graves had sufficient balance and experience to avoid this error.

The book has special value to the G-2 Section of the School.

Charbonneau, Lt.-Colonel Jean.—**La Bataille des Frontieres et la Bataille de la Marne vues par un Chef de Section (8 aout-15 septembre 1914)**. [The battle of the Frontiers and the Battle of the Marne (8 August-15 September 1914).] Paris, 1928. M 9403-J.44:4N5

CONTENTS: Avant-propos; La concentration, la marche a l'ennemi (9 aout-21 aout); Le choc; La retraite (resistance sur la Meuse); La retraite (marche vers le sud); La bataille de la Marne; La poursuite; La stabilisation; Epilogue; Quelques enseignements a retenir.

REVIEWED BY COLONEL J. A. WOODRUFF

This book is an account of the operations of a machine gun section of the 7th Colonial Infantry which belonged to the 3d Brigade of the 3d Division of the French Colonial Corps. This Corps was part of the Fourth French Army and fought in the battles of Neufchateau, Rossignol and St. Vincent on 22 August, 1914, which are described in detail by Grasset in his book on Neufchateau, and by Pugens in Rossignol.

The book gives a general account of the operations of the Colonial Corps and adjacent units during the period of open warfare, and intersperses extracts from a journal apparently written by the author immediately after the events described.

The operations of the machine gun section and later of the machine gun company of the 7th Infantry are described very vividly, from the early days of the War until after the battle of the Marne. The maps in the volume make it easy to follow the text.

The author also includes a study of open warfare operations of the future under conditions of mechanization and motorization.

Two interesting examples of command liaison in open warfare are given, one French and one German (pp. 162-164).

The book is of value to the G-2 and G-3 Sections.

Rouquerol, General Gabriel.—**La bataille de Guise, 29 aout 1914**. [The battle of Guise, 29 August 1914.] Paris, 1931. M 9403-J.44:4N5

CONTENTS: Avant-propos; Recit d'un temoin; Etude sur la bataille de Guise; Considerations critiques sur la direction d'ensemble de l'artillerie du 3e corps d'armee. [Preface; Story of a witness; Study of the battle of Guise; A critique on the employment of the artillery of the III Army Corps.]

REVIEWED BY MAJOR D. M. BEERE

This book is essentially a defence of the method of employment of the artillery with the III Corps, the author being the Chief of Corps Artillery. The book is not recommended for reading except by one making a very detailed study of the battle and then only after the French official account and the German Reichsarchiv (Die Schlacht bei St. Quentin 1914, in two volumes) have been premised.

Germany. Reichsarchiv.—**Schlachten des Weltkrieges. Band 35: Schicksalswende. Von der Marne bis zur Vesle, 1918.** [Battles of the World War. Vol. 35: The turn of fate. From the Marne to the Vesle 1918.] 1930..... M 9403-J.44:8-U1

CONTENTS: Die Entwicklung des Angriffsplans und die Angriffsvorbereitungen des Gegners; Die Ereignisse zwischen Oise und Marne von Mitte Juni bis zum 17. Juli und der "Rheims"—"Marneschutz" Angriff. Der französisch-amerikanische Angriff am 18. Juli: Die Ereignisse bei Gruppe Staabs; Der Verlauf der Kämpfe bei Gruppe Watter; Die Kampfergebnisse bei Gruppe Winckler; Die Kämpfe bei Gruppe Schoeler; Die Ereignisse an der Süd- und Südostfront der 7. Armee; Die Höheren Kommandostellen und die O.H.L. am 18. Juli; Die Ereignisse auf der Feindseite. Die Fortsetzung des Angriffs am 19. Juli; Der Verlauf des 20. Juli; Die Ereignisse des 21. und 22. Juli; Der Rückzug hinter die Vesle; Betrachtungen. Kartenverzeichnis.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR A. VOLLMER

This is number 35 of the German monograph series "Schlachten des Weltkrieges" by Alfred Stenger assisted by Colonel Lange and Captain Herrmann. It describes from the German side the operations which resulted in the loss by them of the Chateau Thierry salient, beginning on 18 July 1918.

The Germans had decided on 18 June 1918 on the Rheims offensive for 15 July to improve their weak Chateau Thierry salient.

On the 28th of June the 10th French Army under Mangin had gained ground on the west of the salient and made prisoners. On the 17th of July when the German Rheims offensive had failed to materialize it was settled that the Allied 10th and 6th Armies should attack on the 18th and that the 9th, 5th, and 4th farther east should join in the attack. A total of 42 French, 4 American and 4 British Divisions with 6 Cavalry Divisions, 187 medium and 150 light tanks were ready. Mangin's main attacking force was hidden in the woods of Villers Cotterets.

On the other side of the salient the German Seventh Army (Boehn) was reorganizing on June 13, after the Chemin des Dames offensive. Their units are represented to us by this monograph to have been weak, their manpower dissipated in elaborating the defences scattered in depth, with no strong positions anywhere, and trenching material was inadequate. He was forbidden to counterattack. At the beginning of July the French attack continuing and influenza depleting his force, the troops were ordered to adopt "elastic yielding." On July 5th Boehn's three western corps were formed into a ninth army under von Eben.

A great French attack was expected on July 14th but when it did not materialize the Germans relaxed vigilance. General von Eben reported that his reserves were weak, his troops tired, and that no intrenching had been done, and asked for replacements. When the German Rheims attack failed the last hope of success was gone. The Seventh Army proposed to withdraw. This was given approval by the Supreme Command, which, however, postponed issuing a definite order.

The maps accompanying the monograph are better than usual and show the troops in position. Taking the German enumeration there were 51 German divisions available to meet 50, but the American divisions were of double the infantry strength of the German.

By 5:10 AM on the 17-18 July the French barrage was creeping forward and the French and Americans following it were deep in the positions of the 9th and 7th Armies. The Germans had no knowledge that

this offensive was coming. The French 10th and the left of the 6th Army had attacked and Mangin had obtained the surprise which he wanted. By 5:35 AM the bombardment had opened and at 6:20 the infantry and tanks had advanced.

By midday it was evident to the Crown Prince that the divisions on the west front of the salient had been overwhelmed. At 12:45 P.M. the retirement of the troops across the Marne was ordered and the rearward positions fixed. By afternoon the situation was well in hand, but an evening attack brought a new crisis. Ludendorff at Mons ordered four divisions to move to the Crown Prince's Group.

On 19 July the French continued to attack and captured three or four miles of depth of ground. The reserves were exhausted and the situation of the 7th Army was critical. At 4:10 PM an order for reconnaissance of rearward positions for withdrawal across the Aisne was issued.

On the 20th the French front of attack was widened, but the Germans had withdrawn on the previous night across the Marne. The next night the corps of Winckler, Schoeler and Kather fell back. On the 21st and 22nd the French pressure slackened, and the Germans still yielded ground. They say they considered a counterattack, but abandoned it as taking too much time. On the 22nd Ludendorff ordered preparation for a complete evacuation of the salient probably on 24th or 25th. By August 1st the retirement across the Aisne-Vesle was made and the Chateau-Thierry salient had been lost.

The monograph is of value to the Military History Section.

Germany. Reichsarchiv.—**Schlachten des Weltkrieges. Band 30:**

Gorlice. [Battles of the World War. Vol. 30: Gorlice.] (Monographs of the Reichsarchiv). Edited by Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Tile von Kalm. 1930.....M 9403-J.47

CONTENTS: Einleitung; Die kriegslage im Frühjahr 1915; Der Entschluss der Obersten heeresleitung zum Durchbruch von Gorlice; Das kampfggebiet. Die Vorbereitungen für den Durchbruch von Gorlice; Die Durchbruchschlacht am. 2 Mai; Die Fortsetzung der Schlacht am 3. Mai; Die Auswirkungen der Schlacht. [Introduction; The campaign situation Spring of 1915; The decision of the high command to breakthrough at Gorlice; The combat area. The preparations for the breakthrough at Gorlice; The breakthrough battle on 2 May; The continuation of the battle on 3 May; The "denouement" of the battle; Lists of maps, illustrations and appendices.]

REVIEWED BY MAJOR A. VOLLMER

This number (30) completes the accessions of the C. & G.S.S. Library for this monograph series of the German Reichsarchiv (Gerhard Stalling, Publisher, Berlin) which is entitled "Schlachten des Weltkrieges in Einzeldarstellungen . . ." and which comprise a total of 36 numbers.

An earlier series, sponsored by the then German General Staff in the field, was entitled "Der grosse Krieg in Einzeldarstellungen . . ." This series was commenced in 1917 during the War and approximately 40 numbers were published. Of these, however, only 15 are now available, due to the prohibitions of the Treaty of Versailles. These are all in the C. & G.S.S. Library.

The monograph here under review (Gorlice) number 30 of the new series, is not to be confused with number 21 of the old series (Gorlice-Tarnow) (C. & G.S.S. Library Class No. M 9403-J.47:5-G.436). The former is by Lieutenant Colonel Oskar Tile von Kalm; the latter is by Leonhard Count von Rothkirch Freiherr von Trach. "Gorlice-Tarnow" is impassioned propaganda, while "Gorlice" is a carefully prepared detailed narrative.

The study shows how the Germans prepared a breakthrough in 1915, on a thirty mile front, Gorlice-Tarnow. The breakthrough was to be followed by a wheel from direction northeast to that due east behind the Russian front in the Carpathians. 56,000 men of the Russian Third Army opposed 70,000 Austrians on this front. Four German corps were sent to

make up the Eleventh Army together with one Austrian corps, an Austrian reserve division and an Austrian reserve cavalry division. On the left of the Eleventh Army stood the Austrian Fourth Army, on its right the Austrian Third Army. General von Mackensen, with Colonel von Seeckt as Chief of Staff, was in command both of the German Eleventh and Austrian Fourth Armies. von Mackensen was under the direction of the Austrian G.H.Q. which was in liaison for this operation with the German High Command under von Falkenhayn.

The Eleventh Army completed its dispositions on 28 April including all reconnaissance. The general instructions for the attack stressed the necessity of keeping the advance continuously moving. Definite objectives were purposely not assigned, but lines of advance were designated.

The Russians had learned of the preparations for this attack but had not yet brought up additional forces when it was launched. The order for the attack was issued at 6 PM on the 29th. The Eleventh Army was to make the breakthrough on 2 May. The Austrian Fourth Army was to advance eastwards at the same time to cover the left flank. The Austrian Third Army was to maintain contact with the German right.

Artillery fire was to be carried on during the night of 1st-2nd May followed by a four hours bombardment at 6 AM on 2 May.

The bombardment met very little reply and this was soon silenced. The advance went forward unimpeded. By 3 May the Austro-Germans were attacking the second position which was captured late that day.

On the 4th, Russian counterattacks succeeded only in covering their retreat. It was now a pursuit. The Russians evacuated the Carpathians. 140,000 prisoners, 100 guns and 300 machine guns were captured.

The maps show the German advance in detail. The account is of military-historical value.

Pochhammer, Captain Hans.—**Before Jutland.** Admiral von Spee's last voyage. Coronel and the battle of the Falklands. (Translation from the German) 1931..... M 9403-L8-C4

CONTENTS: At Tsingtao; From Tsingtao to Truk; At Ponape; At war; At the Marshall Islands; Off Samoa and Tahiti; The Marquesas Islands—Off Easter Island; The battle of Coronel; At and off Valparaiso; Rounding Cape Horn; The battle of the Falkland Islands; After the battle.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR C. A. WILLOUGHBY

It is often said that the reminiscences of navy and army officers are the substance of military history; but historians have found official documents more instructive than personal memoirs. How often is Marbot quoted as an authority by the historians of the Napoleonic Wars? Very rarely; there is only one reference to the brigadier's narrative in Petre's history of the Wagram campaign. Napier consulted personal memoirs carefully; but his great sources of information were battle orders, official instructions and official reports.

Captain Pochhammer was a gunnery officer in Admiral von Spee's squadron; he was rescued after the battle of the Falkland Islands, and wrote his reminiscences when he was a prisoner in England. His book, therefore, contains descriptions of the battles of Coronel and of the Falkland Islands, which, however, are far better described in the British and German official histories.

Hegemann, Werner.—**Napoleon or "Prostration before the hero."** (Translation from the German by Winifred Ray). London, 1931..... M 94405-N2-D

CONTENTS: Preface; The enchanted castle on the summit of Mont Blanc; Napoleon and the tribulations of the "Pan-European Congress"; Mysteries and minutiae of the enchanted castle; How the Great War and the travelling emperor came up for discussion; First intervention of Anatole France and praise of unselfishness; "Adultery is an affair of the sofa;" Did Napoleon ever live?; The evangelists of the saviour of the world; Napoleon's talented buffoon-

ery, the Prince de Ligne, Anatole France, Wieland, Byron, Heine; Anecdotes of Napoleon and of Frederick the Great; Napoleon and Frederick the Great as generals; Napoleon on the generalship of Frederick the Great; Napoleon and Frederick the Great as writers and orators; Napoleon and Frederick the Great and painting, architecture and music; Tears and invectives of Napoleon and of Frederick the Great; Napoleon and Goethe; Summary of the second half of the conversation concerning Napoleon and Goethe; Philosophy and the sword; Napoleon, Frederick II. and women; Napoleon's Prussian adherent and antagonist—Frederick William III; Queen Louise; Napoleon and Frederick the Great as legislators; Napoleon and Frederick as Caesars; Napoleon and Frederick the Great as suicides; The spirit-raising: Hebeel, Nietzsche. Spengler—life of the heroes after death; Nietzsche's "I want wars" and the justification of Goethe's Napoleonic enthusiasm; Napoleon, Beethoven and the Revolution; Plutarch—Cornelius—Schiller; English nationalism and the Catholic religion; Did the English or the Germans overthrow Napoleon?; Nietzsche, the prophet of superman, condemns Napoleon; The "epilepsy" of great exploits and its admirers; World-history comparisons; Corsica; Chance, destiny and public opinion; Ranke denies Napoleon's "conquering bestiality"; Meinecke and Nietzsche elucidate Ranke; Stresemann and Napoleon; Napoleon as a faustian apostle of storm and stress; The Lord's Prayer and Napoleon's battles; Europe's troubles solved by "greater Switzerland" and the war of the future; Napoleon during the battle of Leipzig, by an eye-witness; Tolstoy on Napoleon; Victor Hugo on "the opponents of the Emperor"; Toussaint L'Ouverture, called "the Napoleon of San Domingo"; Notes; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR J. C. MULLENIX

This book is very largely made up of descriptions or estimates of Napoleon made by a great many different people, among them being Byron, Goethe, Anatole France, Nietzsche, Muller, Hugo, Tolstoy, Ranke, and Stresemann. It describes, in the form of conversational dialogue between these people, Napoleon's opposition measures against divorce, his attitude toward civil marriage, his ideas on religion, and samples of his wit. It purports to show him in various roles; as a "man of granite," as a horseman, as a writer, as a peacemaker, etc. It compares Napoleon and Frederick the Great as military leaders, patrons of art and music, legislators, "Caesars," suicides, philanderers, etc., and gives Napoleon's comments on Frederick and his campaigns. It shows also the cruel side of Napoleon's character.

The book sets forth the hero worship as held by Goethe and Nietzsche for Napoleon.

So much has already been written of Napoleon that the reviewer believes this book to add little or nothing to the knowledge of him. The reviewer also believes that a more tiresome volume would be difficult to find.

Guedalla, Philip.—**Wellington.** 1931.....M 94606-E4-C.42-B92 (WE)

CONTENTS: Preface; The education of Arthur Wellesley; Sepoy General; Dublin Castle; Peninsular; 1815; Occupied territory; The Cabinet; Prime Minister; Rearguard action; Apotheosis; Authorities; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR R. C. STICKNEY

This book, which was placed by War Department Bulletin 44, August 24, 1928, in the reading course recommended for officers (Interval between Command and General Staff School and the Army War College) upon reports of the manuscript, has just come from the press. Mr. Guedalla, whose prior histories include "The Second Empire" and "Palmerston," states that since 1928 the writing of this book has extinguished all other interests (and almost all other occupations) for him.

It is an excellently written book of some five hundred pages with maps of India and "The Peninsula" inside the covers, and a photographic model of the battlefield of Waterloo on a large scale. Covering as it does the whole eighty-three years of Wellington's life in so small a volume, the campaigns and battles are necessarily covered very hastily. (Napier devotes six good-sized volumes to the Peninsular War.) It is believed that the book has great value as biography, and, so far as the campaigns and battles are concerned, as collateral reading.

The pages covering the campaigns and battles are easily read either with or without maps, and give the essence of the subject from Wellington's point of view.

The book is founded on the thirty-four volumes of Wellington's correspondence, supplemented by a mass of unpublished manuscript material including documents at Apsley House to which the author was given full access, and numerous journeys to the Peninsula.

Authorities, published and unpublished, on which the text is founded are fully cited at the end of the book, and referred to by over fifteen hundred marginal notes which, as the author states "provides the necessary aids to scholarship without defacing the narrative page with footnotes or interrupting sentences with small imprisoned numerals."

Bisbee, Brigadier General William Henry.—Through four American wars. The impressions and experiences of Brigadier General William Henry Bisbee as told to his grandson William Raymond Bisbee. 1931.....M 973-B92 (BI)

CONTENTS: Introduction; Highlights of a military career; Meeting the man; Completing a picture. The General's story: Preface; Early memories; A country boy plays; Striking out for myself; To the golden west; Across Indian trails; To Ohio from the Garden of the Gods; Lincoln—inspiration to all; The unexpected essence of all history; Field campaigns; Guerrilla nastiness; Battle of Stone River; Recuperation after the battle; The Tullahoma campaign—Hoovers Gap and home; Mustering duty and Faneuil Hall; The Atlanta campaign; Some personal observations; To the Indian country; Fort Phil Kearny massacre; A cheerless trip to Omaha; Staff life and "magic cities"; More Indians and sidelights; Early Army incidents; Riots, rattlesnakes and more Indians; Outings with General Crook; "Days of the Empire"; Two promotions and the Presidio; From the Golden Gate to Cuba; Spanish-American War incidents; Colonel of the "13th" in the Philippines; Promotion and retirement; Retrospection; L'Envoi.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR F. A. DONIAT

This book is a biography of Brigadier General William Henry Bisbee who entered the regular army of the United States as a private at the outbreak of the Civil War, and retired for age in 1902. It is partly written by the general and partly by his grandson.

The part of the work written by General Bisbee is an interesting narrative of a long and active life that took him to Colorado during the gold rush there in 1859, through the Civil War, Indian Wars, Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection. It was written when the general was 90 years old from memory only, as he kept no notes. He does not go into the tactics or strategy of any of the campaigns in which he participated; gives only anecdotes, experiences of camp life and personal contacts with people that he has known.

The part of the book written by his 30 year old grandson is blind hero worship, crude in its execution and a bit dull.

The book has no particular value to any section of this School, but that part written by the general, which is the major part, is entertaining reading to anyone fond of biography or of stories connected with the development of our country in the post Civil War days.

Falk, Edwin A.—Fighting Bob Evans. 1931.....M 973-B92 (EV)

CONTENTS: Underway; The brood; Fort Fisher; Legs and horizons; Charlotte Evans; Naval frontiers; Command; On the beach; "Fighting Bob"; Reading between the lines; Threshold seas; Pomp and diplomacy; Battleship No. 1; The "Untoward Incident"; War; Tidings from afar; Blind man's buff; "Incomprehensible"; Prelude; The battle of Santiago; Rear Admiral; Asiatic Fleet; Supremacy; The last cruise; Landlocked.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR A. VOLLMER

This book has many features to recommend it. It holds the reader's interest through all of its 451 pages. Perhaps its only strictly School interest lies in stress on the significance which certain naval operations have had in campaigns (Fort Fisher in the Civil War; Manila Bay and Santiago in the Spanish-American War). It has, however, another, if more elementary, educational value. It is one of those thoroughly human, lively, and inspiring accounts which are more suited to stimulate a military-naval historical reading interest than many of the dry titles offered in some reading lists.

Another feature is that the book portrays Fighting Bob Evans against the background of his times. One is given the contemporary scene in somewhat of the intimate manner of Mark Sullivan in "Our Times," and therein moves the picturesque figure of our naval hero. The effect is realistic. Especially lively and fascinating is the account of the battle of Santiago.

This biography has above all the merit of conveying to the reader the real personality of the man—the gruff, forceful, courageous, but withal compassionate, figure of "old Gimpy."

An excellent index of 40 pages completes the volume.

Hagedorn, Hermann.—**Leonard Wood**. A biography. In 2 volumes.

1931

M 973-B92 (WO)

CONTENTS: Vol. I: Prefatory note; Father and son (1860-1863); A Cape Cod boyhood (1863-1880); The making of a doctor (1880-1885); Chasing Geronimo (1885-1886); Catching Geronimo (1886); Growing years (1886-1890); The widening horizon (1890-1898); The Spanish War—Training the Rough Riders; The Spanish War—The Santiago campaign; Governor of Santiago City (1898); Military governor of Cuba—The first three months (1900); Military governor of Cuba—The second three months (1900); Military governor of Cuba—The second half year (1900); Military governor of Cuba—The Platt amendment (1901); Military governor of Cuba—The keeping of the promise (1902); Interlude; Appendix.

Vol. II: Governor of the Moro Province—The first half year (1903); Governor of the Moro Province—War and peace (1904); Governor of the Moro Province (1904-1906); The military administrator (1906-1910); Chief of Staff—The struggle for the future (1910-1912); Chief of Staff—Malice domestic and foreign levy (1912-1914); The fight for preparedness (1914-1915); The bitter years (1915-1916); The struggle with the administration (1916); First blood for politics (1917); The War—Training the 89th Division (1917); On the battlefield (1917-1918); The final battle with the administration (1918); The training of the 10th Division (1918); Reconstruction and politics (1919-1920); The Republican convention (1920); The mission to the Philippines (1921); Governor-General of the Philippines—The first year (1921-1922); Governor-General of the Philippines—Warfare (1922-1924); The last victory (1924-1927); Appendix; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR W. E. CHAMBERS

This is an excellent and authoritative biography which contains many lessons on leadership of value to the army officer. The two volumes of the book are rich in anecdotes that elucidate the character of Leonard Wood and throw many interesting sidelights on the leading figures of the army and public life of his time. The accounts of General Wood's experiences with Lawton in the Geronimo campaign, as Military Governor in Cuba, as Governor-General of the Philippines, and just prior to and during the World War are particularly interesting and instructive. A reading of the chapters on Wood as Governor-General of the Philippines will facilitate an understanding of the present day situation in the islands.

Wright, Edward Needles.—**Conscientious objectors in the Civil**

War. 1931

M 9737-C8-J5

CONTENTS: Introduction; The noncombatant religious sects of the Civil War; Struggle in the North for political recognition; Struggle in the South for political recognition; Attitude by the civil authorities toward conscientious objectors; Attitude of the military authorities toward conscientious objectors; Official attitude of the noncombatant sects; The Civil War and the World War—A comparison in conscientious objection; Bibliography; Index.

REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. S. PRATT

The book is a comprehensive and authentic account of the ever present and vexatious problem of the "conscientious objector" in war. The author discusses the origins of the various sects of objectors and their movements to and colonization in the United States; their Articles of Faith, memorials, development, persecutions, as well as the manner in which the Government endeavored to adjudicate the problem in the Civil and World Wars.

The term "conscientious objector," as applied by the author, is limited to persons of certain religious sects whose tenets or Articles of Faith oppose participation in all wars or warlike measures and to persons who, although unaffiliated with any religious denomination, were opposed to all wars on moral or other intellectual grounds. The term does not include those

persons who opposed the military measures of the North and of the South for political, or other reasons.

Most of the sects were relatively small in numbers but their opposition to military demands of all sorts were so persistent that the authorities were forced to listen to them, and, in some cases, to accede to their requests. The principal sects were the Society of Friends (Quakers, founded by the English Dissenter George Fox in the seventeenth century), the Mennonite Church (founded by the German Protestant Menno Simons in the sixteenth century), the Church of the German Baptist Brethren (Dunkers, founded by Alexander Mack in 1708), the United Society of Believers in Christ's Second Appearing (Shakers; communistic in its organization, and founded by the Englishwoman Ann Lee in the eighteenth century), the Community of True Inspiration (Amana Society, founded by the Germans Eberhard Ludwig Gruber, and Johann Friedrich Rork in the sixteenth century), the Schwenkfelder Church (founded by the German Casper Schwenkfeld in the sixteenth century), Christs Brethren (Christadelphians; founded in the nineteenth century by the English Protestant, John Thomas), and the Rogerims (founded in the seventeenth century by the non-conformist, John Rogers).

The author discusses the various governmental policies formulated from time to time for handling the problems of conscience, and the organizational means for putting these policies into effect. Authentic evidence is presented of persecutions and tribulations suffered by conscientious objectors at the hands of political and military personages, and the civil populace. Objectors received greater consideration from high political and military officials than from subordinate officers. War-time governmental officials were more lenient towards objectors than were the leaders of the Confederacy. The harshness of treatment accorded objectors seemed to vary with localities, and personalities in control. The principal difficulties encountered in adjudicating cases appeared to be due to two main causes; first, failure to possess an accurate knowledge of the tenets of the different sects, and second, lack of uniformity in the treatment of specific cases arising in different sections of the country.

An analysis of the subject matter contained in the book leads the reviewer to the following conclusions:

- a. The problem of the "conscientious objector" will always be present in any future emergency.
- b. A large percentage of alleged conscientious objectors are not bona fide adherents to the Articles of Faith they profess.
- c. That bona fide objectors are fanatics possessed of an abnormal psychological conception of life, its purposes and responsibilities.
- d. That bona fide objectors, proven so after careful, impartial, lawful investigation, should be accorded every consideration by governmental officials and the general public, and their tenets of life respected under the law of the land.
- e. That legislation should be prepared in time of peace for presentation to the law-making bodies in the event of war, setting forth policies for controlling the phenomenon, and legalizing procedure and agencies of execution.
- f. That the machinery for the execution of justice include within itself the means for assuring nation-wide uniformity of procedure, investigation, and determination of exemptions and classified penalties.
- g. That in the prosecution of justice, the executors of the law should be always on the alert to detect and punish severely subversion agents operating under the cover of conscience.

This book should be of particular interest to the Judge Advocate Sub-section of the Command and General Staff School.

Sauliol, Rene.—**Une autre guerre de nations. La guerre de secession.** [Another war of the nations. The War of Secession.] France, 1929 M 9737-E

CONTENTS: Avant-propos; Introduction; Premiere Partie (mai-fin juillet 1861): L'Impuissance des Armees improvisees; Deuxieme Partie (Fin juillet-mars 1864): Deux nations en armes; Troisieme Partie (mars 1864-avril 1865): Le commandement unique et la victoire du Nord; Annexes; Croquis.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR R. C. SMITH

If an American writer or one in England writes a book about the American Civil War it occasions no surprise. But when a Frenchman, a keen military student, publishes a comprehensive and detailed study of that conflict, some people may wonder why he selects such a subject when there is so recent a world war on the continent of Europe. M. Sauliol, the author, answers this query in his introduction. He says that the War of 1914-1918 presented certain interesting characteristics but that it did not cover the entire range of warfare. The more recent was a war between coalitions of nations; the American Civil War was truly a war between two nations. The War of 1914-1918 was fought largely between professional armies, in the beginning at least. He is not convinced that the situation of the Civil War will not reoccur if the pacifist visionaries succeed in too completely disarming the nations, a situation in which neither side is adequately prepared and which must be long drawn out while resources are being mobilized and armies are being trained. Hence he considers his subject worthy of current study.

He has based his study chiefly on the contemporary work of European observers: Count of Paris, Prince de Joinville, Ferdinand Lecomte, Scheibert, General de Chanal, E. Grasset, General de Trobriand, and others. He has used as his principal sources in English: Ropes, Steele, and the memoirs such as Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, etc.

The study is on rather broad lines and gives more attention to the political and strategical questions involved than to a study of tactics. It is interesting to have the detached viewpoint of an European on the causes of the war. "The Civil War was above all the consequence of an antagonism between types of society; it was secondarily the result of political and economic antagonism."

The study is divided into three principal parts: Part I (May-July 1861) The impotence of improvised armies. Part II (July 1861-March 1864) Two nations in arms—The North becomes organized in spite of its errors and defeats; the South wears itself down by its victories. Part III (March 1864-April 1865) Unity of command and victory for the North—The suffering of the South.

The book is of interest in any study of the strategy of the Civil War.

Hergesheimer, Joseph.—**Sheridan.** A military narrative. 1931 M 9737-E4-C.73-B92 (SH)

CONTENTS: Foreword; The mountains; The valley; The plain; Bibliography; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR H. L. TWADDLE

It is apparent that the author's primary object in presenting this book to the public is to picture the successes and failures of Major General Philip H. Sheridan in their true light.

The major portion of the book is devoted to detailed accounts of the operations in which Sheridan participated. The text is most uninteresting reading; there is page after page of the details of movements and actions of the forces engaged.

The work represents an immense amount of careful research, the value of much of which is lost due to the fact that the maps accompanying the text are exceedingly poor and of almost no value to the military reader in tracing the movement of troops.

A summation of the author's views of the accomplishments of Sheridan are contained in the following extracts:

* * * * *

"The Appomattox Campaign, the last period of the war, served as a field for General Sheridan's most brilliant accomplishment. He reached then, the highest point of his genius for cavalry operations. Sheridan had, once before, in the raid toward Richmond, shown his great ability with mounted troops; he had already begun his complete transformation of that arm of the service; now the establishment of cavalry as an independent force, the end of its futile subordination to infantry, Sheridan's true majority, rapidly became actualities. There was no fortuitous elements of luck, no mere good fortune, in General Sheridan's pursuit of Lee; it was the result of headlong determination, a persistence that overcame every obstacle. The reputation he acquired at Missionary Ridge was largely created by accident; Sheridan advanced with his troops up the Ridge; not because he saw the possibility of an immediate victory; not, even, on account of his unquestionable bravery; he went on because the position at its foot was impossible. A mistake of General Grant's resulted to his immeasurable credit.

"The additional renown, far surpassing the fame of his conduct at Chattanooga, brought to him the battle of Cedar Creek and his famous ride from Winchester, was, again, the result of chance, with the addition, the assistance, of his magnetic and resolute character. His personal and spectacular triumph against Jubal Early, it is plain, occurred because General Sheridan was inexcusably slow in rejoining his troops on the 19th of October, 1864. The enthusiasm created by a very different, a sentimental and inaccurate, string of verses seems to have blinded everyone to the fact that, probably delaying for the pleasures of the bottle at Martinsburg and Winchester, he left his army, faced by a reenforced and bitterly vigorous enemy, without its commander. His great and peculiar excellence has been, correspondingly, ignored in accounts founded on the very military qualities Sheridan most distrusted rather than upon his solid and undeniable virtue.

"That, except in the case of his successful Virginia raid, was not wholly the ability of a cavalry commander; it was, as well, the result of what he had learned in the Quartermaster's Department at the beginning of the Civil War. He was—an accomplishment of the first importance in war as well as peace—a splendid caterer for his soldiers. In the days of starvation when the Union army was shut up in Chattanooga, it will be recalled, his troops' and officers' tables were so well provided, by a small mounted force maintained in a cove of the Waldron Range, that Sheridan was able to send wild turkeys to the messes of other regiments. His camps, in addition, were well maintained; his troops always comfortable to the greatest degree that comfort was procurable. Here was the foundation of their regard for General Sheridan, it was the base of his purely individual triumph at Cedar Creek.

"It was recognized by everyone who served with him, of course, that Sheridan could and would fight; he fought at the proper moments with an utter, an apparently desperate courage. * * * But when in his estimation, the time was not right, he refused to fight at all. Nothing that might be possibly avoided could then make him join battle. His men knew that, too, and appreciated it: the troops engaged in many combats with high enthusiasm, but they did not regard a hopeless chance or useless deaths with enthusiasm. General Sheridan, like Sherman and Grant, was never reluctant to pay in human loss for useful victories; war with him was always practical, an end in which men were no more than material; but even that, because of his transparent honesty, was an addition, rather than a detractor, to the high regard in which he was held by the common soldier.

"General Sheridan had managed to retain, as well, his singular lack of self-seeking; he continued to submerge his own good, his advancement, in the cause of the Union and the accomplishment of its success. He did, however, naturally, develop the small traits of vanity inescapable to his age and position * * * (Sheridan held the rank of major general at thirty-three) * * *

" * * * General Sheridan was, in every instinct and ability, a soldier and commander; he was, from the beginning of his maturity to the end of the Civil War, identical in traits, in virtues and faults; but his native ability, founded upon a rigid and determined character, inevitably developed and improved. Yet he cannot be entirely explained by these solid and undeniable facts. He had the benefit, at crucial moments in his career, of extraordinary good fortune; but it cannot be said that his success rested upon that. The quality most apparent in Sheridan, after careful consideration, is genius, * * *

"General Sheridan, for example, made a number of expensive and, at times, obvious mistakes; the battle of Fisher's Hill was one; the point of his attack on Early at 4 P.M. in the long struggle of Cedar Creek, was, another. He was never, it is recognized, a brilliant tactician; he had, as he knew, a peculiar topographical ability; and that, especially in his last pursuit of Lee, was invaluable; but this was not enough to make him remarkable. He was, usually, a quiet man; when he was not in action he preferred a placid and easy-going company; Sheridan, then, was unimpressive. In battle he was totally different; combat had the effect of creating in him, as though he were a lamp, a strong light. He was, at once, capable of a passionate cursing and low-voiced impressive tranquillity of confidence. * * *

"He cannot be described in either the conventional terms of morals, popular spiritual values, or of exact psychology; his genius—an unsatisfactory word—continually defeats that. He was not defeated by his defects nor successful because of his virtues; he had some of the quality of George Washington's supremacy * * * What he was, intrinsically, was palapable to men, to soldiers, but beyond description. It could not be put into words. It did not matter, finally, that he did sleep at Martinsburg and Winchester instead of hurrying on, unimpeded by the fat Colonel Alexander, to his army; if he were drunk or sober is equally unimportant; he easily overcame mistaken actions and adverse conditions. It may be incorrect, an injustice, to refer, in his connection, to luck at all. General Sheridan, by the sheer force of his innate being, may have created the results attributed, by others, to fortunate circumstances."

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This book is of value to the research student of the Battle of Chattanooga; The Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864; and the Appomattox Campaign, with somewhat of the political situation at the time.

GENERAL

Somary, Dr. Felix.—**Changes in the structure of world economics since the war.** London, 1931.....330.904

CONTENTS: Preface; Introduction; Reorientation of the economic ideas of liberalism and socialism; The British Empire: The problem of the organisation of the British Empire; The transformation of the United States from a colonial power into a world power; England in relation to the United States; Europe in relation to the United States; Europe since the war; France and Germany; Pre-requisites for an economic union between France and Germany; Italy and the rest of Europe; Russia; Russia and Europe; The monopolistic movement and its effect; Wage differentiation and wage standardisation; The state and the various classes; The economic outlook of the individual and of the state; The decisive antitheses.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR K. F. BALDWIN

This book is an English translation of certain lectures given originally in German at the University of Heidelberg.

The author, a prominent continental banker, not only considers the economic conditions of the leading powers before and since the World War, but the relationship of the great powers and of Europe to the United States.

He stresses the passage of the age and ideas of liberalism and the rise of socialism. Speaking of socialism he says: "In the last fourteen years Socialism has arrived and against the sole defeat in Italy must be weighed the great measure of success obtained in all the other leading states." However, the author appears to be unbiased in his personal beliefs and sticks carefully to the logical conclusions of an economic expert.

The present financial leadership of the United States in the world and of France in Europe is stressed. Russia is shown as possessing many of the same natural advantages as the United States but is making extremely slow and sluggish economic progress. Switzerland, considering her population is in the best condition of any country in Europe. Economic decay begins east of Switzerland's Rhine frontier and Germany is in a sad plight. England is slow at readjustment but gradually recognizes the passage of financial power to the United States and adjusts her policies to favor the colonies.

The book is short—only 220 pages—and the reader can secure in a very short time, a good idea of the fundamental economic principles, amplified by cold facts, now at work in the world.

Crawford, Claude C. & Leitzell, Edna M.—**Learning a new language.**

1930 407

CONTENTS: Introduction; Preface; Aims and purposes of foreign language study; Thinking in the foreign language; Pronunciation; Vocabulary; Spelling; Listening to the spoken language; Speaking; Reading; Writing; Translation; Grammar; Special problems in the study of Latin; Language clubs and games; Index.

REVIEWED BY CAPTAIN E. H. ALMQUIST

This book, which has been prepared mainly for students of foreign languages, still should offer a great deal of assistance as a guide for foreign language teachers. The book does not outline any one particular way to study a new language, but presents several ways. The method to be adopted by the student to be dependent upon the results sought. For example, teaching requiring an all-round mastery of the language as compared to preparation for foreign travel, the methods to be used would naturally differ.

The authors stress the importance of the direct method, by which the language is learned by making a direct association in the mind between the foreign word and the idea it represents without resorting to an English word as a link between them. A basic element in the direct method is that of learning words in connection with objects to which they refer.

Under the chapter on "Pronunciation," methods are presented for acquiring the essentials of this phase of language study under three main headings: (1) Ability to give the appropriate sounds to the individual letters; (2) Ability to accent correctly the syllables which make up a word; (3) Ability to give the proper inflection or intonation to the words within a sentence or paragraph.

The chapter on "Vocabulary" discusses two principal ways of acquiring a working vocabulary. First, by the learning of words in their natural settings, such as reading, forming sentences, the use of pictures, etc.; second, by formal vocabulary drills and exercises, the study of derivatives, vocabulary notebooks, completion exercises, etc.

Spelling is treated under its chapter, in which a few of the major principles underlying the mastery of spelling of foreign words are discussed.

Under "Listening to the spoken language" the authors differentiate between the ability to understand a foreign language when spoken by an-

other person and the ability to read or speak it. A few of the principles treated are: listening for thought instead of words; listening to a variety of voices; listening for key words, etc. A number of types of listening exercises are given.

In the chapter on "Speaking," methods and suggestions are offered for the guidance of those who desire to acquire a speaking proficiency in foreign languages. Some of the methods discussed include: questions and answers as the basis for practice in speaking; dramatization; composition of original sentences; oral reading, etc.

Reading is treated under two main heads, namely, what to read, and how to read. Under the first, standards and types of reading matter to be desired in a program of reading are considered. Under "How to read," principles concerning the method of reading are discussed.

In a similar manner suggestions for acquiring proficiency in writing are discussed in the chapter on this phase of studying a new language.

Translation is treated under two main divisions: (1) Nature, values and limitations; and (2) Methods. This method of study is not without its drawbacks due to its tendency to obstruct the direct association between the foreign word and the idea, is sometimes lacking in accuracy, wastes time and is often dull and uninteresting.

The chapter on "Grammar" deals with some of the major considerations which enter into the study of grammar in connection with foreign languages.

Inasmuch as Latin is a difficult subject for the student due to its being so highly inflected, the authors present a chapter which considers the special chapters to the peculiar needs and purposes of the Latin student. The development of speaking ability in Latin is of questionable worth because there are so few to whom the language can be spoken, and therefore speaking skill is more or less unnecessary. The Latin student is more concerned with being able to read than to speak it.

In the final chapter under "Language Clubs and Games" it is shown how the study of foreign languages can be carried on outside the classroom in the form of recreation by such activities as clubs and games. Several types of club activities and games are presented.

Each of the thirteen chapters is followed by a list of questions and exercises based on the subject matter contained therein, and also a very complete list of selected references.

This book is of interest to all students of foreign languages.

Fenneman, Nevin M.—**Physiography of western United States.**

1931.

551.40987

CONTENTS: Preface; List of maps for reference; Great Plains province; Southern Rocky Mountain province; Wyoming basin; Middle Rocky Mountain province; Northern Rocky Mountain province; The Columbia plateau; Colorado plateau province; Basin and range province; Sierra Cascade province; Pacific border province; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR E. S. JOHNSTON

Professor Fenneman, distinguished geologist of the University of Cincinnati, was the first of his craft to publish a scheme of subdivision of the continental United States, based on the essential character of the terrain. His classification by provinces and sections has been adopted by the various professional societies and governmental agencies, and so may be considered standard.

This book describes the superficial character of that portion of the country west of the Mississippi; a map is included showing the author's scheme of subdivision of the entire country.

The description, accompanied by numerous sketches, relates to what we would regard as that phase of military geography known as physical geography; the other phases are touched on only incidentally, and no effort is made to make them complete. A working knowledge of geology is necessary for complete comprehension of the author's explanations, but

is not essential to a fair understanding of the nature of the terrain described. The book is of special interest and value to the G-2 Section of this School, in connection with the course in military geography.

Bülow, Prince von.—**Memoirs of Prince von Bulow**. Vol. I: From Secretary of State to Imperial Chancellor, 1897-1903. (Translation from the German by F. A. Voigt). 1931.....943-B92 (BU)

CONTENTS: Editor's preface; German publisher's preface; Index.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR S. C. GODFREY

Not since the publication of Bismarck's "Reflections and Reminiscences" a generation ago, it is said, have any memoirs stirred up such a storm in Germany as those of Prince von Bülow, now published posthumously. It was the Prince's misfortune, after being dropped by the Kaiser as Chancellor in 1909, to sit with folded arms and see his country crushed and humiliated, his own great talents unused. Naturally his story is told not without bitterness and invective. Written largely in the anecdotic style, it is concerned chiefly with the personalities of his wide acquaintance.

For the military student, interest centers in the intimate glimpses disclosed of the actors who were to play leading roles in the World War, the Kaiser, von Moltke, von Tirpitz, Bethmann-Hollweg. One feels that the author possessed unusual insight into the character of the Kaiser, a man of charm, but with the neurasthenic's instability; who did not want a war; who could term himself "Admiral of the Atlantic" and in a public speech compare the Germans to Huns, and yet earn the sobriquet of "William the Timid"; above all a consummate play-actor who failed to face realities. von Moltke's remark on hearing of England's entry into the war is cited as typical of the German failure to appreciate British military strength: "Thank God! I would rather have the English army in front of me, so that I can defeat it, than have England observe malevolent neutrality out of my reach." Admiral von Tirpitz "will live in German history" as the able organizer of the German navy. But Bethmann-Hollweg and the Foreign Office of 1914 personify for the author an incubator in which all the evil eggs, the diplomatic blunders of 1914, were hatched.

It may be surprising to American readers to learn not only that the Kaiser and the majority of Germans were sympathetic to Spain in 1898, but also that they expected the Spanish navy to vanquish that of the United States.

This volume covers particularly the period 1857-1903. The complete text includes five other volumes.

Bülow, Prince von.—**Memoirs of Prince von Bulow**. Vol. II: From the Morocco crisis to resignation, 1903-1909. (Translation from the German by Geoffrey Dunlop). 1931.....943-B92 (BU)

REVIEWED BY MAJOR S. C. GODFREY

In reading the second volume of these interesting, yet at times dull, memoirs, one is impressed by the author's colossal conceit. He would paint himself as a second Bismarck, with the Kaiser, Germany, all Europe as mere background. Bülow claims he is writing as though he were under oath, yet his account of the Morocco crisis, for example, is far from the whole truth. He vaunts his diplomatic triumph in overthrowing Delcassé and causing the Algeiras conference. But at that conference Germany was isolated with Austria, while the Entente was greatly and significantly strengthened at the expense of German prestige.

It is also hard to believe (in view of what we know about the "Schlieffen plan") that Bülow tells the "whole truth" about the German plan to invade Belgium. While he describes a characteristically indiscreet statement

by the Kaiser to the King of Belgium on that subject, and tells of conversations with Schlieffen, he states his own conviction as to the unwisdom of violating Belgium's neutrality, and gives the impression of believing that German plans at that time did not contemplate entering Belgium when and until France and England had done so.

When Count Schlieffen retired as Chief of Staff in 1905, General von Moltke, selected as his successor, begged the Chancellor to use all his influence to have his appointment cancelled. He expressed his own inadequacy to v. Bülow in these words, significant in the light of later events: "I lack the power of rapid decision; I am too reflective, too scrupulous, or if you like, conscientious for such a post. I lack the capacity for risking all on a single throw, that capacity which made the greatness of such born commanders as Napoleon, our own Frederick II, or my uncle."

Bülow's concern about the world situations in 1906 caused him to break his "general rule of never disturbing the work of soldiers." He wrote to the Minister of War asking some searching questions about preparedness. His own opinion of the German Army is given as follows: "I could not avoid the impression that the importance of technical training was underestimated. . . . In no other army did so fine a feeling of comradeship exist as in the German. But in many cases it was hidebound; a number of officers considered the cavalry the only thing that mattered, the one branch of the service fit for a gentleman, the infantry a useful decisive weapon, the artillery nowhere at all, in spite of the fact that Napoleon had begun with it."

Perhaps the chief interest of this volume, as of the first, is the picture it gives of the Kaiser. There are not lacking traces of real, if often irritated, affection felt for his sovereign, as well as a deep-seated loyalty. But with maturing years William II is made to appear increasingly puerile, as "infant terrible" more and more incorrigible. "His boastfulness, his intellectual extravagance, his incoherent disregard of facts" led to one annoying outbreak after another. It was natural, almost inevitable, that Bülow, striving to offset the ill effects of these indiscretions, should eventually incur his sovereign's displeasure and be forced to retire. This the Chancellor did with great dignity. Reading the whole amazing record—the clinical record, as it were—it is not to be wondered at that the patient (if reports be true) wept as he read it himself at Doorn!

Chamberlin, William Henry.—**The Soviet planned economic order.**

1931.....947.09

CONTENTS: Introduction; The Soviet state economic planning: Origin and backgrounds; The five-year plan in execution; The remolding of Russian agriculture; Planned economic life; Results and prospects; Appendices: Documents relating to the Five-Year Plan.

REVIEWED BY MAJOR A. VOLLMER

An elementary account of the Five Year Plan by the correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, a journalist of many years experience in Russia, able to speak from direct study of its effects.

He gives full credit to the Bolsheviks for introducing the idea of such consistent planning in time of peace as all the powers had to adopt, more or less, during the World War. He is impartial in assessing the good and bad results of the Bolshevik methods, but believes that we are too close to the plan to judge its true significance. He is sure, however, that Russia will never revert to capitalism.

He stresses the basic importance of agriculture. The test of the system he sees in the attitude of the people, especially the peasants, in their ability and will to learn new techniques, and keep the pace and endure the strain imposed by the masters of the Soviet order. While the plan has succeeded in collectivizing a quarter of the peasant farms and increasing the output of its industries at the rate of 25 per cent, it has deteriorated

the living standards and failed to bring about qualitative improvements in industry.

An earlier book (September 1929) by the same author, "Soviet Russia: A Living Record and a History," affords a more extensive treatment of the political, social, and economic background. Also, in connection with the book under review, there may be mentioned "The Planned Economy of Soviet Russia" by A. Ford Hinrichs and William Adams Brown in the Political Science Quarterly for September 1931 (Vol. XLVI, No. 3, page 362) inasmuch as it comprises another late account of the basic economics. Not to go farther afield into the history and biography of the Soviets; "Humanity Uprooted," by Maurice Hindus (1929) is a very readable account of social conditions; "The Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union: A Political Interpretation," by a proponent, G. T. Grinko, Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., constitutes a basic source book on this subject matter; "The Soviet Challenge to America" by George S. Counts (1931) is a clear, lively, and systematic account of the plan; and "Russia Today and Yesterday," by Dr. E. J. Dillon (1930) is a personal and fascinating recital by a highly qualified observer of the social conditions as he found them on revisiting Russia in 1928. (For other material on Russia see class number 947, and 330.947 both on second floor of Stack Room as well as on separate book case of reading room, C. & G.S.S. Library. Also see title "Russia" for periodical articles in RCMW. Further bibliography of material not on hand can be supplied by reviewer in Library Office.) The War Department Intelligence Summary for October 9, 1931, page 13510 covers the collectivization movement, available in Library Office to officers of the U.S. Services.

The significance of the Russian social and economic experiment as presented by the book under review and other literature thereon becomes increasingly apparent as time goes on. With Germany in her recent announcements of policy, going in for national economic planning, with Newton D. Baker giving extensive consideration thereto in a recent article in the American Magazine as a possibility for the United States, and in view of the recurrences of economic depression the matter merits attention. Beyond this economic phenomenon Russia is pregnant with possibilities for unprecedented social and political changes in the rest of the world through peaceful processes, and as an incubator for future conflict her conditions are likewise excellent. For the latter reason, if none other, she bespeaks the attention of the military student, and literature like this book under review merits the attention of this School. Without becoming an alarmist it is submitted that nowhere else are the conditions for bringing about international conflict so completely present and this in the face of troubles elsewhere in Asia and threats in Europe. In Russia there is motive, intent, political creed, and sufficient capacity. The investigator quickly passes from an attitude of disregard to one of academic interest and finally to one of concern. He emerges with the conviction that this area should be given greater attention in military planning and preparedness than any other.

In the words of Dr. E. J. Dillon, "Bolshevism is no ordinary historic event. It is one of the vast world-cathartic agencies, to which we sometimes give the name of Fate, which appear at long intervals to consume the human tares and clear the ground for a new order of men and things. The Hebrews under Moses and Joshua, the Huns under Attila, the Mongols under Djinghis Khan, and the Bolsheviks under Lenin are all tarred with the same transcendental brush."

